Book. Hh 13

THE INSTITUTION OF A PRINCE.

OR, A TREATISE OF THE Virtues and Duties of a SOVEREIGN.

Tranſlated from the French *of the Abbe* DUGUET.

VOL. I.

LONDON:
Printed for R. DODSLEY, at *Tully*'s Head in *Pall-Mall*. MDCCXL.

A

LETTER

TO THE

PUBLISHER, &c.

SIR,

THE Publick, I think, is obliged to you for this Tranſlation. The Part you give us in *Engliſh* is richly repleniſhed with noble Sentiments and uſeful Inſtructions, not to Princes only, but to all Men in general, and to young Gentlemen of Birth and Fortune in particular.

As for the other Part, *concerning the Duties of a Chriſtian Prince, with regard to his People, conſidered as a Chriſtian Society*, &c. it relates only to a *Roman Catholick* Prince and State; and therefore I am of your Opinion, that it would have found few Readers among us, and could have been but of little uſe to any *Engliſh* Reader. The Tranſlator, I think, hath done Juſtice to the excellent Original, having no where, as far as I am capable of judging, miſtaken the Senſe, and having conformed as much as was requiſite, if not as much as was poſſible, to his Author's manner of writing. I have taken notice of a few Errors of the Preſs, which you may place at the End, if you think proper.

BRUTUS, it is ſaid, never read a Book but to better his Heart, that is, to inſtruct him in the Knowledge of Mankind, and the Duties and Rights of Man, and to ſtrengthen his Virtue and public Spirit. And this Treatiſe will have that Effect upon every attentive Reader. In it the natural Rights of Mankind, the true Grandeur, and Happineſs of Society, the Duties of Magiſtrates and Subjects, are ſet forth in the moſt perſpicuous and moving Manner; with the greateſt Force of Reaſon, and the moſt warming Zeal. It was wrote for the Uſe of a young Prince born to deſpotick Sovereignty; and yet ſpeaks to him

him with a Freedom and Boldneſs, that is become very uncommon in Countries, where the Sovereignty is happily limited by Laws. And who can read ſuch a bold and honeſt Addreſs to an abſolute Prince, about the Duties of Kings, the natural, unalienable Rights of Mankind, and the inexpiable Guilt of abuſing Power, even tho' it be not bounded by Laws and Compacts, without being filled with juſt Indignation againſt all who ſpeak or write in a free Government with one Grain of ſervile Adulation; and much more againſt thoſe who employ their Skill in Sophiſtry, to give an Appearance of Virtue to that blind, implicite Submiſſion to Governors, which, with whatever ſpecious Name it may be coloured over, is indeed giving up a Right, which if we do not actually exerciſe, we are not actually free! When it is wholly out of our power to exert that Right, then are we thorough Slaves: and we cannot preſerve it otherwiſe than by the uninterrupted, vigilant, I had almoſt ſaid, jealous Exerciſe of it.

I HAVE been tempted, ſince I read this honeſt Advice to an abſolute Prince, to compare it with the Language of ſome late Writers amongſt us, who diſcourſe of publick Affairs in a manner that implies ſuch an Opinion of the Weakneſs or Corruptneſs of thoſe in the Adminiſtration, and of the Weakneſs or Corruptneſs of the Nation, that were it

not the higheſt Injury to both, our Situation would indeed be almoſt remedileſs. For their Language to the Publick, ſhews plainly they think it acceptable to thoſe in Power, to ſay the People are ſeditious, when they enquire into the Reaſon and Tendency of their Reſolutions and Meaſures; and that this ſlaviſh Notion is become already ſo prevalent among us, that there is no need of gilding it to make it go down.

In former times, it was thought neceſſary to pervert Scripture, and take many other ſophiſtical Methods in order to make a People born free believe it was unlawful to reſiſt Encroachments on their Liberties. But now it ſeems it is enough to tell us roundly and plainly, without diſguiſing the Matter, that to enquire and look about us, that we may ſee whether all is ſafe or not, is ſeditious Diffidence. And yet ſure, if to keep a watchful Eye upon our beſt Treaſure, be Diſreſpect to Authority, Reſiſtance muſt be highly criminal: we can have no Right to defend what we have no Right to guard. And can we watch with our Eyes ſhut?

But whoever may be ſo fooliſh as to dream of making their Court to an Adminiſtration, by a Language ſo diametrically oppoſite to our excellent Conſtitution, I am as ſure, that they muſt be hated and deſpiſed by thoſe

thoſe to whom they pay ſo bad a Compliment, as I am ſure that we are abſolutely ſafe; and that we cannot poſſibly offend good Rulers, by our moſt zealous Concern about the Intereſts with the Care of which we have entruſted them.

NO Perſon who is acquainted with the Diſputes that have lately happened in *France* and ſtill ſubſiſt between that abſolute Monarch and the Parliament of *Paris*, will be at a loſs to find out why this Book was prohibited there, if he looks into what the Author ſays of Parliaments in the Second Part, Chapter VII.

THE *Engliſh* Reader will make Allowances for the Author's Ways of ſpeaking about the Origin of Sovereignty, and a Right Divine in Kings. He goes upon a Principle he durſt not diſpute; and, taking it for granted, ſhews, that not employing Power for Publick Good, muſt be the blackeſt of Crimes in the ſight of God, who cannot be ſuppoſed, without Blaſphemy, to have delegated Power for any other Reaſon or End, but for the Encouragement of all the publick and private Virtues, and for the Diſcouragement of Vice; and to diffuſe Happineſs amongſt Subjects as univerſally as may be. There is no occaſion to tell a *Briton* upon what Foundation our preſent very happy Eſtabliſhment ſtands; and

and that the Rights of the People, and thoſe of our Rulers, are ſecured by one and the ſame Charter; the only Charter for Sovereignty God can approve, if Morality and the Law of Nature be not empty Words. Yet I cannot chooſe but add a very few plain things upon this Subject, which none in the Author's Country dare ſpeak out, whatever he may think. For to think freely, and to declare our Sentiments as freely, is a Part of the glorious Right and Treaſure which the Diviſion of Power and other Orders in our Conſtitution are deſigned and adapted to preſerve. And as while we know the Value of the Treaſure, and daily enjoy the Pleaſures and Advantages of it, we will take care of its Fortifications and Bulwarks, and keep a watchful Eye upon them; ſo our high Reliſh for the Treaſure will grow in proportion to our Watchfulneſs over the complicated Fences by which alone it can be preſerved. When a Conſtitution is free and well pois'd, the only Danger is from the People's being lulled aſleep by Eaſe and Security; from their loſing a lively Senſe of the Worth of Liberty, in conſequence of the Propenſity and Affluence which it produces, as high Health makes one forget the Value of it.

Our Author ſpeaks of an inalienable, divine Right in Kings: but Right to govern cannot be called divine but in one or other of theſe

theſe two Senſes: Either becauſe the Commiſſion is immediately given by God in a ſpecial, extraordinary Manner. Or, becauſe it may be inferred from evident Principles of Reaſon, to be agreeable to the Divine Will, that one ſo and ſo qualified, and ſo and ſo inſtituted, ſhould govern. There remains no other Senſe in which Magiſtrates can be ſaid to be of God, except that, in which the worſt of Beings, and their moſt miſchievous and flagitious Actions are of him; *i. e.* permitted by him. Now a Commiſſion immediately given by God to any Perſon to rule over others, can only be proved by Miracles. The very ſame Arguments which demonſtrate that a divine Commiſſion to teach muſt be aſcertained by Miracles, and cannot be aſcertained any other way, do more ſtrongly evince, that there is no other way of documenting or aſcertaining a Divine Right to rule. And as it is acknowledged that no Miracles can prove a Divine Commiſſion to teach Doctrines contrary to Reaſon, or the Law of Nature, founded upon the eſſential and immutable moral Differences of Objects and Actions. —— So, *a fortiori*, no Miracles can prove a Divine Commiſſion or Right to ſuch Rule and Command over Men, as is contrary to the Law of Nature, God's univerſal and unalterable Law. But ſo far is it from being true that abſolute Power, or Power to rule without Controul,

is

is conſiſtent with Reaſon, and the Law of Nature, that, on the contrary, ſuch Power is directly repugnant to Reaſon and the Law of Nature; and conſequently it is Power of ſuch a kind, as cannot be agreeable to the Will of God; cannot be given by him; cannot be proved even by Miracles to be approved by him. God permitted the *Jews* to have abſolute Kings, becauſe they would have them: he did not give his Aſſent or Approbation to it: He permitted it in his Wrath againſt their Folly and Wickedneſs.——And what the Conſequences were, we may ſee in their Hiſtory. But it is not my Buſineſs here to enter into an Examination of Revelation on this head. We need not conſult it here; the Caſe is evident:

Scimus, & hoc nobis non altius inſeret Ammon.

Power not ſo ballanced by Diviſion, and ſo circumſcribed by Laws, that there is the greateſt Security human Affairs admit of, for its not being abuſed to the Deſtruction of the very End of Government, is contrary to the Law of Nature, which is the unchangeable approving Will of God, clearly pointed out to us by the natural Relations of things; becauſe, by (willingly) conſenting or ſubmitting to ſuch Power, Men riſk their beſt Intereſts, nay all their Intereſts, on the moſt

moſt precarious Bottom. But if that be not repugnant to Reaſon, and the Law of Nature, it is impoſſible to prove expoſing our Members, nay our Life it ſelf in the moſt dangerous manner, to be a Crime; or any thing indeed to be a Sin, either againſt Self-Preſervation or Society. Some have ſaid, that any Form of Government is good if it be well adminiſtred: but no Form of Government can be good, or agreeable to Reaſon and the Law of Nature, but in proportion as it has well ſecured it ſelf by wholeſome Reſtraints and Proviſions againſt the Danger of a bad Adminiſtration; —— becauſe no other Form is a proper Security for the ſole lawful End of Government. Now if this be true, it muſt likewiſe be ſo, that a People is obliged by the Law of Nature, which is the Will of God, to maintain all their Rights as Men, as Beings endued with all the rational Capacities and Powers which conſtitute them Men, and make them capable of high Attainments in moral Happineſs; obliged to maintain and preſerve all theſe invaluable Rights ſacred, and to tranſmit them unviolated to Poſterity. If Self-Preſervation, which ſurely muſt be underſtood to comprehend more in its Meaning than barely the Preſervation of Animal Life, be a moral Obligation; or if there be any Obligation to Society, to Poſterity, that Concluſion muſt hold good. It is therefore in every ſenſe a moral,

moral, and conſequently an indiſpenſible Obligation to preſerve, ſecure and maintain our Rights as Men. But there is but one way, after having made a good Conſtitution of Government, to do ſo, which is to guard that Conſtitution with watchful Diligence, that it be not impaired, maimed, or corrupted in the ſmalleſt Degree. For no Building depends more upon the Integrity of all the Parts, and their cloſe Coheſion, than a well-conſtituted civil Government does upon the equal Balance of Power, and the ſteady, uniform Operation of all the various Orders which compoſe it; rendering it not merely the moſt fair and goodly Object to behold, but likewiſe a convenient and pleaſant, and withall a ſecure Habitation for Men: Men born to enjoy all the Happineſs which well cultivated Reaſon, ingenious Induſtry, and firm Benevolence can procure to them: Men born for ſocial Happineſs, and therefore for uniting together, in the propereſt manner, for promoting their beſt common Intereſts. To ſuppoſe Men made by their Creator for any other end is Impiety.

He muſt therefore diſapprove every Form of Government, which is contrary to publick Happineſs; and he can only approve Governments in proportion as they are adapted to anſwer that End; and he muſt will that

Slaves

Slaves ſhould take all proper Methods to make themſelves free and happy; and that a free and happy People ſhould zealouſly and jealouſly watch, in order to preſerve their Liberty and Happineſs.

I am,

SIR, &c.

THE

THE PREFACE Of the FRENCH PUBLISHER.

THIS Work I have the Honour to publiſh, was wrote by the famous Mr. *Abbe Duguet*, already ſo well known to the Publick by all his Performances. I have been ſo happy as to meet with a Copy I have Reaſon to think is correct;

and I don't know that ever it was printed before; an Impreſſion of it indeed was begun in *Savoy*, in the Town of *Annecy*, in the Year 1733; but the Author, who was then alive, whoſe Humility and avoiding of Praiſe made him deſire that his Works ſhould not be printed, at leaſt, in his own Lifetime, found out a Way to ſuppreſs the Impreſſion of this Work, tho' it was expected with great Fondneſs, by all who were inform'd of it. I believe I do a great Service, when I inform the Publick what engaged Mr, *Duguet* to compoſe this Treatiſe; and for this Reaſon I have made as narrow an Enquiry into it as poſſible, and what I or my Friends could diſcover amounts to this.

Victor-Amedeus Duke of *Savoy*, ſince King of *Sardinia*, eſtabliſhed in his Dominions an ancient religious Houſe upon the ſame Regulations with that of *la Trappe*, in a Place call'd *Jamiers*, near the City of *Annecy*. He applied to the Abbot *de la Trappe*, for one of his Monks to govern that Houſe in Quality of Abbot. Abbot *de la Trappe* ſent him *P. Arſene* of *Paraſa*, the Brother of a Counſellor to the Parliament of *Toulouſe*, and a Native of that City. The Duke of *Savoy* put a very high Degree of Truſt and Confidence in this new Abbot: He went often to that Houſe, and made long Stays in it, during

during that Time he was inſtructing himſelf in his Duty, and how to fulfil it, about this he often conſulted the Abbot, and particularly about the Education of the Prince of *Piemont*, his Son, the eldeſt Brother of the preſent King of *Sardinia*, whom the Duke of *Savoy* look'd upon as one that would reign in *Spain*, and whom he was inclin'd to inſtruct in all the Obligations of a Prince deſtin'd to govern the People of ſo great a Monarchy. The Abbot *de Jamiers* was the Friend of Mr. *Duguet*; he was perfectly well acquainted with his Merit and great Endowments of Mind.

His own Humility perſuaded him that his Friend would anſwer much better than he could, the Wiſhes of the Duke of *Savoy*, with regard to the Education of the Prince of *Piedmont*; but uncertain if Mr. *Duguet* would grant what he deſign'd to ask of him, he reſolved to write him a Letter, without mentioning it to the Prince, begging him to compoſe a Treatiſe upon the Education of a great Prince for the Uſe of the Prince of *Piedmont*; not by inſtructing him from the Cradle, but ſuppoſing him already of Age to govern, as in reality the Prince was. Mr. *Duguet* at firſt refuſed, but at laſt complied; but upon Condition none ſhould know he was the Author of that Work: and that the Abbot *de Jamiers* would preſent it in his own Name.

The Abbot would not conſent to this, but he promiſed Mr. *Duguet*, not to name him, and to content himſelf with ſaying it was compoſed by one of his Friends : Upon Condition that Mr. *Duguet* would draw up the Letter that the Abbot *de Jamiers* ſhould ſend to the Duke of *Savoy* along with the Work. Mr. *Duguet* conſented upon theſe Terms, and wrote this Treatiſe, which I now preſent to the Publick ; he gave it the Title of the *Inſtitution of a Prince* ; and I don't think I ought to change the Title. As I have the Happineſs of having a Copy of the Letter that Mr. *Duguet* wrote under the Name of the Abbot *de Jamiers*, to the Duke of *Savoy*, as alſo a Copy of the Letter he wrote under the ſame Name to the Prince of *Piedmont* his Son, I believe the Publick will be pleas'd that I have added them here.

TO

TO THE
DUKE of *SAVOY.*

" SIRE,

" THERE is nothing inſpires with
" greater Boldneſs than Gratitude,
" and I find it is difficult to confine it with-
" in the narrow Bounds of Reſpect, when
" it is perfect and ſincere. If I had been
" under leſs Obligations to your Royal
" Highneſs, I would have continued in Si-
" lence; but all Reſtraint is uneaſy to my
" Mind, and I have occaſion for greater
" Freedom than Complaiſance allows. It
" ought to be allow'd me to give after ha-
" ving received ſo many Favours; for
" without this the Weight of them would
" prove too heavy: But what I give is
" none of mine, I am only he Conveyer.
" I have engaged a Friend who has a

" Senſe of the Favours you have beſtow'd " on me, to write on a Subject in which " you have the higheſt Concern, and his " Work is the Preſent I ſend you.

" He has been inform'd of the great Qua- " lities of the Prince of *Piedmont*, the care " you have taken to render them perfect, " and the ſerious Application you beſtow " upon his Education. He reverences as " well as I the Deſigns of Providence with " regard to a Prince evidently deſtin'd for " a great Empire, and upon whom the " Happineſs of a numerous People will " depend; and he would reckon it a great " Happineſs, if the Reflections I have the " Honour to preſent to you could contri- " bute to ſo important and general a " Good.

" I wait your Judgment of this Work " to regulate mine; you ſhall ſet the Value " upon it. I can however aſſure your " Royal Highneſs, that the ſole Care of " the Author has been to diſcover Truth, " and to tell it without making it loſe its " Strength.

" He knows you love Truth, and that " the only Way to pleaſe you is to pre- " ſerve all it's Dignity and Force; he " thinks he would have failed in that re-

" ſpect

" ſpect that is due to you, had he made uſe
" of any Reſerve, which is only neceſſary
" when Truth dare not ſhow it ſelf, without
" the Attendance of Flattery. The Author
" alſo promiſes the Proofs of || Religion;
" but that Deſign may make a whole Work
" by it ſelf; and if you deſire it ſhould be
" executed, I am not afraid to anſwer
" for the Obedience of the Author. This
" Work that I have the Honour to preſent
" to your Royal Highneſs may ſurprize you
" at firſt by its Length; but the Subject
" is of infinite Moment, and it cannot be
" well treated of without going to the bot-
" tom of it; which neceſſarily requires Ex-
" actneſs and great Extent.

" It is eaſy to point out in a general and
" ſuperficial Manner, the Duties of a
" Prince, and to ſhow him what he ought
" to be, without giving Rules to arrive at
" his Duty: But detach'd Maxims have on-
" ly a tranſient Effect. An Author ought
" to convince the Mind, remove all Objec-
" tions, make the Subject eaſy by entering
" into a Detail, which can be of no Uſe
" without Perſpicuity, nor perſpicuous if it
" is not a little extended. Your Royal
" Highneſs knows better than I, that a
" Work is ſhort when nothing is ſaid but
" what is neceſſary; it belongs to you to
" judge if the Author ever departs from his

|| This Work is Printed at *Paris*, under the Title of, *The Principles of the Chriſtian Faith.*

" ject or loſes Sight of it; whether his Re-
" flections are ſolid, or ill founded and ob-
" ſcure.

" I ſhall be a little humbled if your
" Royal Highneſs deſpiſes them, but I hope
" you will excuſe my Zeal, and not con-
" demn my Intention, tho' you ſhould con-
" demn the Work.

" If on the contrary, you approve of
" this Work, I ſhall feel a ſenſible Pleaſure
" in having preſented to you a Work wor-
" thy of Eſteem, and which may deſerve
" that of the Prince of *Piedmont*; and al-
" ſo of being able, tho' by the Aſſiſtance of
" another, to give a real Proof of my lively
" Gratitude, and with what profound
" Reſpect, I am

M. S.

Your Royal Highneſs's

moſt humble and moſt

obedient Servant,

F. ARSENE *of* Paraſia,

Abbot of Jamiers.

TO

TO

M. S.

The Prince of *PIEMONT.*

" IT has been with great Diffidence that I
" made bold to preſent to your Father
" a Work undertaken for your Royal High-
" neſs; but if he conſent to its being alſo
" preſented to you, I will then begin to e-
" ſteem it. I have had no other ſhare in it
" but in forming the Deſign, and prevailing
" upon one full of Veneration to you, to
" execute it. I hope you will ſee nothing
" in it that is not agreeable to the great
" Views and noble Diſpoſitions God has in-
" ſpired into your Mind, and that you will
" feel your Sentiments and Diſpoſitions cor-
" reſpond to thoſe Duties pointed out to
" you in that Work. The high Education
" that has been given you, the Example of
" your Father, added to his Counſels, have
" already prevented the Reflexions which I
" offer you: but the moſt knowing Princes
" are alſo the moſt docil; and the leſs Occa-
" ſion

" ſion they have for Inſtruction, the more
" fond they are of it."

" THE Author has had no View but to
" ſatisfy this noble Duty, and he has made
" uſe of no Veil to conceal the Truth from
" your Royal Highneſs. He knows that
" you are able to bear all its Splendor ; and
" as you don't incline to have any thing con-
" ceal'd from you, he has taken care to tell
" all the Truth. If he had thought you leſs
" perfect, he might have flatter'd your
" Weakneſs ; but he has been ſenſible that
" your excellent Diſpoſitions of Mind ſet him
" at liberty, and that he can ſay nothing
" that will aſtoniſh you, if he keeps ſtrictly
" to the Truth. He hopes, with many o-
" thers, that you will govern great Domi-
" nions, and that God will make uſe of you
" to make Juſtice reign and flouriſh in them:
" and this new Reaſon makes him more live-
" ly intereſted in every thing that may con-
" tribute to the Happineſs of the People, and
" your Glory."

" I, WHO live conceal'd in Solitude, em-
" ploy my Mind chiefly with the Hopes of
" ſeeing Piety flouriſh by your Protection and
" Example, and of ſeeing the Diſcipline of
" Monaſteries re-eſtabliſh'd, which will be-
" come under your Reign ſafe and peaceable
" Azylums, which will be fill'd with faithful

" Servants

" Servants of *Jeſus Chriſt*, attentive to " Prayer, detach'd from the Cares of the " World, and worthy of being heard by " Princes, whoſe Condition expoſes them " to great Dangers, to deliver others from " them."

" My Brethren and I dare not entertain " that Opinion of our Prayers: but we are " always addreſſing our Prayers to Heaven, " to bring down continual Bleſſings upon " your Royal Highneſs; and it is only in " this Way that I can teſtify the perfect Sub- " miſſion and profound Reſpect with which " I am,

M. S.

Your Royal Highneſs's

moſt humble and moſt

obedient Servant,

F. Arsene *of* Paraſſa,

Abbot of Jamiers.

The Duke of *Savoy* receiv'd this Work with great Joy; he read it with great Satiſfaction, and was deſirous to know the Author: but the Abbot of *Jamiers* was faithful to his Friend, and conſtantly refus'd to name him. And tho' afterwards Mr. *Duguet* had the Honour

Honour of ſeeing that Prince, who gave him great Marks of his Confidence in the Stay he made at *Jamiers*, in 1715, during which Year the Duke of *Savoy* made many Journeys there, where he ſaw him, diſcourſed with him, and conſulted him in many things; yet he never inform'd him he was the Author of that Work. The Publick does not expect of me, that I ſhould make an Analyſis of this excellent Work: it would leſſen it to add to it the Work of any other, and it does not require any Explication. It is compos'd with all that Accuracy and Order of which Mr. *Duguet* was very capable; and this, in my Opinion, is the ſtrongeſt thing I can ſay for it. And tho' it is a Prodigy of Erudition both ſacred and prophane, yet one is not fatigued in reading of it: for Mr. *Duguet* has ſuch an Art of putting his Readers in his Place, that one would be tempted to think he himſelf was Maſter of all that Erudition; and there is no getting free of the Deluſion till you have laid aſide the Book.

I THINK I have fulfill'd my Duty in writing the Preface, for which I want the Indulgence of the Reader: but I am perſuaded he will pardon any Faults in it, in conſideration of the Service I have done him in publiſhing ſo excellent a Work.

THE

THE INSTITUTION OF A *PRINCE*, &c.

PART I.
The QUALITIES, VIRTUES, and DUTIES of a PRINCE.

CHAP. I.
How great a Bleſſing a good Prince is. Why it is ſo rare. General Diviſion of the Work.

ARTICLE I.
How great a Bleſſing a good Prince is.

1. HITHERTO I had confin'd myſelf to praying for Kings, and for all whom God has entruſted with the Reins of Government, as St. *Paul* (*a*) hath commanded every Man to do; and I was far from apprehending that I ſhould at any time be obliged

(*a*) 1 *Tim.* ii. 2.

obliged to give Counſel to a Prince, for whom Providence is preparing a great Empire, beſides the Dominions to which he was born Sovereign.

II. I have duly weigh'd, methinks, the chief Reaſons which ought to make me remain in Silence; but thoſe which call upon me to break it appear far ſuperior: And as I hope to continue unknown, except to him who muſt judge of my Performance, before preſenting it to the young Prince, for whoſe Uſe it is intended, I perſwade myſelf, my Raſhneſs will end there, or at leaſt that I ſhall not be put to any Confuſion on that Account.

III. I would rather be condemned by thoſe who cannot know the Motives which juſtify my Zeal, than fail in my Obedience to Divine Providence, whoſe Commands appear to me very expreſsly ſignified. I know God may chuſe whom he pleaſes to declare his Will; that he ſometimes employs the weakeſt Inſtruments in bringing about the greateſt Ends; that he ſtands in no need of any Perſon; that he does not preſuppoſe Underſtanding and Wiſdom in thoſe he employs, but gives theſe Abilities to them, and that it is no good Reaſon for diſtruſting his Goodneſs, that one ſees nothing in himſelf to merit it.

IV. If it is not he who commands me to ſpeak, I cannot doubt, however, but it is he who inſpires me with the fear of diſpleaſing him, and I am convinced that a ſincere regard to his Glory and the publick Good are my Motives to it. He ſees my Heart and all that he hath given me, and knows how long I have earneſtly deſir'd the Completion of what he hath promiſed by his Prophet, (*a*) *All the*

(*a*) Confiteantur tibi, Domine, omnes reges terræ, quia audierunt omnia verba oris tui. *Pſ.* 137.

Reges

the Kings of the Earth ſhall praiſe thee, O Lord, when they hear the Words of thy Mouth; to the end that all the People under their Government may praiſe him and obey him, for he alone is great, and before him all other Majeſty vaniſheth.

V. I know St. *Auguſtin* ſays, (*b*) That the greateſt Bleſſing, which can happen to Mankind and Empires, is to be governed by Princes who have great Prudence, and a full Capacity for the Arts of Government, joined with ſincere Piety. And I cannot diſſemble how great a Happineſs I ſhould reckon it, if the ſame Goodneſs, which deſtines for a powerful Nation a Prince who ſhall make them happy, vouchſafes to make Uſe of me to contribute, in any Degree, to the Accompliſhment of his Deſigns, and the Hopes of that People.

VI. A Prince truly worthy of reigning is one of the moſt (*c*) precious Gifts Heaven can confer on Mortals. The Heathens themſelves have acknowledged it: The Darkneſs of their falſe Religion hath not been able to hide from them theſe two evident Truths, That God alone gives good Kings, and that ſuch a Benefaction includes in it many other Bleſſings; for nothing is more excellent than that which moſt perfectly reſembles God, and the nobleſt Image of the Deity is a Prince who is juſt, moderate, chaſte, holy, and who only reigns, that he may make Virtue reign.

Reges terræ & omnes populi, principes & omnes judices terræ laudent nomen Domini, quia exaltatum eſt nomen ejus ſolius. *Pſ.* 148.

(*b*) Illi autem qui verâ pietate præditi benè vivunt, ſi habent ſcientiam regendi populos, nihil eſt felicius rebus humanis quam ſi Deo miſerante habeant poteſtatem. *S. Auguſtin. l.* 5. *de Civit. Dei, c.* 19.

(*c*) Nullum eſt præſtabilius & pulchrius Dei munus erga mortales, quàm caſtus & ſanctus, & Deo ſimillimus princeps. *Plin. Paneg. Traj.*

VII. After *Solomon* had ſucceeded to *David*, and given Proofs that he inherited his Piety as well as his Throne, the King of *Tyre* (*d*) render'd publick Thanks to God for his Mercy in giving to the People of *Iſrael* ſo wiſe and underſtanding a Prince. He ſaw whence ſo great a Good came. He traced it to its Source. He intereſted himſelf in it, in the Name of all Kings, whoſe Glory ought to be the ſame; and he acknowledged it was becauſe God loved *Iſrael* (*e*), and that he had render'd the Prince ſo perfect, to whom he had committed the Care of them.

VIII. The Queen of *Sheba* (*f*), more affected by what ſhe ſaw, than by all the wonderful Things ſhe had heard of the Wiſdom of *Solomon*, had the ſame Sentiments with the King of *Tyre*, and expreſſes herſelf in Terms which well deſerve Attention: *Bleſſed be the Lord thy God which delighted in thee, to ſet thee upon his Throne, to be King for the Lord thy God; becauſe thy God loved Iſrael, to eſtabliſh them for ever, therefore made he thee King over them, to do Judgment and Juſtice.*

IX. It is upon the Throne of God himſelf, according to this Queen (*g*), that *Solomon* was placed; becauſe it belongs to God only to reign over

(*d*) Benedictus Dominus Deus, qui fecit cœlum & terram, qui dedit David regi filium ſapientem & eruditum, & ſenſatum atque prudentem. *Lib.* 2. *Paralip*, *c.* 11. *v.* 12.

(*e*) Quia dilexit Dominus populum ſuum, idcirco te regnare fecit ſuper eum. *Ibid. v.* 11.

(*f*) Sit Dominus Deus tuus benedictus, qui voluit te ordinare ſuper thronum ſuum regem Domini Dei tui; quia diligit Deus Iſrael, & vult ſervare eum in æternum: Idcirco poſuit te ſuper eum regem, ut facias judicia atque juſtitiam. *Lib.* 2. *Paralip. c.* 9. *v.* 8.

(*g*) Voluit te ordinare ſuper thronum ſuum, regem Domini Dei tui. Quia diligit Deus Iſrael, & vult ſervare eum in æternum. Idcirco poſuit te ſuper eum regem, ut facias judicia atque juſtitiam.

over Men, who are by Nature all equal. *Solomon* is the King of the Lord in a peculiar Senſe; becauſe he is not only a Sharer of his Authority, as all other Kings are, but of his Juſtice, his Wiſdom, his Goodneſs; and by theſe Virtues was worthy of reigning with him and for him. 'Tis to the Love God bore to *Iſrael* that *Solomon* owes all his Merit: 'Tis to the People he is given: It is for their Sake he is endued with Underſtanding and Wiſdom. He is not eſtabliſhed to be their King, but in order to be their Judge, and to render Juſtice to them; and he has neither Prudence nor Authority given him, for any other End, but to protect and conduct them.

X. Theſe few Words are enough for the Inſtruction of Kings. It is not private Perſons who may be ſuſpected of miſunderſtanding the Intereſts of Princes, that ſpeak what we have now related. It is the King of *Tyre*, and the Queen of *Sheba*. Not Sovereigns enlightened by the Doctrine of the Goſpel; but Princes who had no other Light but Natural Reaſon to direct them, and yet better underſtood than many Kings who call themſelves the Diſciples of *Jeſus Chriſt*, what is the chief End of Royalty, whoſe Gift the Wiſdom of Kings is; and how great a Happineſs it is to a People to be governed by a Prince whom God hath given to them in Mercy.

XI. It is preciſely this laſt Point I am now to conſider, becauſe it is of the greateſt Conſequence to Every-one, who is deſtin'd to reign, duly to comprehend firſt of all the infinite Diſtance between a Prince whom God ſets over a People whom he loves, and deſigns to load with Benefits, and one to whom he only communicates Authority, to be an Inſtrument of his Diſpleaſure

and Vengeance (*h*). The one he gives in Mercy, the other in Wrath. He fills the one with Wiſdom, and the Love of Juſtice; and the other he permits, for ſecret Reaſons beyond the Reach of our Diſcovery, to follow his own blind Counſels and unruly Paſſions. Both have legitimate Authority; but the one knows how to employ it aright, and the other abuſes it: The one is a public Bleſſing, and the other a public Curſe. All the Advantages and all the Virtues of human Life are the natural Fruits of the former Adminiſtration, and all its Vices and Plagues are the Chaſtiſements for which the other is intended.

ARTICLE II.

Why ſuch a Bleſſing is ſo rare.

I. IT is indeed aſtoniſhing that any Perſon ſhould heſitate between two Choices, one of which is ſo amiable and juſt, and the other ſo odious and criminal. It is aſtoniſhing that one ſhould need Inſtructions and Counſels for making ſo good a Choice, and holding faſt by it; and 'tis very unaccountable that Examples of thoſe, who have begun well, and reigned to the End with an invariable, ſteady Wiſdom and Equity, ſhould be ſo rare in all Ages.

II. But we have juſt now ſeen that good Kings are granted by God to Nations he loves; and that States are often ſo corrupt and wicked, that they render themſelves unworthy of ſo ſignal a Grace. They are unjuſt; they are avaritious; and

(*h*) *S. Auguſtin parlant de Neron & des Princes les plus injuſtes:* Etiam talibus dominandi poteſtas non datur, niſi ſummi Dei providentia, quando res humanas judicet talibus Dominis dignas. *L.* 5. *de Civit. Dei, ch.* 19.

and their Kings become ſuch: They expect no more from them but external Protection; and confine all their Deſires to a few temporal Advantages; and they are juſtly deprived even of them. They abuſe Plenty and Peace; and their Ingratitude is puniſhed by Wars and heavy Taxes, which ſoon drain them. They are Enemies to Piety and Virtue, and the Princes either know not or deſpiſe theſe Excellencies. They are unconcerned about the Public Good, and only think of their own private Intereſts; and the Princes imitating them think their Intereſt and the Public Good incompatible. They do not pray, as the Apoſtle exhorts, with ſerious Fervor for a King filled with Wiſdom and Goodneſs; and they are treated as their Indifference about ſo great a Bleſſing, and their Diſregard to ſo reaſonable a Precept, deſerve.

III. On the other hand, Princes rarely are well inſtructed in their Duties, and the firſt Tincture given to their Minds by good Education is ſoon defaced. (*i*) They give themſelves up to the Pleaſures of Power without informing themſelves of its juſt Bounds. Pride, the ſecret Venom which accompanies Sovereign Power, keeps them from aſking Counſel, or from following it. They imbibe the Errors of thoſe who flatter them. They become indifferent if not Enemies to Truth. They accuſtom themſelves to confound Reaſon and Juſtice with their Will. They are ſoftened and enervated by the Pleaſures to which they abandon themſelves; while the whole Weight of public Affairs is thrown upon others. They con-

(*i*) Quæritur quæ res malos principes faciat: jam primùm nimia licentia, deinde rerum copia, amici præterea improbi, aulici vel ſtulti, vel deteſtabiles, & rerum publicarum ignorantia. *Julius Vopiſcus in vit. Imper. Aureliani, pag.* 232.

ſine themſelves to Things which require no Application or Labour. They will not be inſtructed but in what will not diſturb their Repoſe. They believe all is well govern'd, becauſe every thing about them preſents them with Images of Proſperity and Affluence. They think that all is due to them, and that their Magnificence and Glory are the chief End of all. They feed their Vanity with the exceſſive Adulations of thoſe who addreſs them with a ſort of religious Worſhip. They ſubſtitute the Pomp and Splendor of Royalty in the room of what makes its true and ſolid Grandeur (*k*). Thus they miſerably ſuccumb under the Majeſty of the auguſt Place they occupy, of which they have in reality nothing but the outward Shew and Pageantry. They live and die without knowing either the Origin of their Power, or its lawful Uſe, and the Account they muſt render of it. They are all their Days Strangers to their Dominions and their People, whoſe Wants they are ignorant of, whoſe Happineſs they neglect, whoſe Groans they deſpiſe; and being wholly taken up with themſelves, and their own private Pleaſures and Intereſts, they never think what they ought to be.

IV. There are many Princes who have not all theſe Faults; and who are poſſeſſed of ſome great Qualities; but there are few who are endued with all thoſe Accompliſhments, which are requiſite to render a Prince truly deſerving of his Dignity; and ſometimes the want of one ſingle Virtue renders all their other good Qualities uſeleſs, becauſe inſtead of being conducted by Wiſdom,

(*k*) Felicitas onus quoddam eſſe videtur plumbo gravius. Eum ergo ſubvertit ac deprimit qui id humeris impoſuerit, niſi plane ſit robuſtus. *Syneſ. de Reg. ad Arcadium, pag.* 15.

Wiſdom, and a duly enlighten'd Underſtanding, they are miſled by Prejudice and Error.

V. It is not poſſible Princes ſhould be exempt from the common Infirmities of all Men, even the moſt upright, ſo as not to fall into ſome Faults, thro' Ignorance or Weakneſs; but it is of the laſt Importance that the Errors of Princes do not proceed from ſome permanent Defect; and that they be tranſient and not deeply rooted; that they do not corrupt the Heart; that they do not blind or darken the Judgment, and that they find a Corrective and Remedy in other good Diſpoſitions of their Mind.

VI. This is the End I propoſe to myſelf in this Inſtitution of a Prince. I would ſhew this Prince what ought to be his Scope (*l*), and what are the proper Means of attaining it. I would preſent to his Sight a Picture, of which he ought to be the true Original; and yet far from thinking that I ſhall aſtoniſh him by a high Idea which may appear to him above his Reach, I have propoſed on the contrary to kindle his Deſires, and, while I excite his Courage, to ſupport and animate his Hopes.

ARTICLE III.

Diviſion of the Work.

I. AS the Things I have to ſay to him regard him in two different Relations, or becauſe I may conſider him either ſimply as the Head and Sovereign

(*l*) Regem tibi tanquam ſimulacrum quoddam erigens hac ratione deſcribam: Tu vero ſimulacrum iſtud vivens & animatum oſtendes. *Syneſ. de Regno ad Imp. Arcad. pag.* 9.

reign of a great State, which he ought to govern by the Rules of wiſe Politics, or as a Chriſtian Prince, who ought to have, both for himſelf and the People entruſted to his Care, more elevated Views than thoſe which terminate in this Life, I ſhall divide the Work into two Parts. In the firſt, I will reſtrict my ſelf to what concerns Civil Government; and in the ſecond, I will add all that Piety and Religion exact of a Chriſtian Prince who deſires to reign for ever.

II. Each of theſe Parts is ſubdivided into two others; one of which treats of the Diſpoſitions and Qualities of a Prince; the other of his Duties to his People. In the former it ſhall be enquired, What he ought to be? *i. e.* What are the perſonal Virtues which fit him for reigning? And in the other, What he ought to do? *i. e.* What ought to be his Conduct toward thoſe under his Government? I have already ſaid, a Prince may be conſidered in two Capacities, either as the Head of a temporal State, or as the Head of a Chriſtian Society; and his perſonal Diſpoſitions, and his Duties to his People multiply, in conſequence of theſe two Relations, in ſuch a manner, that I ſhall take care not to confound the one with the other, but to handle them ſeperately in the four Parts, of which I have juſt now mentioned the natural Order, Connection, and Neceſſity.

III. Let it however be premiſed, before I go further, that I am far from confining my ſelf in the two firſt Parts to Virtues merely human, or to merely temporal Government. I know that Piety and Religion extend through all; that it is not allowable to ſeperate the Temporal from the Chriſtian Prince; and that Prudence in the political Adminiſtration muſt be the Fruit of a high Wiſdom. But one may conſider the Matter in a

more

more human and immediate View, without enquiring into its ultimate End and ſublimer Motives. Thus one riſes by Degrees to a more pure and perfect Virtue; and by rendering an attentive docile Ear to Reaſon, prepares himſelf for becoming a willing Diſciple to Religion and Faith, which command the ſame Things, but propoſe higher Motives and a more noble Recompence.

CHAPTER II.

Firſt Diſpoſition or Quality of a Prince. He ought to know the Origin of his Authority, and the real Title by which he holds it, and the Conditions of it.

ARTICLE I.

A Prince ought to know the Origin of his Authority.

I. IT would be impoſſible to eſtabliſh Order and Peace, if all Men will be independent, and not ſubmit to an Authority which takes from them a ſmall Portion of their Liberty, to preſerve to them the better Part of it. Men would be for ever in War, if they were always endeavouring to ſubject others to themſelves, or continued obſtinately to refuſe Submiſſion to the more powerful; it is neceſſary for their Quiet and Safety to accept of a Maſter; and ſo to give up all Hopes of being ſuch, tho' they ſtill preſerve the Inclination towards it.

II. Hence the human Origin of Authority; and we could hardly know whether it was uſurped or lawful, if God had not taught us that he

he had ratified it, and that his Providence has not only permitted the Project and the Inventors, but that he has render'd the Power of Government ſacred by an immediate Communication of his Authority to thoſe inveſted with it.

III. He has inſtructed us in this important Truth in ſeveral Places of Holy Writ, but more particularly in the Epiſtle to the *Romans*, where St. *Paul* (*m*) eſtabliſhes this general Maxim, *That all Power comes from God*; that the Powers then eſtabliſhed were ſuch by his Appointment, and that to reſiſt them is to reſiſt his Ordinance.

IV. Without this Revelation, which fixes our Minds and decides our Doubts, we ſhould be tempted to pay leſs Reſpect to Authority, the Commencement of which was unjuſt, and that is often exerciſed by Men who diſhonour it by their Actions; but God forbids us (*n*) to regard the Paſſions which gave Riſe to Empires; or the Unworthineſs of thoſe who rule them. The Apoſtle raiſes our Thoughts even to him who preſides over all, and who can bring Good from Evil: And he exhorts us to adore his Wiſdom and Power in dividing the World among thoſe who govern it. *Submit*, ſays St. *Peter* (*o*), *your ſelves*

(*m*) Non eſt enim poteſtas niſi à Deo; quæ autem ſunt, à Deo ordinatæ ſunt. Itaque qui reſiſtit poteſtati, Dei ordinationi reſiſtit. *Rom.* xiii. 1, 2.

(*n*) Qui nec exigui nec contemptibilis animantis viſcera, nec avis pennulam, nec herbæ florulum, nec arboris folium ſine ſuarum partium convenientia & quadam veluti pace dereliquit, nullo modo eſt credendus regna hominum, eorumque dominationes & ſervitutes à ſuæ providentiæ legibus alienas eſſe voluiſſe. *S. Auguſtin. l.* 5. *de Civit. Dei, ch.* 2.

(*o*) Subjecti eſtote omni humanæ creaturæ, propter Deum, ſive regi, quaſi præcellenti, ſive ducibus, tanquam ab eo miſſis, quia ſic eſt voluntas Dei. 1 *Petr.* ii. 13, 14, 15.

ſelves to every Ordinance of Man, for the Lord's Sake, whether it be to the King as ſupreme, or unto Governors, as unto them that are ſent by him, for the Puniſhment of Evil-doers, and the Praiſe of them that do well; for ſo is the Will of God. (For the Lord's Sake, *i. e.* out of Reſpect and Love to him.)

ARTICLE II.

He ought to know the Title by which he holds it, and the Conditions of it.

I. THIS firſt Truth, which is the Foundation of all the reſt, leads us to another which is of very great Moment: For ſince it is certain that God is the Source of Kingly Power, and that it is his Authority which we reſpect in theirs, he muſt have had grand Deſigns in placing them ſo near to him in Dignity, and ſo high above other Men. But it is he himſelf who has revealed his Thoughts and Counſels, with reſpect to ſuch an eſſential Point, by declaring to us, that he has choſen Kings to make them his Miniſters; and that he has eſtabliſhed them in that Quality in his Kingdom, to govern it in his Name, to protect Virtue and puniſh Vice; to render to Men all the Aſſiſtances they want, and to defend them againſt every thing capable of diſturbing their Quiet, by overturning Juſtice and good Order.

II. St. *Paul* (*p*) is preciſe upon theſe Articles. He calls them three ſeveral Times in the ſame Place Miniſters of God for the Good of his People; and it is the Title the Holy Spirit had already given them in the Book of Wiſdom (*q*).

This

(*p*) Dei enim miniſter eſt tibi in bonum. *Rom.* xiii. 4, 6.
(*q*) Miniſtri regni illius. *Sap.* vi. 5.

This Apoſtle puts the Sword in their Hand as from God (*r*), and gives them Power in his Name to employ it againſt the Rebellious. He charges them with the Protection of all the Virtuous, and forbids them to render themſelves terrible to any but the Vicious (*s*).

III. He makes them anſwerable for all the Evil they might have prevented, and have let paſs unpuniſh'd; becauſe they have in their Hands all the Power neceſſary to hinder it or chaſtiſe it (*t*). He ſubmits all Men to them without Diſtinction for that Effect (*u*). And by thus ſetting them above any thing on Earth, and entruſting them with the full Adminiſtration of all temporal things, he places them next to himſelf, and communicates to them a Majeſty only inferior to his own (*x*).

IV. This is what *Tertullian* ſays, in the Name of all the Chriſtians whoſe Sentiments he only repreſents, "We are full of Reſpect to the Em-
"peror (*y*), becauſe we regard him as holding
"the next Rank to God, having received of
"him the Sovereign Authority over all that is
"in the World, and being only beneath God.
"He is ſo elevated that God alone is ſuperior
"to him (*z*). We know it is the Lord who has
"placed him by his Will and Choice in ſo emi-
"nent

(*r*) Non ſine cauſa gladium portat, Dei enim miniſter eſt.

(*s*) Principes non ſunt timori boni operis, ſed mali.

(*t*) Vindex in iram ei qui malum agit. *Rom.* xiii. 4.

(*u*) Ad vindictam malefactorum, laudem vero bonorum. 1 *Petr.* ii. 14.

(*x*) Omnis anima proteſtatibus ſubdita ſit. *Rom.* xiii. 1.

(*y*) Colimus imperatorem & hominem à Deo ſecundum, & quidquid eſt à Deo conſecutum, & ſolo Deo minorem. *Tertull. ad Scapulam, pag.* 86. *Edit. Rigalt.* A.

(*z*) Ideo magnus eſt quia cœlo minor eſt. *Tert. Apoleg. c.* 30. *p.* 30. B.

" nent a Station (*a*). And it is for that Reaſon " that we intereſt ourſelves in his Preſervation, and " that we offer for him our Prayers to God, the " eternal only true God, upon whom only he de- " pends (*b*), and next to whom he is firſt."

V. But upon what Conditions hath God render'd him ſo auguſt (*c*)? We have juſt now heard what they are. The original Right, by which he holds his Sovereignty, teaches him upon what Terms it is granted to him. He is eſtabliſhed King to be the Miniſter of God; he reigns that he may be the firſt in rendering Obedience to God, and that he may make all others obey him; he is charged with the Execution of his Orders; and he has unlimited Power in no other Senſe, but to give to his Zeal and Fidelity to God an unbounded Extent.

VI. His Duties are proportioned to his Power. All Pretexts which can excuſe Negligence are removed from him, the Obſtacles which may reſtrict a confin'd Authority, are to his but a more ample Occaſion of exerciſing it. He can join to Laws and Example Recompenſes and Puniſhments. He can ſink Vice into Ignominy, and exalt Virtue to due Honour. He is Maſter of all that can work on the Hopes or Fears of Men in this Life, and 'tis becauſe he is Maſter of all, that he is obliged to account to his Sovereign, whoſe Miniſter he is.

VII. God has not entruſted his Authority with any one to ſuffer it to be ill imployed, much leſs to be abuſed. He did not intend merely to flatter and nurſe

(*a*) Quem neceſſe eſt ſuſcipiamus, & eum quem Dominus noſter elegit. *Apol. Ep.* 33.

(*b*) Nos pro ſalute imperatorum Deum invocamus æternum, Deum verum, Deum vivum, in cujus ſolius poteſtate ſunt, à quo ſunt ſecundi, poſt quem primi. *Apol. c.* 30. A.

(*c*) Qui per Deum tantus eſt. *Apol. ch.* 36.

nurſe his Pride by giving him Power to be ſerviceable in the World. He has aſſociated him to a Share of his kingly Authority, which is a Government of Juſtice, Wiſdom, Clemency and Goodneſs. He has divided as it were with him the Cares of his Providence, which is attentive to all and overlooks nothing. He ſees him exactly becauſe he has placed him immediately under his Throne to have a near View of his Conduct and Adminiſtration. He obſerves if he uſurps to himſelf a Power, the Uſe of which is only depoſited in his Hands as a Truſt; if he affects to put himſelf in the Place of his Maſter; if he confines to himſelf the Honours paid to him as if they were due to his Perſon; if he forgets that he reigns but by Commiſſion, and for a Time; if he ſeparates the Glory attached to the Miniſtry committed to him, from the Care and Attention which are the Foundation and Eſſence of it; if he renounces his fundamental Right to his Sovereignty by refuſing Obedience to God, and by not endeavouring to bring all his Subjects into due Submiſſion to the Divine Will; if he ſinks and degrades himſelf into the ſhameful Condition of an unfaithful and ingrate Servant, by employing againſt his Lord the Power he holds of him, and vainly endeavouring to preſerve, by his Revolt againſt him, a Grandeur, his ſole Title to which is Obedience to him.

VIII. It infinitely concerns a Prince to underſtand fully the Truths compriſed in theſe few Words: "Princes are the Miniſters of God (*d*), "eſtabliſhed for this ſole and eſſential Reaſon, "that they may be his Servants." There is nothing more ſacred or inviolable than the Will of

(*d*) Miniſter enim Dei ſunt in hoc ipſum ſervientes. *Rom.* xiii.

of God in the Inſtitution of Things. It is that Will which is their Origin, and conſtitutes their Work and End. It is that which makes the Law of their State and Being. 'Tis the Deſign which he propoſed in forming Creatures, which is their Scope and Rule. Therefore ſuch a Prince is a Monſter, contrary to all Order, who pretends to reign without being faithful to God; without knowing his Will, without obeying it, without making it to be honoured by all others; he who is not a Prince, but that he may be a more zealous Servant of God, the beſt inſtructed in his Laws, the moſt jealous of his Authority, the moſt diligent to procure Obedience to him, and the moſt inexorable to all Offenders.

IX. The Patience of God ſometimes bears long with ſuch Perfidy; but what is to come is not the leſs real becauſe it is deferr'd: And what is pronounced in the Book of *Wiſdom* (*e*) againſt Princes who have not conſidered whence they have their Authority, and upon what Terms they received it, ought to fill all thoſe with Dread, in whom the Belief of God is not quite extinguiſhed. *Hear therefore, O ye Kings, and underſtand: Learn, ye that be Judges of the Ends of the Earth. Give Ear, ye that rule the People, and glory in the Multitude of Nations. For Power is given you of the Lord, and Sovereignty from the*

(*e*) Audite reges & intelligite, diſcite judices finium terræ, præbete aures vos qui continetis multitudinem, & placetis vobis in turbis nationum; quoniam data eſt à Domino poteſtas vobis, & virtus ab altiſſimo, qui interrogabit opera veſtra & cogitationes ſcrutabitur, quoniam cum eſſetis miniſtri regni illius, non recte judicaſtis nec cuſtodiſtis legem juſtitiæ, neque ſecundum voluntatem Dei ambulaſtis. Horrende & cito apparebit vobis, quoniam judicium duriſſimum his qui præſunt fiet. Exiguo enim concedetur miſericordia, potentes autem poteuter tormenta patientur. *Sap.* vi. 2, *& ſeq.*

Higheſt, who ſhall try your Works, and ſearch out your Counſels. Becauſe being Miniſters of his Kingdom, ye have not judged aright, nor kept the Law, nor walked after the Counſel of God. Horribly and ſpeedily ſhall he come upon you: for a ſharp Judgment ſhall be to them that be in high Places. They ought to be juſt and faithful in proportion to their Power; They ſhall be puniſhed as Princes, becauſe they were not made ſuch for any other Reaſon but to be Servants of God with eminent Power and extenſive Liberty.

X. We are however now only conſidering a Part of their Power, becauſe we confine ourſelves at preſent to what relates to Civil Government: But 'tis abſolutely neceſſary that a Prince be well inſtructed in the Origin of his Authority, and in the Conditions upon which it is granted to him, which he may learn with Certainty from God himſelf in the Holy Scriptures; all human Reaſonings being comparatively too weak and uncertain to ſerve for a ſolid Foundation to Truths teeming with Conſequences of ſuch Importance.

CHAPTER III.

A Prince ought to look on himſelf as deſigned for the Service of the State, and not as made for himſelf alone, but even as charged with repreſenting the Divine Conduct by his Behaviour.

ARTICLE I.

A Prince ought to conſider himſelf as belonging to the State.

I. THESE two Truths are natural Conſequences of the former; (*f*) for it is ob-

(*f*) In the preceeding Chapter.

obvious that a Prince being the Miniſter of God for the Public Good, it is to the People he is given: It is for the Public Good he is deſtined and appointed: It is likewiſe evident that a Prince, holding the Place of God with regard to his People, as inveſted with his Power, and having a Part of his external Providence committed to him, ought to repreſent by his Conduct the Adminiſtration of God who employs him, and reigns as it were by him. But it is proper that Truths of ſuch Conſequence ſhould be brought nearer to us, and be more accurately conſidered by us. We ſhall therefore treat of them ſeperately.

II. The more narrowly one examines all that the Sacred Writings teach us concerning the Authority of Kings, the more clearly it appears that God hath appointed them for no other End but the Good of his People. It is to render Juſtice, to prevent Violence, and to preſerve Peace and Equality: It is to reward Virtue and to puniſh Vice: It is to defend the State againſt Foreign Enemies, and to make it internally happy. All this is repeated in a thouſand different Manners in the Sacred Books: But St. *Paul* (*g*) has given us the Subſtance of all in a few Words: *A Prince is the Miniſter of God to thee for Good.* In that Saying all is compriſed that the Holy Scriptures ſay on this Head.

III. It is therefore the ſame Thing to be King and to be for the Good of the Republic; to be for the People and to be Sovereign. One is born for others, if he be born to command them; ſince he ought not to command them but for their Benefit. It is the Foundation and Character of the Royal State not to be for themſelves: It is

(g) *Rom.* xiii. 3.

the Eſſence of their Grandeur to be conſecrated to the Public Good. It is with regard to them as to the Sun, the Fountain of Light, which is placed in an eminent Place, only to ſpread his Beams over all. It would be doing them an Injury to confine them within the Limits of a private, ſelfiſh Intereſt. They neceſſarily ſink into the Obſcurity of private Men, when they have Views leſs extenſive than their States. They are for all, becauſe all is entruſted to them. They are not for themſelves merely, becauſe it is impoſſible to ſeparate them from the Body, of which they are the Soul and Spirit. They are ſo cloſely united with the Republic, that one cannot diſtinguiſh what belongs to them from what belongs to it; one may as well ſuppoſe a real Diſtinction in reſpect of Intereſt between the Head and the other Members of the Body, as between a Prince and his State (*b*).

IV. This is what was ſtrongly repreſented to a young Prince, by one who had had the Care of inſtructing him, and who ſtill preſerved ſome Authority over his Mind. (*i*) The Republic, ſaid he, is not for you; but on the contrary you are for it: And he added in another Place, (*k*) that from the Moment the Emperor had devoted himſelf to the Service of the Empire, he ought to forget himſelf.

V. Right Reaſon leads one to this Concluſion. If we but conſider what a Prince owes to the State, we muſt conclude that he owes himſelf entirely

(*b*) Tu caput reipublicæ es, illa corpus tuum. *Senec. l.* 1. *de Clem. c.* 5.

(*i*) Non rempublicam tuam eſſe, ſed te reipublicæ. *Senec. ibid. Ep.* 4.

(*k*) Ex quo ſe Cæſar orbi terrarum dedicavit, ſibi eripuit. *Senec. ad Polybium, c.* 26.

entirely to it: But when we are aſſured by the Scripture that he is the Miniſter of God, to govern it under his Orders, it immediately appears in a yet more convincive Manner, that all that he is, he is for the Sake of the People God hath given him the Care of.

VI. The Eccleſiaſtical Miniſtry entruſted to a Biſhop may ſerve us in ſome meaſure as an Example to clear up this Truth, if there are yet any Clouds or Miſts about it; for its agreed that a Biſhop is wholly devoted to his Dioceſe, and that he ought to employ all his Talents, all his Labours, his whole Life, for its good. He is looked upon as unworthy of his Charge, if he gives himſelf up to his Pleaſures, or to his private Intereſts, or to any other Care but that of his Flock alone. Would it not be inſufferable for him to manage the Revenues of the Church as if they were his perſonal Property? Every one in ſuch a Caſe ſoon calls to Mind that he is only entruſted with the Adminiſtration of them: And the more he ſhews his Ambition to be Maſter of all, without being uſeful, the more is he regarded as one who has abſolutely forgot his Rank and Duty.

VII. Now whence comes this clear and certain Light which produces in every one ſo juſt a Perſuaſion and Judgment with relation to the Epiſcopal Conduct? It proceeds from hence, that every one knows a Biſhop is the Miniſter of God for the good of his Church. This principle is the Source of all thoſe Concluſions which are immediately drawn againſt him, if he forgets his Commiſſion and the ſole End of his Authority. But the ſame Principle holds equally true with reſpect to Kings. A King is the Miniſter of God for the good of the State, as a Biſhop is for the good of the Church. If therefore he ever loſes Sight of the only

only Foundation and End of his Authority; if he is indifferent about his People; if his Attention and Care are entirely turned toward other Objects; if he perſuades himſelf that all is made for him, and that all ought to be ſubſervient to his Ambition, Voluptuouſneſs, and Pleaſures; if the Idea of his being for the Republick and of his owing all to it is offenſive to him, as if that perſuaſion, ſo truly glorious to Kings, had ſomething in it diſhonourable to him or derogatory from his Dignity, what would he have us to think of him? what does he imagine himſelf to be? or what deſign can he attribute to God in ſetting him upon the Throne, worthy of Divine Wiſdom and Goodneſs?

VIII. We have already ſeen that it is for the Love of the People God eſtabliſhes Kings. (*l*) Princes born amidſt the darkneſs of Paganiſm have they not bore teſtimony to the Truth? And had they any other notion of themſelves, but that they were for their People; and that their Grandeur conſiſted in making them happy? Is it then poſſible that Chriſtian Princes ſhould place their Glory in the Contrary, and confine it to vain external Magnificence, and a fruitleſs domination, of which the People rather feels the Weight than the Benefit? I do not now enquire whether Examples of ſuch blindneſs are frequent. I content myſelf with obſerving that the Temptation to ſeparate the Pomp of Majeſty from the perpetual Cares belonging to their Miniſtry is very great and exceedingly apt to ſeduce Kings: That all Men are naturally inclined to make themſelves the Center of all: That Kings are more expoſed to this dangerous

(*l*) *L.* 3. *of* Kings *Chap.* 10. *v.* 9. *L.* 2. *of* Chron. *Chap.* 2. *v.* 11. *& Chap.* 9 *v.* 8.

dangerous Snare than others, becauſe every thing bends to their Will and poſſeſſes their Minds ſtrongly to the Idea of their Maſterſhip over all; the univerſal dependence of every Subject upon a Word of their Mouth, the Homage, the Complaiſance, and too often the Flattery, of thoſe about them, eaſily ſeduce them to think that all is made for them, and that they are under no Obligations but what they pleaſe to impoſe on themſelves.

ARTICLE II.

A Prince is charged with repreſenting the Divine Conduct by his Behaviour.

I. A Prince ſtrongly convinced that he is obliged to repreſent the divine Adminiſtration by his own, has very different Sentiments. He has penetrated into the bottom of that Important Truth, *That he is the Miniſter of God:* And he conſiders himſelf as ſent to Men as it were to render God viſible in his Perſon; that God has laid upon him ſeveral of the external and known Parts of his providential Care; that he hath imparted to him a ſhare of his Power and Majeſty to put him in a Condition to repreſent him to the Eyes of the People; and that it is upon his Throne (*m*) that he makes him ſit, to pronounce from thence his Orders, and attract to himſelf univerſal Reſpect by a conduct meriting to be attributed to God himſelf, (*n*) who wills that Men ſhould regard him as his Deputy, and Judge of him as his Miniſter.

II. He knows that the moſt auguſt Character of

(*m*) Bleſſed be the Lord thy God, which delighted in thee to ſet thee on his Throne. 2 *Chron.* C. 9. *v.* 8.

(*n*) To be King for the Lord thy God. *ibid.*

the Deity conſiſts in having (*o*) need of nothing and in commanding nothing but for the good of thoſe who obey him: And tho' the firſt of theſe Privileges be incommunicable, he exerts himſelf to imitate the principal Part of the Divine greatneſs, by propoſing to reign only for the good of others, and to command nothing but what is really for the advantage of his Subjects.

III. What he looks upon to be the greateſt honour of his elevated Rank, is that he is ſet out to publick View (*p*) in order to give them by his Clemency, his Juſtice, and his application to promote good, ſome faint Idea of the inviſible God who governs all things. He reckons himſelf happy in having received of God a Power equal to his zeal for his glory; and he conſoles himſelf in reſpect of the Dangers to which his Dignity expoſes him, by the conſideration of the Power he hath to obey God, far above private Perſons whoſe narrow limited capacity often confines their Virtue almoſt to mere good wiſhes.

IV. He underſtands that it belongs to him to juſtify Providence, by correcting whatever it ſeems to overlook; while it realy but leaves it to him to remedy it, by delivering the weak from Oppreſſion, and thus removing that Stumbling-block which raiſes in many Minds great doubts and ſuſpicions of Providence; by bringing Virtue and Merit out of that Obſcurity in which God ſeems to have hid them; by haſtening to puniſh

(*o*) Nihil Deus jubet quod ſibi proſit, ſed illi cui jubet. Ideo verus eſt Dominus, qui ſervo non indiget. *S. Auguſt. Ep.* 138. *ad Marcellin. n.* 6.

(*p*) Deus providentiæ ſuæ quamdam imaginem tribuit (in Regibus) proindeque ſummi Regis amicus eſt, qui hic eadem cum illo appellatione gaudet, niſi nomen ementiatur. *Syneſ. de Regno ad Arcad, Imper. p.* 8.

puniſh the injuſtice and arrogance of the powerful, the delay of whoſe puniſhment to another Life would make the weak doubt whether God is ſo ſufficiently attentive to human Affairs as we ought to believe him to be.

V. His deſire is to conduct Men, by the amiable Features of Wiſdom which ſhine in his Behaviour, to that ſupreme wiſdom which preſides over all, but is little obſerved by thoſe who judge by mere outward Appearances, unleſs it renders itſelf (ſo to ſpeak) more familiar and acceſſible, by manifeſting itſelf to them in the Conduct of a Prince whom it inſtructs in ſecret, to render him the publick Interpreter to the People. They are thus raiſed by him to the Knowledge of the ſupreme Wiſdom. They mount to the Throne of God by that of the Prince. They eaſily diſcern that a Government ſo remote from the paſſions and weakneſſes of Men cannot come from Man alone; and they are thus led to Religion by their Intereſt and Gratitude.

VI. I don't know what Princes, little accuſtomed to ſuch Truths, may think of this Doctrine: But it is an irreparable Loſs, methinks, to them not to have known them; and by Conſequence to have been ignorant of all that is truly Great and Auguſt in their Situation. What reproach hath not one a right to upbraid them with for having ſo unworthily ſupported the Character of the Miniſter and Envoy of God; for having ſo unſuitably repreſented the infinite Wiſdom and Goodneſs of the Sovereign who has put them in his Place; for having excited ſo many Murmurs and Complaints againſt his Providence; they who are employed to juſtify it and gain reſpect to it and confidence in it from the whole World; for having uſed againſt Virtue, an authority which they received to promote

mote its Intereſts; for having put the Children to death in the Sight of their Parents, by the very Sword given them on purpoſe to protect the Innocent and Weak?

VII. A young Prince cannot too greatly apprehend ſuch juſt Accuſations; and he ought to hearken with earneſt Attention to what is ſaid to him by one of the moſt illuſtrious Fathers (*q*) of the Church. "Honour your Purple, acknowledge the great Deſign of God in your Perſon: He governs by himſelf Heavenly Beings: He divides the Government of thoſe on Earth with you: Act therefore like him, and as in his Place, toward your Subjects; and exhibit his Conduct in yours."

CHAPTER IV.

What Judgment a Prince ought to form of his Elevation and Grandeur.

I. HE knows (*r*) its Origin and the Terms annexed to it. He hath inferred from thence the principal Conſequences with regard to himſelf, as devoted to the Service of the Publick, and charged with exemplifying the divine Conduct by his. He is now to compare his Elevation and Grandeur with himſelf, and to examine what there is in it of Real with reſpect to him. But in this Enquiry I don't comprehend the exteriour Pomp or what

(*q*) Imperatores, purpuram revereamini. Cognoſcite quantum id ſit quod veſtræ fidei commiſſum eſt, quantumque circa vos myſterium. Supera ſolius Dei ſunt; infera autem, veſtra etiam ſunt. Subditis veſtris Deos vos præbete. *S. Greg. Naz. orat.* 27. *p.* 471.

(*r*) *Ch. II. & Ch. III.*

what outwardly contributes to render the Power venerable which is of divine appointment. Its what it hath in itſelf of moſt divine and independent of Men, that the Prince is here to conſider. He is now to take a View of his rank as it exalts him above private Perſons ſo near to God, and renders him a ſecond Majeſty only (*s*) ſubordinate and inferior to the firſt, the Source of all Power and Honour, in order to form a ſound Judgment of it, and of what it hath in it that is real with relation to himſelf.

II. So ſoon as a Prince enters upon this reſearch, he immediately diſcovers that his Grandeur is foreign to him: That is to ſay, that he is not the Source of it; that it is only lent to him; and as it were applied to him from without, ſo as that it can never belong to him in Property; becauſe Sovereignty in its Origin appertains to God alone, who is eſſentially the ſupreme Lord of Heaven and Earth, and who cannot yield his Right to another without reſigning to him the Glory of his Godhead, and the incommunicable Power of creating, with the Rights reſulting from it, which is impoſſible.

III. Thus a Prince finds himſelf equally ſubject to God with all the reſt of Mankind. He is abſolutely as dependent in every particular upon the ſupreme Cauſe as the leaſt or meaneſt of Men; and he feels that he remains wholly the ſame with reſpect to his interior and true State, tho' he hath an Authority over others that belongs to him alone.

IV. He therefore conſiders himſelf with reſpect to God as being a King by Truſt and Deputation, of which he exerciſes the Juriſdiction till it ſhall pleaſe God to revoke his Commiſſion. He compares himſelf to an Officer deputed by his Sovereign to

(*s*) Religio ſecundæ majeſtatis. *Tertull. Apol. cap.* 35.

to repreſent him in a certain Ceremony, who knows very well that his Maſter hath not reſigned his Place to him by honouring him with that tranſient Function.

V. He unites in his own Mind the twofold Idea of what he is internally and what he exerciſes outwardly. He ſupports to his Subjects the auguſt Character of a Sovereign becauſe he is inveſted with it; and he preſerves the modeſty of a Subject toward God, the King of Kings. He commands, and he obeys; and he does not command but in Obedience; and he thoroughly comprehends that the higher he is elevated above Men, the leſs that Elevation belongs to him who at bottom has nothing but what is natural to all Men,

VI. He knows (*s*) that he is born with the ſame weakneſſes as other Mortals; that in his Infancy he ſtood in need of the ſame Succours; that he ſhall have the ſame common End; that Royalty hath ſtill left him internally the ſame with thoſe who are not Princes; and that he ſhall leave it and be as thoſe who never were inveſted with it; that it is therefore with reſpect to him an adventitious State, and that he would groſly deceive himſelf if he ſhould judge of himſelf and of his real Condition by what is abſolutely diſtinct and ſeparate from it.

Second Reflexion.] VII. This firſt Reflection leads the Prince to another which is a Conſequence of it. He underſtands without needing to be appriz'd

(*t*) Sum quidem & ego mortalis homo, ſimilis omnibus, & ex genere terreni illius, qui prior factus eſt, & in ventre matris figuratus ſum caro. Et ego natus accepi communem aerem, & primam vocem ſimilem omnibus emiſi plorans. In involumentis nutritus ſum, & curis magnis: nemo enim ex Regibus aliud habuit nativitatis initium. Unus ergo introitus eſt omnibus ad vitam, & ſimilis exitus. *Sap. VII.* 1. *& ſeq.*

appriz'd of it, that Sovereignty by itſelf gives 'em no ſuperior perſonal advantages of Body or Mind; that it is not the ſame thing (*t*) with Merit; that it is not inſeparable from Wiſdom and Virtue; that it does not furniſh a Remedy for any defect, but on the contrary often ſerves to multiply them, and make them more conſpicuous; and that the Grandeur which raiſes a Prince above private Men, leaves him ſometimes far beneath any ſuch, if he is not Elevated but by his Situation, nor Great but by his Power.

VIII. 'Tis true (*x*) it is a ſhameful thing; it renders one a Monſter, to be the firſt in Rank and yet below many in Merit: For the order of Nature demands that theſe two Funds of pre-eminence ſhould be united, and that the Head which governs the Body ſhould be the Seat of Reaſon: But what ought to be, does not take Place: And nothing is of more conſequence than that a Prince ſhould take Care to precaution himſelf againſt that Error, which as groſs and palpable as it is, hath ſeduced an infinity of Sovereigns, who have concluded from their being Kings, that they deſerved to be ſuch; and that none of their Subjects could be ſo wiſe as they, becauſe they were ſubmitted to their Rule.

Third Reflection.] IX. But if Sovereignty ſhould have Merit as well as Power, how long does it laſt? What becomes of it when a Prince dies? (*y*) Who can diſtinguiſh the Aſhes of a Man who has reign'd ever

(*v*) Non tu de illis es, qui dignitates virtutes putant. *S. Bernard. L. 2. de Conſider. C. 7.*

(*x*) Monſtruoſa res, gradus ſummus, & animus infimus. *S. Bernard. L. 2. de Conſider. C. 7.*

(*y*) Dele fucum fugacis honoris hujus, & male coloratæ nitorem gloriæ, ut nude nudum conſideres. *S. Bernard. L. 2. de Conſider C. 9.*

ever ſo long from thoſe of a Slave? The Grave confounds and levels all the diſtinctions which appeared for ſome Moments as real: And human forgetfulneſs adds ſomething to the deſtruction Death makes; for ſome of thoſe of the ſucceeding Age often know not the Names of them who ruled over their Grandfathers.

X. What then are the few Years during which one has been called a King, with reſpect to all the Time in which he is ſo no more? What proportion can a Reign of a few Years bear to an immenſe Eternity in which one is degraded, and even ſeverely puniſhed for the abuſe of a Sovereignty ſo ſhort with reſpect to the exerciſe of it, and ſo durable with regard to the Account to be rendered of it? Let therefore a Prince whom ambition hath not wholly corrupted, ſeriouſly compare what he is internally with that borrowed Power which he can only retain a few Years: Let him not confound his everlaſting Intereſt with an Adminiſtration that ſhall be taken from him. Let him maturely reflect upon the unhappy Error of thoſe who appropriate Royalty to themſelves in ſuch a manner, that they can never conſider themſelves without it; and who never call to Mind, that the longeſt Reign, were it as extenſive as the Univerſe, is but a Point, in compariſon of that vaſt, boundleſs Eternity, in which all Dignities ceaſe, and the uſe made of them only ſubſiſts for ever.

Fourth Reflexion.] XI. There would be ſome Conſolation for the ſhort continuance of Royalty, if it afforded ſurer and eaſier means than other Conditions in Life for arriving to true Felicity. But there is none on the contrary expoſed to ſo many Perils, or which furniſhes more occaſions to evil Concupiſcences; or to which Vertue finds ſuch difficult acceſs;

ceſs; which puts more Obſtacles in the Way of the Goſpel-doctrine; is more environed with Seducers, and more deſtitute of all Succours againſt Deceit or Corruption. This we ſhall clearly ſee in the Progreſs of this Diſcourſe; and the ſad Experience of almoſt all Princes is too publick and too manifeſt a Proof of it.

XII. He therefore who has it in his Power to accept or refuſe Royalty, and upon whom Providence does not impoſe, either by Birth or ſome other Obligations as certain and clear as it, the neceſſity of mounting a Throne, would be but wiſe in deliberating well what he ſhould do. He would thus ſhew himſelf to be thoroughly acquainted with the Duties, and conſequently with the Dangers, of Sovereignty. He would diſcover a Mind more great and elevated than all its Grandeur; or, to ſpeak more properly, than the Ambition which luſts after it; And he would prove himſelf worthy of it by his fear of engaging with it and of ſuccumbing under its Weight. Some Men who had nothing but human Prudence to direct them have been capable of making theſe Reflections. They have been able to ſee nothing in ſovereign Power that could dazle their Minds; and when the Empire was offered to them they looked upon nothing as great in it but its Dangers, which intimidated them, and the Duties which they thought above their Abilities to perform.

XIII. Hiſtory hath preſerved to us two memorable Inſtances of this. One is the Emperor *Tacitus*, and the other the Emperor *Probus*; both worthy of commanding, and perſuaded with much Difficulty to accept of the Power. Here is the Hiſtory of the former in a few Words. The Senate (z) and

(z) Quod rarum & difficile fuit, Senatus Populusque Rom. perpeſſus

and Army having with mutual Conſent delayed for Six Months to name a Succeſſor to *Aurelian*, becauſe they were diſpoſed to make a good Choice, and were afraid of being deceived, the Senate at laſt caſt its Eyes upon *Tacitus*, the firſt and moſt diſtinguiſhed Perſon of that Body. (*a*) More flattering Circumſtances could not happen to a private Perſon; and never was one called to the Empire in a more lawful and honourable manner. *Tacitus* however was not at all tempted; and the publick Regiſters (*b*) aſſure us, that he returned this anſwer to the Senate who had unanimouſly named him; (*c*) I am ſurprized that you ſhould have any Thoughts of me for ſucceeding to *Aurelian*, one of the greateſt Princes we have ever had; of me who am old and ſcarcely able to do the Duties of a Senator: Conſider with more deliberation what Man you drag from his Study, and at what time of his Life, to expoſe him to all the Toils of Government, the Chief of which is to march at the Head of Armies. The whole Senate (*d*) repreſented to him that it was to his Mind and Prudence the Empire was confided; and that it was his Mind they choſe not his Body. But his perſiſting in the Refuſal, was like to have thrown the Republick into extreme Danger: And therefore one (*e*) of the wiſeſt

perpeſſus eſt, ut Imperatorem per ſex menſes, dum bonus quæritur, Reſpublica non haberet. *Vopiſc. In vit. Taciti, p.* 284.

(*a*) *He was*, primæ ſententiæ conſularis.

(*b*) *Vopiſcus* aſſures that he copies the very Regiſters of the Senate.

(*c*) Miror vos, P. C. in locum Aureliani, fortiſſimi Imperatoris, ſenem velle principem facere. Vix munia Senatus implemus. Videte diligentius quam ætatem de cubiculis atque umbra in pruinas æſtusque mittatis. *p.* 284.

(*d*) Qui melius quam ſenex imperat? Imperatorem te, non militem facimus. Tu jube, milites pugnent. Animum tuum, non corpus, eligimus. *Ibid.*

(*e*) *He had been Conſul, and was called* Metius Falconius Nicomachus. *His diſcourſe was recorded in the publick Regiſters.*

wiſeſt and moſt eloquent Senators made him feel the ſuperior Force of the Reaſons for his Acceptance, above thoſe which diſpoſed him to decline it; and thus obliged him to ſubmit to an Election they were ſtill reſolved not to change. *Tacitus* at length conſented and ſaid, (*f*) I have then henceforth only to devote all my Cares, and to exert all my Efforts in a manner that may anſwer your Expectation, by giving Counſels worthy of you and of an Emperor, ſince I cannot fill that Dignity by Actions of Bravery and bodily Strength.

XIV. *Probus* was equally ſage and moderate. He oppoſed as long as he could the Inclination and Importunity of the Army who declared him Emperor. (*g*) You make, ſaid he, a bad Choice, which is neither ſuitable to me nor you. You neither conſult your own Good nor my Character. I am an Enemy to all Flattery and Complaiſance; and I will not be for you. It was the ſure way to make the Zeal of the Soldiery for him relent, to addreſs them in this Faſhion; nay, it was to riſk the turning it into Indignation againſt him; but he fear'd that leſs than their Zeal; and we have no reaſon to doubt but what he wrote to one of the principal Officers of the Empire (*h*) was his real Sentiment. (*i*) I never deſired, ſays he, the Place I poſſeſs. It was with the utmoſt reluctance I accepted it; and I only continue in it becauſe I am conſtrained to it, thro' fear of involving the

(*f*) Curabo, enitar, efficiam, ne vobis deſint, ſi non fortia facta, ſaltem vobis atque imperatore digna conſilia. *p.* 285.

(*g*) Non vobis expedit, milites, non mecum bene agitis. Ego enim vobis blandiri non poſſum. *Vopiſc in vit. Probi. pag.* 291.

(*h*) *A Capiton, Preſet du Pretoire.*

(*i*) Imperium nunquam optavi, & invitus accepi. Deponere mihi rem invidioſiſſimam non licet. *ibid. pag* 291.

State in new Dangers, and expoſing myſelf to them.

XV. Theſe great Men judged more wiſely of the ſovereign Power than moſt Princes, who fear the Dangers of it leſs, becauſe they are leſs acquainted with them. They had more Judgment and leſs Ambition; and they ſtill knew, that the moſt preſſing and perſuaſive Motive that can engage one to accept of Royalty, is the Deſire of being truly uſeful to the Republic, and the fear of its falling into bad Hands.

Fifth Reflexion.] XVI. This then is what a Prince ought to eſteem in his Grandeur, and what alone ought to render it precious to him. He is by it put into a condition of becoming the Benefactor of the Republic, of promoting in it many valuable Goods, and of remedying many Evils; of giving Life and Motion to a great Empire; and of making Juſtice and good Laws flouriſh in it; of bringing Virtue and Probity into Reputation; of inciting a Spirit of Induſtry, and eſtabliſhing Peace and Plenty in it. He reckons himſelf happy in that Senſe, for having been choſen by Divine Providence to be the Source and Fountain of ſo many Bleſſings to a People; and he comforts himſelf under all the Toils and Dangers of his Dignity, with the Hopes of being uſeful to an Infinity of Perſons, and yet more by the Joy of having been ſo.

Sixth Reflexion.] XVII. But he always diſtinguiſhes his own real State from that of others; and at the ſame Time that he renders them happy by his ſage Conduct, he does not believe himſelf to be truly Great, becauſe he hath great Power; nor even becauſe he uſes it for the public Good; but becauſe he is really in his Heart and Soul truly Good: For thither muſt he go to judge juſtly

of

of himſelf. (*k*) It is good, ſays St. *Auguſtine*, that good Princes reign long and over many Nations: But this Utility is to the People rather than to the Princes. (*l*) And when God gives to the World ſuch as have all the Qualifications neceſſary for reigning, ſtill it is rather to the Empires than to the Emperors that God ſhews Kindneſs.

Seventh Reflexion.] XVIII. It does not follow from hence, that the Merit of a Prince, who makes a right uſe of his Authority, is not very great in the Sight of God: But even in that Senſe his Authority and the good Uſe of it have a more immediate Reſpect to the People than to himſelf; and it is becauſe he is fully perſuaded that all his Greatneſs is for the ſake of others, that there is ſuch Merit in employing it well.

XIX. Thus it is, a young Prince ought to form his Ideas of princely Grandeur, in order to have juſt Conceptions of it; and not be in danger of being hurried away by the falſe Prejudices of the greater Part of Mankind, who admire nothing in a Sovereign but his Power and Independence; who imagine him happy, becauſe he is Maſter of all that his voluptuous Deſires can covet; who think or would perſuade him to think, that his Grandeur is his natural State, and make as great a diſtinction between him and them, as it does between his and their Rank or Place.

(*k*) Utile eſt ut boni longe lateque diu regnent: neque hoc tam ipſis quam illis utile eſt quibus regnant. *S. Auguſt. L.* 4. *de Civit. Dei, Cap.* 3.

(*l*) In hac ergo terra regnum bonorum non tam illis præſtatur, quam rebus humanis. *ibid.*

CHAPTER V.

What Judgment a Prince ought to entertain of the exterior Splendor belonging to his Dignity.

ARTICLE I.

A Prince ought to have a juſt Notion of his Exterior Greatneſs.

I. AS he muſt always live in the middle of that Pomp, and be always ſurrounded with it, it is of great Importance to him to know the End of it, and to what purpoſe it ought to be employ'd: Otherwiſe his Mind will be filled with popular Errors, and he will quit the Paths which alone can lead him to ſolid Glory, to follow by deceitful ones a vain Idea of Splendor and Majeſty, which will vaniſh in the Moment he thinks to ſeize it, and will only leave him the Confuſion of being miſled and impoſed upon.

II. The exterior Pomp of his Grandeur comprehends two Things: The Honours or Reſpects paid him, and the Magnificence. The one depends on the Prince, and the other on his Subjects. It is of Conſequence, to examine both to the bottom; and to avoid Confuſion it is proper to examine them ſeparately.

ARTICLE II.

What Opinion a Prince ought to have of the Honours and Reſpects due to him.

I. IT is certain, Reſpect and Veneration are due

due to Princes. (*m*) They repreſent God; they are cloathed with his Authority; it is he who has rendered them ſo great, and placed them over us; and it would by conſequence be to fail in Reſpect to him, to refuſe a ſincere Homage to the Majeſty with which he has inveſted them.

II. All the Arguments which prove the Authority of Princes to be neceſſary to the Preſervation of the Public Peace and Tranquility, and that without it all would run into Diſorder and Confuſion, are likewiſe Proofs of the Obligation every-one is under to pay Reſpect to it in Juſtice and Gratitude. It is the firſt Tribute we owe to a Prince for all the good Offices we receive and expect from him; and it is viſible, that an Authority not reſpected according to the Extent of its Power would become abſolutely uſeleſs; or would be very limited in the good Effects, which it ought and would otherwiſe produce.

III. The more certain it is, that the moſt profound Reſpect is due to Authority, ſince it comes from God, and is deſtin'd for the Public Good; ſo much the more evident is it, that it belongs more to the Station the Prince is placed in, than to his Perſon. It is a natural Conſequence of his Grandeur itſelf, and adds nothing that is internal and perſonal. It is not neceſſarily annexed with Merit, and is no Proof of it. It leaves all one's Defects as it found them, and cannot change one of them; and if it finds a Prince deſtitute of ſome eſſential Qualifications it is no Supplement for them.

(*m*) Nos judicium Dei ſuſpicimus in imperatoribus, qui gentibus illos præfecit. Id in eis ſcimus eſſe quod Deus voluit. *Tertull. Apolog. c.* 32.

IV. Whence it is manifeſt, that a Prince would deceive himſelf, if he ſhould attribute to himſelf an Honour only due to his Authority, and imagine he merited all that his Place deſerves. His kingly Character and his Perſon are two very different Things. The one is ſacred and divine; but the other may be very unworthy of it: And a Prince ought to have it deeply fixed in his Mind, (*n*) that God, by entruſting him with an Authority which he commands us to reſpect, did not intend to flatter his Vanity, nor furniſh Fewel to his Pride; but that he deſigned the Prince ſhould fear to diſhonour by his Conduct ſo reputable an Authority, and exert himſelf with all his Might to merit by his Actions the ſame Honour that is due to his Character.

V. The Reſpect paid to a Prince is indeed, to a noble Mind who hath juſt Sentiments of true Greatneſs, a very powerful Incentive to endeavour to deſerve it. He would be aſhamed to receive it without laying himſelf out vigorouſly to merit it. He would otherwiſe look upon it as a publick Reproach for his unworthy Conduct; and he would be covered with Shame and Confuſion, if he was convinced all the Reſpect was rendered to his Station and Authority, and no Part of it to his own Merit.

VI. He knows however very well, that notwithſtanding all his Efforts, he is ever ſhort of deſerving the Veneration he receives from all the Perſons who are ſubject to him, (*o*) whoſe Merit and Virtue are frequently ſuperior to his; and this inward

(*n*) Non vult te facere ſuperbum Chriſtus. *S. Auguſt. Enarrat. in Pſal.* 125. *n.* 7.

(*o*) Ordinavit ſic Deus eccleſiam ſuam, ut omnis poteſtas ordinata in ſæculo, habeat honorem, & aliquando a melioribus. *S. Auguſt. Enarrat. in Pſal.* 125. *n.* 7.

ward Reflection enables him to contain himſelf from being too much flattered by the vain Imagination of his being the Object of univerſal Homage. He ſees, with a ſort of confuſion, Perſons of high Merit proſtrated at his Feet, and is not intoxicated by an Honour which is ſometimes more due to him who renders it than to him who receives it, if it was to be regulated by Merit and not by Rank.

VII. For ſome Sorts of Grandeur are natural, and others are of Inſtitution. Thoſe of the former kind are real good Qualities of the Mind or Heart, ſuch as Prudence and Goodneſs: The others are Diſtinctions of Authority and Rank; ſuch as the Quality of a King and that of a Prince. Honour is due to both, but not Eſteem. Honour and Eſteem unite when the Grandeur is likewiſe natural and real: But when it is not, Honour remains ſeperate from Eſteem.

VIII. It is juſt, to honour the Authority to which we are ſubjected: But it is not juſt that a Prince ſhould exact Eſteem without any Title to it but his Authority. That would be indeed to confound two Things abſolutely different in themſelves. When a Prince really has the eſtimable Virtues, I will eſteem him; but when he contents himſelf to have Power, I will reſpect the Authority God has given him, but I will refuſe him my Eſteem.

IX. He muſt poſſeſs both kinds of Greatneſs, the Natural and the Inſtituted, to oblige me to unite, with regard to him, Reſpect and Eſteem: And he ought to underſtand, that as it would be Folly to diſpute his Sovereignty with him, under pretence of having more Merit than he, ſo it would be a great Injuſtice on his Side, to pretend to more Right than another to Praiſe and Approbation, merely becauſe he is Sovereign.

X. It is therefore neceſſary that a Prince, who hath a juſt Judgment and a diſcerning Spirit, ſhould fix upon his Mind the real Diſtinction between the Honour always due to him, and the Eſteem which may, without any Injuſtice, be refuſed him. If any one fails in Reſpect to him, his Authority, to which it is due, puts the Means in his Hands of making it to be payed to him, and of puniſhing all who refuſe to render it. It is Power then avenges the Contempt of it, and Force comes in to aſſiſt Grandeur: But it would be to confound the Nature of Things, and a groſs Abuſe of Power, if one ſhould attempt to force Eſteem. 'Tis to Merit only that ſuch an Honour is due, and Power would but exert all its Terrors in vain to obtain it.

ARTICLE III.

What Opinion he ought to have of the Magnificence accompanying his Grandeur.

I. IT is the ſame with regard to Magnificence, which ſo many Princes endeavour to ſubſtitute in the room of all Merit. It may be proper to draw an external Attention and Regard to him; but it cannot ſupply the Place of any one perſonal Quality: The whole Uſe of it conſiſts in making an outward Shew of Grandeur; and it only becomes worthy of Praiſe by being directed by Right Reaſon.

II. We may have a very preciſe Idea of what is meant by Magnificence; for tho' it extends to Things of very different Natures, yet, I think, one may divide them into two Claſſes: The firſt of which comprehends whatever contributes to the Authority and Security of Kings; and the other all that ſerves to Splendor and Pomp. The Officers of the Prince and of the Crown, a Guard,

and

and Troops, placed as the Intereſt of the State requires, make part of the former; Palaces, rich Furniture, rare and precious Moveables, a ſhining and numerous Court and great Expences, belong to the other Claſs, which is wholly for Shew and Pomp.

III. There is nothing that it concerns a Prince more to have a juſt Apprehenſion of than this; but it would be to anticipate things, and not to treat of them in proper Order, to expatiate on this Subject at preſent; becauſe the due Conſideration of it is connected with ſeveral Truths, which muſt prepare the Way for ſetting it in a due Light. I ſhall ſatisfy myſelf with making ſome Reflexions, which will ſerve as a Foundation for the Conſequences I am to draw in another Place.

IV. One cannot deny that the Grandeur of temporal Princes ſtands in need of a Magnificence which comprehends all that is neceſſary to their Security and Authority; and even ſomething for Trappings and Shew. They reign over all viſible Objects, and have every thing in their Power that can ſtrike the Senſes. It would therefore be to deprive them of the Badges of their Empire, not to allow them a Part of what is ſubject to them; and it would be to confound their Authority with the Eccleſiaſtical Miniſtry, the Authority of which is independent of all external Pomp, becauſe it is wholly ſpiritual, and its Object falls not under the Comprehenſion of our Senſes, but is wholly ſpiritual.

V. It is neceſſary that the King ſhould be the Centre of the State, and command the univerſal Reſpect of all his Subjects. Some do not ſtand in need of external Majeſty to mark out to them the real Authority which God hath eſtabliſhed: But the greater Part know no Grandeur but that which ſtrikes their Senſes: They admire nothing but

but what Voluptuouſneſs prompts them to, and they muſt ſee in the Prince the Image of that only Happineſs and Greatneſs they are fond of: Without it he does not appear to them elevated above them, becauſe they have no other Notion of Grandeur; and with reſpect to ſuch it would be almoſt to degrade the Prince, to take from him all that Pageantry which dazles them.

VI. But the Prince, who keeps it up on their Account ought not to fall into their fooliſh Error: He ought not to place any Part of his Happineſs in a Magnificence he is forbid to ſet his Heart upon; in which there is nothing ſolid; and that is indeed only excuſable on account of the Weakneſs of thoſe for whoſe ſake it it is neceſſary, and the Impoſſibility of maintaining without ſuch methods the Reſpect due to ſovereign Authority.

VII. Amidſt all this State and Pomp he ought to have the Love of Moderation, and even of Simplicity well eſtabliſhed in his Mind: It ought to afflict him in Secret, that he may not reject and put away all that troubleſome Pageantry which ever follows him, and is truly a burdenſome Reſtraint: He ought to look upon the Condition of a private Man as happier than his, becauſe it is leſs liable to Arrogance; and bear like *Eſther*, with inward Regret, all that only ſerves to make Majeſty appear more fierce and awful; and to retrench from his Magnificence whatever is not abſolutely requiſite to the Support of Authority.

VIII. For it is not true that the latter depends ſo much on the former as is imagined, and that the one may not be diminiſhed without making ſome Encroachment on the other. Princes of ſolid Merit know how to make up many ways what they ſeem to loſe by cutting off ſomething from their exterior Pomp and Splendor. They make themſelves

themſelves to be reſpected by their prudent Conduct upon a much more ſure and ſolid Foundation, than they are by their outward Faſtuouſneſs. The Love and Confidence of their People, which they know how to gain, attaches them more firmly to them than the vain Admiration of a Magnificence not very neceſſary. And ſuch Princes would be extremely uneaſy, if their Subjects ſhould talk more of the Grandeur of their Palaces and their Riches, than of their perſonal Merit, their Righteouſneſs, their Humanity, and their ſincere Application to render thoſe whom they govern truly happy.

IX. One Example will ſufficiently evince this Truth. Never was a Prince more reſpected or better obeyed than *Auguſtus*. Cities were built in honour of him in almoſt all the Provinces. Nay, things were carried ſo far, that even Altars were erected to him while he was yet alive, in an idolatrous Manner highly criminal; yet never was Prince more removed from Vanity and Oſtentation. (*p*) He ſatisfied himſelf with one ſingle Apartment, which he occupied Summer and Winter for forty Years. (*q*) His Furniture was ſo plain and modeſt, that private Perſons a few Years after would not have been contented with it. He wore no Cloaths but what *Livia* his Wife, his Siſter and his Daughter, had ſpun and worked. (*r*) He eat very little, and of the commoneſt Things. And

(*p*) Per annos amplius quadraginta eodem cubiculo hieme & æſtate manſit. *In Vit. Anguſt. Suet. cap.* 72.

(*q*) Inſtrumenti ejus & ſuppellectilis parcimonia apparet etiam nunc, reſiduis lectis atque menſis, quorum pleraque vix privatæ elegantiæ ſunt. Veſte uſus eſt ab uxore, & ſorore, & filia neptibusque confecta. *Ibid. cap.* 73.

(*r*) Cibi minimi erat, atque vulgaris fere. Secundarium panem, & piſculos minutos & caſeum bubulum manu preſſum, & ficus virides biferas maxime appetebat. *cap.* 76.

And he drank very little Wine (*s*). See then all the Magnificence of a Prince who commanded the whole World, and whom Men thro' exceſſive Love and Gratitude had deifyed, while he was yet among them.

X. I am not therefore ſurprized at what a great Man ſaid to the Emperor *Arcadius*; (*t*) That the *Roman* Empire never made a greater Figure, than when its Emperors leaſt affected Shew, commanded its Armies themſelves, ſuffered the ſame Hardſhips with the Common-Soldiers, lived in great Simplicity, and had nothing in their Dreſs but what was very ſimple and modeſt, as may be ſeen by their Statues, which Children, ſays that Author, now think ridiculous. But after the Emperors thought of rendering themſelves conſiderable by Gold and Purple, and external Magnificence, (*u*) they loſt of their true and ſolid Greatneſs, in proportion to their Ambition after a merely ſuperficial one.

XI. It is in fact a neceſſary Conſequence of the Error into which Princes fall, with regard to what would make them truly great, that they neglect it, and ſubſtitute in its Place Things which have only an empty Semblance of Greatneſs, and which bad Princes may have as well as the good; and which thoſe carry fartheſt, whoſe Riches being their ſole

(*s*) Vini quoque natura parciſſimus erat. *cap.* 77.

(*t*) Quonam tempore Romanas res melius ſeſe habuiſſe putas? Num ex quo purpurati & inaurati eſtis? An potius tunc, cum exercitibus præficiebantur homines in propatulo vitam agentes, ſole aduſti, reliquoque in cultu ſine ullo artificio ſimplices, non tragicum timorem ſpirantes, ſed laconicis pileis tecti, quos in ſtatuis pueri ſpectantes derident. *Syneſ. pag.* 16.

(*u*) Quantum imperatoribus ſuperbi atque arrogantis cultus acceſſit, tantumdem deceſſit veritatis. *Ibid. pag.* 17.

ſole Merit, are an exhauſtleſs Source of new and extravagant Expences, which fall exceedingly heavy on their Subjects.

XII. It is Weakneſs that brings about this fatal Exchange: It is becauſe they feel it is much eaſier to dazzle fooliſh Eyes by a Magnificence that coſts the Prince nothing, but his Subjects very dear, than to ſupport, by real and univerſal Merit, the genuine Majeſty of Sovereignty. They put in the room of what is internally wanting, the Mind being poor, puſillanimous, and miſerable, an Outſide loaded with ſparkling Ornaments, which they vainly expect will cover their Defects; and ſubſtitute, inſtead of ſomething real, an external Decoration, which deceives the Prince himſelf, but very few others. Whoever is truly worthy of ruling a People ought to be aſhamed to owe his Authority to ſuch ſilly mean Supports; and he ought always to have that Maxim of one of the greateſt Emperors the *Romans* ever had preſent before his Mind; that (*x*) it is Virtue and true Magnanimity, and not external Magnificence, which gives Weight and Dignity to Sovereigns.

CHAPTER VI.

One of the moſt eſſential Qualifications of a Prince is to know Mankind well.

I. AFTER the Reflexions the Prince has made upon the Power God has inveſted him with, and its Conſequences and Badges, he ought

(*x*) Non multum inſignibus aut ad apparatum regium auri & ſerici deputabat; dicens, Imperium in virtute eſſe, non in decore. *Alex. Sever. dans la vie qu'on a fait Lampride. p.* 215.

ought to turn his Eyes towards thoſe with the Government of whom God has entruſted him. He cannot diſcharge that Truſt wiſely without knowing them well; and his Reign will be nothing but a Train of Follies and Blunders, if he neglects a Science, which, properly ſpeaking, is the Science of Kings, and ſhould be made their chief Study all their Days; and which, after many Expences and Reflections, will ſtill remain very imperfect.

II. If one had only a Herd of mere Animals to overſee, he could not do it ſucceſsfully without being very attentive to whatever can hurt them or be uſeful to them; without ſtudying the beſt Way of managing them; and without daily learning what Experience diſcovers to a careful Obſerver, with relation to their Maladies and the proper Remedies. How much more juſt then is it, that a Prince, charged with the Care of Men, ſhould vigorouſly apply himſelf to the Study of Mankind, that he may not govern them without Intelligence, and as it were at hazard; that he may not employ in the Government of rational Agents any other means but Reaſon and Prudence; that he may enter into their real Wants, ſatisfy their juſt Inclinations; preſerve whatever is good in them, and oppoſe or remedy whatever is wrong or unjuſt among them.

III. Can one believe that a Paſtor, who hath no higher Charge than to look after a Flock of Sheep would acquit himſelf of his Truſt by merely conſulting his own Honour, and employing nothing but Force? How then can we imagine that a Prince has nothing to do but to command whatever he pleaſes and to ſupport his arbitrary Will by

by Force, and that to reign it is only neceſſary to be deſpotick?

IV. One muſt have a very low Idea of Royalty, to confine it merely to Power, and exclude Reaſon entirely from it. Is there a Father who would not think himſelf diſhonoured if we ſhould judge him incapable of conducting his Family with Diſcretion? Would we truſt an imprudent Man with the Government of a City; with its Laws, its Commerce, its Liberties and Immunities? And what Raſhneſs muſt it then be to undertake the Care and Government of a vaſt State, conſiſting of Millions of Men, without endeavouring to underſtand thoroughly what they are, and hence to learn ones Duty toward them?

V. A good Prince ardently deſires to know how Men are moved, attracted, governed, filled with Admiration and high Eſteem, that he may lay himſelf out to attain to all thoſe Qualities which are able to produce ſuch Effects. He is earneſt to know what they expect of their Governour, that he may not come ſhort of their Expectation. He will enquire why it is their Intereſt to ſubmit themſelves to him, that he may govern and manage their Intereſts in ſuch a manner that their Submiſſion to him may be more ſecure and conſtant. He will carefully attend to what may offend them, or excite their Diffidence, that he may diligently avoid it. He will look attentively into their Deſires and Inclinations, that he may diſcern what it is fit or unfit to grant them, leaſt he ſhould by a fooliſh Complaiſance have any hand in encouraging Evils which ought to be hinder'd by his firm Oppoſition to them.

VI. He applies himſelf above all things to know by what means Men of various Characters and Intereſts may be united in the ſame Way of thinking;

thinking; by what Methods of Inſinuation one gets into their Hearts; by what Remedies one cures their Prejudices; by what degrees their Confidence is gained; and by what Symptoms it may be diſcovered whether one is Maſter enough to be able to eſtabliſh all the Good he judges neceſſary; becauſe this is the End of all a good King's Projects: And it is for this Reaſon that he inſpects narrowly into thoſe whom he would ſerve and make happy; which he cannot do but by rendering them better Men.

VII. Beſides theſe Reaſons, which are ſtrong and unanſwerable, the Prince is obliged to make the Knowledge of Mankind his principal Study, in order to know the Abilities, Diſpoſition, Capacity and Merit of his Subjects with relation to Employments: It belongs to him to chuſe and place them in different Offices: Upon him fall all the hurtful Conſequences of a bad Choice; of him ſhall the Account of all theſe Things be demanded: And how can a Prince behave himſelf well in a difficult Choice, if he knows not the Nature of every Employment; or cannot judge of his Qualifications to whom he confides it; if he ſuffers himſelf to be impoſed upon by falſe Appearances; if he takes aſſiſtance in ſuch a difficult dangerous Matter from unfaithful or unknowing Perſons to whom he hath moſt unadviſedly given his Ear?

VIII. How ſhall a Prince be able to diſtinguiſh extraordinary Merit hid in Obſcurity, from that which is much inferior but highly vaunted of? How can he know what is real Merit in each State of Life, without having himſelf univerſal Merit? And how is it poſſible that he can have acquired it, if he is ignorant of the Merit of others, and of the Means they uſed to attain to it?

IX. How

IX. How ſhall he be able to judge of many Qualities united in the ſame Perſon, ſome of which are good and others bad, to mark out a proper Station for ſuch a one in which he ſhall not be dangerous but uſeful? How on the other hand can he have firmneſs enough to refuſe an Employment to a wiſe Man of a well regulated Life, but who hath not ſufficient Reſolution and Strength of Mind to reſiſt the Dangers with which that Charge may be governed? How ſhall he be capable of determining himſelf in every Nomination to a Charge by the Motive that ought ſolely to decide in the Matter, without ever allowing himſelf to be deceived by other Qualifications, excellent indeed in themſelves, but not thoſe which are particularly requiſite to that Station.

X. Who may not ſee by this ſuperficial View, which is indeed far ſhort of the Importance and extent of the Subject, that a Prince is expoſed to a thouſand Miſtakes and Impoſitions, if he does not know Men, and for what they are fit; if he cannot ballance their good with their bad Qualities; and if he is not capable of foreſeeing to what Wickedneſs Perſons, whom he ought not to lay open to ſuch Danger, may be tempted, by Opportunity ſuited to natural Inclination?

XI. But what renders the Knowledge of Mankind infinitely more neceſſary to a Prince than all that hath been ſaid, is the Intereſt he hath himſelf in the Matter: For he cannot avoid having to do with many Perſons, dividing his Authority with them, and admitting them into his Counſels and Confidence. And it is of the laſt Moment to him to know thoſe thoroughly whom he truſts, and to whom he delegates a part of his Power; for if he is deceived in his Choice, he will be deceived in all they do?

XII. His good Intentions will be of no avail; they will ever continue to be abortive, or ſucceſsleſs. In vain will he deſire to know the Truth; it will never come near to him. He will always remain ignorant of it, and of the true State of his Kingdom; of real Merit, and of what deſerves his Favour and Reward. He ſhall be but a nominal King, and in reality a Dupe. His Power will only ſerve to render him odious; and will belong to his Miniſters, and not to him.

XIII. There is then no greater Danger to a Prince, nor any thing the Conſequences of which are more remedileſs, than not to have Eyes enough to penetrate into the inmoſt Retreats of the human Breaſt, to diſcover there the very contrary of what Artifice preſents an outward Semblance to him.

XIV. There are Characters which appear very near to one another, which are really very different. (*y*) Vice often counterfeits Virtue, and ſometimes hath more the outward Appearances of it than Virtue itſelf; becauſe the Shew of it being only what it wants to have, all its Attention is toward that ſingle Point. One muſt look very near to Objects, and with a very diſcerning Eye, not to be deceived; in the Courts of Princes eſpecially, where, in truth, all know one another well enough, but all equally hide themſelves from the Prince, by the external Appearances with which he is almoſt always ſatisfied.

XV. He muſt give his utmoſt attention to diſtinguiſh Truth from Falſhood, aſſumed from real Modeſty, affected Simplicity from that which is ſincere and natural, the pretended Diſintereſtedneſs

(*y*) Vitia nobis ſub nomine virtutum obrepunt: in his magno periculo erratur: his certas notas imprime. *Senec. Epiſt.* 45.

neſs from that which is deeply rooted in the Heart; counterfeit Probity from that which is eſtabliſhed on ſolid Principles; and hypocritical from the genuine and well enlightened Duty.

XVI. For no Virtues are more falſe than thoſe which want nothing but inward Truth, and their whole Study is to keep up an outward Reſemblance to what they are not. There are no Men more dangerous than thoſe who apply themſelves to impoſe upon others by a Shew of Merit. There are no Perſons more corrupt, or more treacherous, becauſe there are none who more deſpiſe real Virtue and the Dictates of Conſcience; and who by conſequence are under leſs reſtraint from the Motives which influence or reſtrain others.

XVII. A private Perſon is not much intereſted in examining ſeverely whether one really is what he ſeems to be. He ought, on the contrary, not to encourage a ſuſpicious Temper, or allow himſelf to fear that an appearance of Wiſdom and Modeſty is but a Cover to a very bad Heart; becauſe God does not permit him to penetrate into a Myſtery reſerved to himſelf to know. But a Prince is under Obligation not to content himſelf with the outward ſuperficial Appearances of Things; becauſe he is under Obligation to avoid being deceived; and he cannot be more dangerouſly impoſed upon, than in placing his Confidence in an Impoſtor, imagining he places it well, and on Truth itſelf.

XVIII. It is for the ſake of the whole State that he is diffident: It is out of love to his People that he is timorous and ſuſpicious. It is to avoid an Error by which the whole Kingdom would ſuffer, and for which God will call him to a ſtrict Account, if he does not take all prudent Meaſures to avoid it. Open, unmaſked Vice does not

alarm him; it carries its Guilt and Condemnation on its Front. Vice mixed with ſome Virtues gives him no Inquietude; becauſe it ſeems to take no pains to hide itſelf: But Probity which ſeems perfect awakes his Attention; not that he deſires not to find it ſuch; but becauſe he apprehends ſome hidden Ambuſh: For pure undeſigning Virtue is extreamly rare at Courts. It is ſeldom that one without any Views diſcovers to the Prince what he himſelf does not ſee and know; and if he is not capable of judging otherwiſe than by outward Appearances, and what he hears, he will ever be a very bad Judge of what is real and not counterfeited.

CHAPTER VII.

Defects a Prince muſt avoid, not to be deceived in judging of Men.

Firſt Defect, &c. I. THIS Art is very difficult, as may be conjectured from what hath been ſaid, and it will appear more fully in the following Chapter: But the Prejudices of Mankind, and with which Princes are more liable to be prepoſſeſſed than others, throw Obſtacles in the way to it more inſurmountable than all the Difficulties with which it is in itſelf attended.

II. The firſt proceeds from a malignant Diſpoſition, more eſpecially when it is accompanied with ſome degree of Penetration and Judgment. Then all Virtue is ſuſpected by a diffident Prince who hath little Knowldge and leſs Experience of it. Through fear of being deceived by a falſe Appearance, he rebukes even Truth itſelf. He imagines he

he ſees what is not viſible. He is even hunting after what never appears. He ſends Reaſons from his own Heart to juſtify all his Suſpicions of others. He thinks it impoſſible to do good for its own Sake. And he is quick in finding out bad Motives to the moſt innocent Actions. He imputes it to Ignorance of the World when one judges favourably of Men; and believes his Knowledge far ſuperior to that of the Vulgar, in proportion as he fancies he has ſucceeded in diſcovering what was hid from them.

III. How can one ſo diſpoſed know Merit and thoſe who have it? Muſt one lay aſide the Appearances of Virtue to perſuade him one is really virtuous? Is Virtue a mere Sound which hath nothing real in it? Or in that caſe, what would he have us think of himſelf? And whither are all his Cares not be deceived directed; ſince he cannot poſſibly avoid being ſo; whatever does not appear bad being more ſo than any other thing elſe, becauſe Hypocriſy is joined with it? Beſides, what can one chuſe where all is corrupted? Or what Succeſs does one propoſe by Precaution, which muſt terminate in rejecting every thing?

IV. It is viſible, that Diffidence, carried to this Exceſs, involves in the ſame Inconveniencies with blind Imprudence; ſince it leaves no room for diſcerning Merit, but pretending to diſtinguiſh Truth from Falſhood, Vice from Virtue, Merit from Hypocriſy, and confounds them all together.

V. A well diſpoſed Prince does not ſcrutinize what is good and virtuous thro' fear it ſhould be really ſuch. On the contrary, he ſearches it with earneſt Deſire, and hopes to find it give Succeſs; and when he finds it to be ſuch, he well knows the Value of it. It is from a ſincere Eſteem of

Merit that he fears miſtaking it, and he is diffident of what has only the Semblance of it, purely becauſe he fully underſtands in what the Reality conſiſts.

VI. It belongs then to Virtue to know and diſtinguiſh Virtue. (*z*) Vice knows it not, and cannot know itſelf. It is Light alone that can judge of Darkneſs, and Wiſdom only that can diſcern Imprudence. (*a*) All the Knowledge of thoſe who are inſtructed by their own Malignity of Temper, is Obſcurity and low baſe Suſpiciouſneſs. Such Perſons mutually applaud one another when they meet; and in calumniating Virtue they vie with one another in ſurmiſing Suſpicions againſt its Utility. But when they ſpeak to Men of Probity and Wiſdom, they paſs in their Sentiments for blinded Fools, to whom Virtue is unknown, and who judge of others by their own corrupt Hearts.

VII. Theſe are the Reflections of a wiſe Pagan. 'Tis his Expreſſions I have been making Uſe of; and I think myſelf obliged to add what he ſays farther on the ſame Subject. (*b*) It would be a great Happineſs

(*z*) Improbitas neque virtutem, neque ſeipſam unquam cognoſcit. Virtus vero, quum naturæ temporis experientia acceſſerit, & ſui ipſius & improbitatis cognitionem conſequetur. *Plato L.* 3. *de Rep. p.* 408.

(*a*) Verſutus ille & ſuſpicax, qui & multa injuſte agit ipſe, & qui vafer ac ſapiens putatur, quando cum ſais ſimilibus verſatur, ingenii acritate, & prudenti perſpicacitate valere creditur, ſua in ſe exempla reſpiciens. Quando autem cum bonis & ſenioribus res illi eſt, fatuus prorſus apparet, importune & præter rem diffidens, & candidam morum ſimplicitatem ignorans, quippe cujus nulla in ſe habeat exempla. *Idem. ibid.*

(*b*) Conſentaneum eſt judicem non eſſe juvenem, ſed ſenem. qui ſero quæ & qualis ſit injuſtitia didicerit; qui non propriam in ſeipſo ſit expertus, ſed qui alienam in aliorum animis longo tempore exploravit & attente & qui ſcientia potius quæ ſit hujus mali natura cognoſcat. *Idem ibid.*

Happineſs (ſays that great Man) if in a well regulated State, thoſe who have the Government of it were Men in Years, and at the ſame Time of thorough Integrity, that they might be able of themſelves to diſtinguiſh Good, and no otherwiſe acquainted with Vice, than by a long Experience that had laid them under the Neceſſity of obſerving it in others. (*c*) In this, ſays the ſame Author, they would be abſolutely different from the Phyſicians a State ought to chuſe; for thoſe are likelieſt to be the moſt able ones, who having weakly Conſtitutions, and beginning the Study early, have thus had by their own Experience, joined with a long Courſe of Enquiry into the Nature of Diſeaſes and Remedies, the beſt Opportunities of making Proficiency in that Art.

VIII. The Wiſdom of this Pagan ought to fill thoſe with Shame and Confuſion who imagine themſelves prudent becauſe they are corrupt; and judge of the Probity of others by the Depravity of their own Diſpoſition. A Prince infected with this unhappy Temper, ſo common among the Great, will all his Life be ignorant of Mankind, and cannot form a true Judgment but of thoſe who reſemble himſelf. I have inſiſted long on this Point, not only becauſe it is a capital one, but becauſe without this Precaution it would be eaſy to confound a great Vice with an eminent Virtue, and to give a Prince a malignant Turn; by exhort-

(*c*) Medici peritiſſimi, & ad artem præſtandam aptiſſimi evaderent, ſi ab ineunte ætate, præter magiſtrorum inſtitutionem, uſum quoque artis mature adhiberent, & ipſi natura non omnino ſana eſſent, ſed omnia morborum genera experirentur: neque enim corpus corpore curant, ſed animi induſtria. *Idem. ibid. p.* 408.

ing him to ſearch Men accurately, and learn to ſcan true Merit narrowly.

Second Defect, &c.] IX. There is another ſort of Diffidence different from this which ſprings from Corruption of Heart, becauſe it only proceeds from want of Reſolution, and Darkneſs of Mind. They know in general that they may be impoſed upon; that it is a great Miſchief to be ſo; that the moſt ſpecious Outſide ought not to be relied upon; that even thoſe of whom they take Counſel may miſlead them either ignorantly or deſignedly. They thus remain in a ſtate of Suſpenſe, and wiſh to continue always in it, if it were poſſible; but the neceſſity of Affairs obliging them to determine themſelves, they chuſe by Chance whoever happens to preſent himſelf, without any Knowledge of him; and are as ready to condemn their Choice as to defend it, not knowing whether he is a Man of Merit, or unworthy of their Nomination.

X. Such Princes often do an Injury to Virtue by rebuting it, and an Honour to Vice by putting it in its Place, and they always confound them by an equal Diffidence of them both, and through an utter Incapacity of diſtinguiſhing them. We muſt neither expect from their Conduct a right Judgment nor Firmneſs. (*d*) Their Minds will ever continue open to all Suſpicions and Calumnies. It will be eaſy to render Merit ſuſpected by them: And as Virtue is ſimple, but Vice full of Wiles and Artifices, ſome Perſon of Ambition and Addreſs will ſeize upon this weak irreſolute Prince, and will hardily take on himſelf all the Deciſions with which he ſees his Maſter to be embaraſſed.

Third

(*d*) Utrumque in vitio eſt, & omnibus credere & nulli. *Sen. Ep.* 3.

Third Defect, &c.] XI. A third Obſtacle, as oppoſite to the Knowledge of Mankind as thoſe I have mention'd, is a Perſuaſion that all Men are much alike, and that it is of little conſequence to examine what they are, or what difference their perſonal Qualities make among them; becauſe all that Difference is but a Trifle: That all have in them, nearly in the ſame Proportion, a Mixture of Good and Bad; that the Abilities and Defects are blended in all pretty equally; and that one has on the one hand equal Reaſon to hope of all equally that they will do well in Employments, and on the other, to fear of all equally that they will acquit themſelves very ill.

XII. In conſequence of this Diſpoſition, one eſteems and deſpiſes all Men equally: And one never ſees any good Reaſons either for placing or diſplacing them, becauſe one will never really rely upon them who are employed, and will be equally miſtruſtful of any Succeſſors that can be put in their Room.

XIII. It is by this unjuſt Prejudice that the greater part of Princes think themſelves diſpenſed from the Study of Men, and that they are very indifferent about what Choice they make, being perſuaded in their Hearts, that after a good deal of trouble in examining they would not have been better ſerved; and therefore Search is but uſeleſs Labour.

XIV. But whoever knows what an almoſt infinite Diſtance there frequently is between one Man and another, for the Church, for the Diſtribution of Juſtice, for War, for the Finances; between a Man worthy of his Prince's Confidence, and one who abuſes it; between one zealous for the Public Good, and one who

who is an Enemy to it: Whoever underſtands theſe Differences is capable of judging of the Blindneſs of a Prince who does not, and of its horrible Conſequences.

Fourth Defect, &c.] XV. But one is often miſled into this unhappy Diſpoſition of Mind by Indolence, which is another Obſtacle to the Knowledge of Mankind. A Prince will reign, and yet be at his Eaſe. He will be Maſter, and yet give himſelf no Toil. He will diſpoſe of all, and yet not give himſelf the Trouble to inform himſelf of any thing. To one of ſuch a Temper it is his Intereſt to make Maxims to himſelf which fall in with his Love of Tranquility; and there is not a more commodious one in that reſpect, than the Perſwaſion of the Equality of Mankind as to Merit or Imperfection. One following this Principle may ſhut his Eyes, and choſe without Fear, becauſe all Men have the ſame Talents: One may blindfold himſelf, and turn any one out of his Place, becauſe all have the ſame Faults: The Prince's Will, to which all is equal, is the only thing which can decide: To go further is vain Subtlety and needleſs Vexation.

Fifth Defect, &c.] XVI. Experience, which ſeems to juſtify this falſe Maxim, is a fifth Obſtacle. I thought, in the Beginning of my Reign, ſays a Prince, that it was neceſſary to know and diſtinguiſh Men; but Practice in the World hath diſabus'd me of that Prepoſſeſſion. I have not known one Perſon that was conſiderably preferable to another. Time has diſcovered to me, in all, hidden Faults. I have heard the ſame Things of all, received the ſame Complaints of all, and very often thoſe I choſe by chance anſwered my Expectation better than any others. It is then

a very needleſs Trouble to think of ſounding Men. 'Tis the Miſtake, the Chimera of Novices; but Experience ſoon undeceives them.

XVII. This is true to a certain Degree, and will always be ſo, when one goes no farther than Court to ſeek for true Merit; and takes the Characters of Men upon content, from the Report of Miniſters, and who continues to judge, by the Idea formed in his Infancy, of what is requiſite to the Places they occupy: But when the Prince ſhall have juſt Conceptions of every thing, and ſhall ſearch among Men to find what approaches neareſt to them; when he ſhall employ to that effect a perſevering Care, as ſhall be ſaid afterwards, he will ſoon diſcover that narrow defective Experience was not a ſure Guide, and that there is in his Kingdom more true Merit than he imagined.

Sixth Obſtacle, &c.] XVIII. But in order to that a Prince muſt have an elevated Mind, and truly great Sentiments: for how or where ſearch for what one knows not? How can one diſcern it, even when it is before him, if he has no Idea of what he ſeeks? 'Tis therefore a narrow confin'd Mind that incapacitates for the Knowledge of Mankind, and by an inſuperable Obſtacle hinders a Prince from making the Diſcernment he ought. Every thing is ſhort and limited to him who hath ſuch a Mind. He thinks nothing real he does not ſee. He takes all to be equal, becauſe his Eyes are not clear enough to perceive the Differences which eſcape their Obſervation; and beyond the narrow Circle about him, all is to him loſt in Obſcurity and Confuſion.

Seventh Obſtacle, &c.] Indifference about the Public Good is yet a more dangerous Obſtacle than

than a mean and narrow Mind. With the moſt excellent Genius, one may be ignorant of Mankind, and true Merit, becauſe one gives little Attention to what but little affects him. It is the Love of the Public which renders him attentive to all that can hurt or benefit it. It is without that but a narrow Self-intereſt which beſtirs a Prince, or puts him into any Anxiety: It is for the ſake of it he deſires to find any Relief in thoſe with whom he ſhares his Cares. When that is not concerned he gives himſelf up to his Eaſe, and makes no Uſe of his Abilities, counting for nothing or loſt Labour whatever does not terminate in himſelf.

Eighth Obſtacle, &c.] XX. In fine, it is Lowneſs of Mind, which makes the laſt Obſtacle I ſhall mention to the Knowledge of Mankind. One is not ſolicitous to find in another what he himſelf wants: One is even afraid of diſcovering it, and is rather ſuſceptible of Jealouſy if he is forced to ſee it, than of Deſire to find it. And thus ſuch an one is better pleaſed not to enquire, and to leave all Mankind in a ſort of Oblivion, which buries the great Qualities of certain Perſons, and hides the Differences they make between them, and the Prince utterly devoid of them.

CHAPTER VIII.

Nothing is more difficult than to know Mankind well.

I. THIS would be true, even with reſpect to the Knowledge of Mankind, merely terminating in Theory, and of which one was not obliged

obliged to make any practical Uſe: For among all the Works of God there is nothing greater than Man; nothing that contains in it more Marvels, or by conſequence more Myſteries and Obſcurities. But it is not to ſuch a barren Science of Man a Prince ought to confine himſelf. He is obliged to enter into an exact Examination, and to reduce what he knows into practice. 'Tis for the Republic's Sake, and not merely to ſatisfy his own Curioſity, that he muſt ſtudy that Infinity of Men confided to his Care, and whom he muſt govern, one part of them by another. It is for their Good that he endeavours to dive into their moſt ſecret Inclinations, and to diſcover the moſt latent Springs which move them; in order to mark out to every one his proper Place, proportion Authority to Merit, make private ſubſervient to public Good; and to conduct the whole State in ſuch a regular manner as to bind and unite all together by reciprocal Bonds, and ſo that the Forces of each Part may contribute to the Intereſt of the Whole.

II. This is the End a Prince ought to propoſe to himſelf (*e*), and without having which in his View, it were better to ſleep his whole Life, (as St. *Auguſtin* ſays) than beſtir himſelf to do nothing; and inſtead of charging his Miniſters with an Infinity of Affairs, which employ them Day and Night, and always fall heavy on the People, diſmiſs them as of no Uſe to the Public.

III. But

(*e*) Quid boni agitis in his tantis curis & laboribus veſtris, niſi ut bene ſit hominibus? Si enim hoc non agitis, vel dormire ſatius eſt noctesque dieſque, quam vigilare in laboribus publicis nulli utilitati hominum profuturis. *S. Auguſt. Ep.* 151. *Nova Edition. ad Cæcilianum. n.* 14.

III. But by what Means can a ſingle Man by himſelf know all that is good and bad in all thoſe who are ſubjected to him? By help of what Light ſhall he pierce the profound Receſſes of the Heart, in which a Man hides himſelf, and is ſo different from what he looks to be? How unravel all the complicated Foldings and Twiſtings in which Artifice ſo envelops itſelf, that a Man hardly knows himſelf, and is firſt deceived by. The moſt miſtruſtful ſuſpicious Perſons don't think they are ſufficiently ſuch to guard themſelves againſt Impoſture; and tho' they are in the wrong, it muſt be owned that the impenetrable Obſcurity of the Thoughts and Sentiments of Men give ſome occaſion to their Malignity.

IV. It would be a Remedy for this, if we could reduce all the Characters of Men to certain general Claſſes; and make ſuch an exact Portraiture of each to a Prince as would enable him to diſtinguiſh them. But Characters are ſo infinitely various, that the Pictures of them could never be ſo drawn as to equal the Originals, and would only ſerve to deceive; ſince he may be ſtruck with ſome Likeneſs in certain Features, which are however joined with very different ones.

V. It may happen that a Man of worth retains ſomething that is offenſive, and gives a diſadvantageous Idea of him. One of an excellent Spirit has not always that humble Air he ought to have. Sincere Virtue is often more negligent and ſimple in its Appearance than its Counterfeit. On the contrary, a very ſuperficial Merit

(*f*) In animis hominum tantæ latebræ ſunt, & tanti receſſus, ut omnes ſuſpicioſi, cum merito culpentur, etiam laudari arbitrentur ſe debere quod cauti ſint. *S. Auguſt. ibid. n.* 4.

Merit may receive a conſiderable Relief from a certain very engaging Manner; and an ambitious intriguing Perſon may hide his wicked Inſide under an external Appearance, that would make a part of the oppoſite Character. How, by conſulting any Models with which one may have loaded his Memory, can one diſcover the Merit which lies concealed under any cunning Appearances, and the Vice which lurks under a Dreſs that highly embelliſhes it?

VI. Princes commonly have a very delicate Taſte of outward Manners, and thus are more liable than others to be deceived with regard to the Subſtance. Their Feeling is very exquiſite; but their Sight is not always juſt, or ſufficiently clear. They are engaged or ſhocked by Things which merit in ſome degree ſuch an Influence, but which are very frequently not the moſt eſſential. They judge readily enough of whatever preſents itſelf to them, and their judgment is often very true; but Appearances are ſeldom deciſive with reſpect to ſubſtantial Merit; and if a Man has certain alluring Qualities, he is admitted into their Favour without a ſeverer Trial.

VII. Princes are told in general that they ought to be diffident of artful, diſſembling Perſons. But into how many different Species may one diverſify that general Character? An open, candid Air hides it in People of great Capacity and Parts. They ſeem to carry their Heart upon their Lips, in order to render it the more impenetrable; and the more Sagacity they have, and the greater Deſigns they are capable of forming, the more dexterous are they at hiding a profound Abyſs of Wickedneſs and Vice under a ſmooth innocent Surface.

VIII. Princes

VIII. Princes are warned to be on their Guard againſt Flatterers; but it is only thoſe of the groſſer ſort who are diſcovered: The more ſkillful ones are appriſed of the Diffidence he has of them, and they carefully ſhun every thing that would betray them or point them out. The more ingenious any are, the more fertile are they in Artifices and Stratagems to conceal themſelves; and the ſame Deſign of getting Poſſeſſion, by Flattery, of a Prince's Heart, is executed an hundred different Ways.

IX. It is the ſame with regard to Ambition, and the Luſt of Power. Who dare avow it before a Prince jealous of his Authority? Such cover themſelves under a Maſk of Modeſty, Averſion to Buſineſs, and Love of Retirement, capable of impoſing on almoſt Every-body; and while they employ different Perſons to ſpeak and act, to ſet off their Abilities and Merit, they themſelves, on their ſide, add one Recommendation more, which they hope will always be very powerful, an Appearance of Humility. Affected Probity, and counterfeit Zeal for the Public, under a Prince whoſe Intentions are all good, take on a thouſand Shapes to ſeduce him; and tho' Falſhood be not always ſucceſsful, it commonly has better Fortune than Truth, whoſe Viſage it borrows, and to which it adds a falſe Varniſh.

X. By what Spirit of Divination ſhall a Prince read in the Hearts of Men the direct Reverſe of what is ſhewn? For it is the Name the Scripture gives to that ſuperior Light which muſt diſcover to him all the fraudulent Artifices employ'd to deceive him: (*g*) A King muſt be a Diviner

(*g*) Divinatio in labiis Regis, in judicio non errabit os ejus. *Prov.* xvii., 10.

Diviner to judge well of every-thing. Who will diſſipate the Deluſions and Fantoms that they will ſet before him in place of Realities? (*b*) The Heart of Man is impenetrable, according to the Language of inſpired Writers (*i*). It is a profound Ocean which cannot be ſounded. What Wiſdom then is requiſite to penetrate it, and diſcover its bottom? And of what vaſt Extent muſt Wiſdom be to have that Succeſs, with regard to ſo many Perſons, whom it is a Prince's Intereſt thoroughly to know?

XI. When a Prince ſtudies Men, all thoſe about him, or who have any Hopes, likewiſe apply to the ſame Study. They examine him more attentively than they are examined by him. They imitate whatever he likes. They ſhew an Averſion to whatever he diſlikes. They approve him, to be approved by him; and amidſt that Multitude of attentive Copiers after his Example, it is very difficult to diſtinguiſh the mere Ape from him who is influenced by honeſt Motives.

XII. They obſerve his Cautiouſneſs and Diffidence, in order more effectually to deceive him, by means of his Vigilance itſelf. They know againſt what he is upon his Guard, and they avoid it. They know what he takes for a proof of Merit; and that is their Study: But with extreme Caution do they put on the Appearance of it; well knowing the great Danger of a Diſcovery, and that nothing is more likely to betray one than Affectation.

XIII. But ſuppoſing none had any Deſign to

(*b*) Pravum eſt cor omnium & inſcrutabile. quis cognoſcet illud? *Jerem.* xvii. 9.

(*i*) Sicut aqua profunda, ſic conſilium in corde viri: ſed homo ſapiens exhauriet illud. *Prov.* xx. 5.

impoſe upon a Prince, how ſhall he know Men? who do not know themſelves, but are the firſt who are deceived, with regard to themſelves; who think they have what they have not; who judge themſelves capable of Things above their Abilities; who miſtake their tranſient Thoughts for real fixed Diſpoſitions; who judge of their Virtue by their Ideas of it floating in their Brain, without ever deſcending into their Heart; and who in fine perſuade themſelves they are capable of every-thing, becauſe they are unable to render Juſtice to themſelves in any one thing.

XIV. Upon what Foundation can he judge that they will preſerve the ſame Integrity in a high Station, which they retain'd in one much leſs expoſed to Temptation? Yet how many are there, whom Promotion has truly degraded, by proving the Means of their Corruption? How many inſolent Perſons were very moderate out of Place? The Hope of getting what they at laſt attain to was a Curb upon their Paſſions; they had one principal View, which for a while ſuſpended all others; but they appear'd in their true Colours ſo ſoon as they were at liberty to ſhew themſelves.

XV. To form a juſt Judgment of Men we muſt not examine them ſo much with regard to what they actually are, as with reſpect to what they are likely to become: For there are a thouſand Springs in their Hearts which do not act, and cannot expand themſelves till ſome Occaſion works them to it. An obſcure Condition keeps all the Paſſions, as it were, in Chains; and one would then think they were extinct, becauſe there is nothing to beſtir them: But when their proper Objects are no longer at a Diſtance, but begin to draw near to them, it is aſtoniſhing to ſee how different from themſelves

themſelves the ſame Men appear to be, and how much one was deceived in thinking they would always be what they had been for many Years.

XVI. A ſimple Peaſant, confined to his little Farm in the Country, and into whoſe Mind Ambition never enter'd, may come gradually to have as unbounded a one as an *Alexander*. In order to this, it is only neceſſary to enlarge the Fetters which reſtrain'd his Deſires, and removed all Probability of Succeſs from them. In Proportion as his Power augments, his Proſpects widen; and if he ſhould obtain ever ſo large an Empire, he would think of nothing but extending it.

XVII. It is not the Man's Heart that is changed or new modelled, but his Fortune; he was in his private Station all that he is upon the Throne; he only wanted to be in a Space that would give room to all his inward Paſſions to work: It is a Remainder of Man's primitive Greatneſs, which he now perverts; and therefore what ought to be well canvaſs'd, in order to judge if the Men who are put into Places of Diſtinction and Power, is whether they were wiſe and moderate by Virtue and Principle, or merely through Impotence. But how can we judge of this before trying them?

XVIII. Some Men are ſo fickle that one cannot rely upon them; but there are others who have more Conſtancy, whom it is of Importance to know, becauſe they are ſometimes ſo with reſpect to Evil as well as Good; and it is extremely dangerous to put Authority into the Hands of a Man capable of puſhing to any Length the worſt Meaſures, if he is once engaged in them. And what doth not one riſk by giving Power to one who may prove invincible in bad, as well as in good Undertakings?

XIX. There are Faults which have no Root in the Heart, and may be amended, tho' they appear very great. There are, on the other hand, Virtues which are not very deeply inlaid into the Mind, tho' they make a ſhining Appearance. Certain Symptoms give ground to hope, that thoſe of the former Claſs ſhall be ſurmounted by better Inclinations; and certain Prognoſtics, on the other hand, afford Reaſon to apprehend that the Virtues of the latter Sort may be overcome by bad Propenſions. How ſhall we deſcry theſe almoſt imperceptible Traces of future Good and Evil, ſo as thereby to regulate the Choice or Excluſion of certain Perſons, whom it is of Conſequence to the Public to have admitted or diſcarded?

XX. A private Perſon rarely ſucceeds in his Judgment of the ſmall Circle of Friends he would have. Many complain of having been deceived, or of having met with nothing that anſwer'd their Hopes. Some have run into the Extremity of believing all Men incapable of Fidelity and Friendſhip; which is the ſame thing as to conclude them incapable of Virtue. What muſt we then think of the Difficulty a Prince muſt find in diſcerning Men of true Merit, to give them his Confidence and Ear; he who is ſurrounded by ſo many Perſons who have an Intereſt in deceiving him, and whoſe Grandeur hath on it ſo many Temptations to attract and invite Seducers to try all their Arts upon him, from which a private Life is far removed?

CHAP.

CHAPTER IX.

Means of knowing Men.

First Mean, &c. I. IT was not my Deſign, in repreſenting how difficult it is to know Men, to diſcourage a Prince, whoſe Intereſt it is to know them. I only meant to ſhew him, that he cannot find either in himſelf, or in human Aſſiſtance, all the Light of which ſuch Knowledge is the Fruit; and to perſuade him to aſk it of God with as humble and ſincere a Heart as *Solomon* in his Prayer (*k*). *And now, O Lord my God, thou haſt made thy Servant a King; and I am but a Child: I know not how to go out or come in. And thy Servant is in the midſt of thy People which thou haſt choſen, a great People that cannot be numbered, or counted for Multitude. Give therefore thy Servant an underſtanding Heart to judge thy People, that I may diſcern between Good and Bad: For who is able to judge this thy ſo great a People?*

2. *Solomon* in this Prayer ſeems to confine himſelf to what regards temporal Government, which is the Part we are now conſidering. He ſees wherein the Difficulty lies, and it is the ſame that we have been repreſenting here. It is a great and numerous People, ſays he, that I have to govern, I who cannot govern myſelf; it is a People whom thou haſt choſen, and whom thou loveſt, whom thou commands me to love after thy Example; but their Inclinations, Wants, Intereſts, and Evils are unknown to me. Inſtruct me, be my Con-

(*k*) 1 *Kings* iii. 7, 8, 9. and 2 *Chron.* i. 10.

ductor, that I may be theirs; make me hearken to thy Wiſdom, that it may be profitable to them to obey me. Let it be thy Wiſdom that reigns over them and not mine; and do not abandon a Nation of which thou art the Father, and the inviſible Paſtor, to the Temerity of a young Prince, who is but equal with his Brethren, and who by conſequence has the ſame Infirmities and Wants, and ſtands in need of the ſame Guidance.

III. This is what he ſaid to God in a Prayer, which ought to ſerve for a Pattern of Prayer to all Princes. (*l*) *O God of my Fathers, and Lord of Mercy, who haſt made all Things with thy Word, and ordained Man through thy Wiſdom, that he ſhould have Dominion over the Creatures which thou haſt made, and order the World according to Equity and Righteouſneſs, and execute Judgment with an upright Heart: Give me Wiſdom that ſitteth by thy Throne, and reject me not from among thy Children: For I thy Servant, and Son of thy Handmaid, am a feeble Perſon, and of a ſhort Time, and too young for the underſtanding of Judgment and Laws. For though a Man be never ſo perfect among the Children of Men, yet if thy Wiſdom be not with him, he ſhall be nothing regarded. Thou haſt choſen me to be a King of thy People, and a Judge of thy Sons and Daughters —— Wiſdom was with thee, which knows thy Works, and was preſent when thou madeſt the World, and knew what was acceptable in thy Sight, and right in thy Commandments. O ſend her out of thy holy Heavens, and from the Throne of thy Glory, that being preſent ſhe may labour with me, that I may know what is pleaſing unto thee; for ſhe knoweth and underſtandeth all Things: And ſhe ſhall lead me ſoberly in my Doings,*

(*l*) Wiſdom ix. 1. &c.

Doings, and preſerve me by her Power: So ſhall my Works be acceptable; and then ſhall I judge thy People righteouſly, and be worthy to ſit in my Father's Seat.

IV. Every Sentence in this Prayer is remarkable; it is clearly aver'd in it, that no Prudence, no Experience, no Labour can enable a Prince to conduct his Subjects well, if he is not himſelf conducted by the Eternal Wiſdom. The Reaſon of this Truth is expreſsly declared; it is becauſe all Things are the Workmanſhip of that Wiſdom, and it alone perfectly knows what it hath beſtowed upon, or given to its Creatures: Man is in a particular manner the Workmanſhip of thy Wiſdom, which hath marked out his End to him, by giving him all that he poſſeſſes and is; and therefore this Wiſdom alone is thoroughly inſtructed in what Man is, and in the manner he ought to be ruled and governed. The natural Conſequence of theſe Principles is afterwards drawn with great Preciſion. (*m*) Without it one will only deceive himſelf; he will not be able to underſtand the Deſigns of Providence; he will not be able to conduct a People rightly, nor to do any thing with becoming Prudence: But with this Wiſdom all will be brought into due Order, and every-thing will be juſtly proportioned, and conducted to its proper End by ſure and infallible Means: God will govern the Prince, and by him the People that obey him.

V. The ſureſt Way then of knowing Men well, and of being capable of ſerving them, is to render himſelf a willing Diſciple to that Eternal Wiſdom, which preſides over all Souls, and reveals to whom ſhe pleaſes whatever is moſt ſecret and hidden in the

(*m*) See what is ſaid in the Book of Wiſdom, Ch. x. 1, 2.

Thoughts and Inclinations of Men. But to become ſuch a Diſciple one muſt prefer it to every thing, even to Kingdoms, if he be a King, and only deſire to reign with and for this Wiſdom. (*n*) *I have deſired Wiſdom, and it was given me. I called upon God, and the Spirit of Wiſdom came to me. I preferred her before Sceptres and Thrones, and eſteemed Riches nothing in compariſon of her; neither compared I unto her any precious Stone. Becauſe all Gold in reſpect of her is as a little Sand; and Silver ſhall be counted as Clay before her. I have loved her above Health and Beauty, and choſe to have her inſtead of Light. For the Light that cometh from her never goeth out. All good Things together came to me with her, and innumerable Riches in her Hands.* This is the high Eſteem one muſt have of Wiſdom, if he would be worthy of reigning. He muſt prefer it to every thing, even to a Throne; for it were much better not to ſit upon it, than to mount it without her; becauſe in that caſe one is only placed upon it for his own Confuſion, and for the Miſery of the People, whom not knowing he cannot profit.

VI. But when this Wiſdom inſtructs a Prince, ſhe gives him ſuch an extenſive Knowledge, and at the ſame time ſo diſtinct and circumſtantiate a View of all that relates to Man, that a great People is then to him as well known as any ſingle private Perſon. The Scripture calls this enlarging the Heart, and ſays, (*o*) God gave to *Solomon* Largeneſs of Heart, even as the Sand that is on the Sea-Shore: That is to ſay, he gave to this

(*n*) *Wiſdom* vii. 7. *&c.*

(*o*) Dedit Deus ſapientiam Salomoni & prudentiam multam nimis, & latitudinem cordis quaſi arenam quæ eſt in littore maris. 1 *Kings* iv. 29.

this Prince a Capacity almoſt immenſe, to comprehend as it were at one View all that is uſeful to Men; all that is conducive to public Good; all that is wrapped up in the complicated Folds of the human Heart; all that is included in the natural Sentiments and Affections of the Mind, (of which he ſoon after gave a celebrated Inſtance) the proper Means of accompliſhing every Deſign or End; every Affair, all that requires vaſt Application and Study to learn; and in fine, whatever is the Object of a good and well-diſpoſed Prince's Heart and Thoughts.

VII. We muſt not however imagine that it is enough if a Prince aſks Wiſdom of God, without uſing other Means of inſtructing himſelf in what Men are, and what they expect from their Prince: For it is Wiſdom that inclines the Prince to take the proper Methods of acquiring Light into theſe Subjects, and of rendering his Mind more clear and penetrating.

Second Mean.] VIII. Nothing is more appoſite to produce this Effect than the ſerious Study of Morality, which ought to be, as it were, the Baſis of a King's Knowledge; for it teaches him what Man is, his Origin; what he was in his firſt State, and what he is become by his Degeneracy; what remains in him of his original Greatneſs; what uſe may be made of the Qualities he ſtill retains for the public Good of Society; what Precautions muſt be taken for Reformation of Mankind; by what Remedies they may be cured; by what Degrees Virtue, the Health of the Mind, is reſtored, and by what Means it is rendered firm and permanent.

IX. Every Article which I have ſlightly touched is of vaſt Extent. But this is not a Place for entering into an immenſe Detail of Particulars. It is ſufficient

ſufficient for me to obſerve, that Princes, who are ſo happy as to find good Inſtructors in this Science, make an infinite Progreſs in the Knowledge of Men; they are able to trace the Motives of Actions to their firſt Principles; to ſee what Men will do almoſt with as much Certainty as if they were called to be their Counſellors; know how to manage their Tempers with wonderful Dexterity; conduct them more eaſily by their Inclinations than by any other Handle; know what ought to be refuſed to them, and what is innocent; and prepare them by leſſer Virtues for more noble and elevated ones.

Third Mean.] X. From this general Knowledge of Mankind, which makes the firſt Part of moral Science, a Prince ought to proceed to the Knowledge of himſelf, which is the ſecond. He deſcends into his own Heart to ſtudy its Movements, and thereby to learn what is capable of influencing and moving others: For all Men are alike in reſpect of Things that equally intereſt them, tho' they make very different Uſes of them, and are diverſified in a thouſand Manners, which do not proceed from a Diverſity of natural Principles, but of their Application.

XI. He perceives by his own Experience, that all Men would be happy; that all have this Deſign in whatever they do or purſue; that they unite together to attain this End more ſurely and eaſily by lending mutual Aſſiſtance to one another; that it is in hopes of ſecurer and more durable Happineſs that they ſubmit themſelves to a King, who may procure them the Means of it, and be in a Condition to remove all Obſtacles and Hindrances that ſtand in the way to it, private Perſons are not able to ſurmount.

XII.

XII. The Prince thus ſees at one View all the Conſequences of theſe fruitful Truths, more capable of inſtructing him than Books. After this Reflection, he attends to what he himſelf deſires in order to his Happineſs; what is juſt and reaſonable in his Deſires, and what is not; what is poſſible to be attain'd in this Life, and what reſerved to a future State: And what he diſcerns to be natural to himſelf he concludes to be ſo to all his Subjects, even the meaneſt, without any Heſitation or Fear of misjudging.

XIII. He likewiſe enquires into all that is wanting to his Happineſs, and all that is able to give him any Conſolation for the Deficiencies he finds there. He feels his Miſery even upon the Throne; but he likewiſe feels the Impreſſion Friendſhip, Compaſſion, and Sympathy with his Uneaſineſſes, make upon his Mind, and becomes by theſe Reflections more humane, more compaſſionate, more tender toward thoſe who are in Diſtreſs, and deprived of the good Things with which he is environed.

XIV. He thus renders himſelf attentive to a thouſand Things, which commonly eſcape the Great, becauſe they almoſt never put themſelves in the Place and Situation of others, and cannot perſuade themſelves that other Men have the ſame Senſibility, and the ſame Wants with them. He ſees what a ſingle Word can do ſeaſonably employ'd, an obliging Manner, a Reaſon mixed with a Command, a Favour accompanied with an Encomium, a Denial ſoftened by humane kindly Expreſſions: And all this he diſcovers in himſelf, tho' his Rank does not allow him to be tried in this manner like private Perſons; becauſe he does not then conſider himſelf as a King, but as ſuch

a Man as thoſe over whom he is placed Sovereign, and deſcending from his Throne into his own Heart, to put himſelf in the Place of his Subjects, he thus clearly diſtinguiſhes what he ſhould deſire to be done to him.

XV. In ſearching his Mind he diſcerns by what means it is that it opens to Truth; what Method muſt be taken to perſuade him; how one Piece of Knowledge prepares the Way to another; what an Error it would be to begin at what is moſt difficult and leſs clear; and thus he learns how he muſt manage others, and reſerve many Truths to a Seaſon when they will be better received.

XVI. He ſtudies with Care what it is that divides Men into ſo many different Sentiments, and how one may by ſuperior Wiſdom re-unite them, by re-uniting the particular Truths which divided them. He recognizes in his own Breaſt a Diſpoſition not to ſurrender himſelf ſo readily to Truth, as to the Manner in which it is told: He obſerves it ſeldom happens that he who miſtakes, miſtakes in all, and that it is not difficult to perſuade a Perſon to abandon his Error, if one does him the Juſtice to own that he ſaw a conſiderable Part of the Truth. He feels in himſelf all the ſecret Sources of theſe Weakneſſes, and hence he learns the Art of inſtructing others, and of conducting them by natural Means in Things where Authority is almoſt never neceſſary.

XVII. It would be endleſs to follow the Prince in all his various Turnings, while he is examining his whole Heart and Frame, in order to learn the Nature of other Men. It is enough for me to have obſerv'd, that the Knowledge of himſelf muſt be to him a great Source of uſeful Light and Prudence, provided his Reſearches and Obſervations do not terminate

terminate in making him a Philoſopher, inſtead of a King.

Fourth Mean.] XVIII. A fourth Mean which greatly contributes to make one acquainted with Men, is accurate Attention to all one ſees and hears, and making due Reflections upon all: It is this daily Experience which is more capable of inſtructing a Prince than all the Advices can be given him.

XIX. For Men cannot always diſguiſe themſelves nor live in Fetters. Artifice is not ſo ſteady and permanent as Nature; and when a Prince has attentive Eyes he at laſt diſcovers what is natural and genuine, and diſtinguiſhes it from the affected. Mens Paſſions change, and in ſhifting they bewray themſelves. It is Truth alone that is equal and uniform. Virtue has but one Face. True Merit has no Intereſt but in being what it is, whether it is obſerved or remains in Obſcurity: But all Affectation to reſemble it is too reſtleſs to maintain its likeneſs to it very long.

XX. A Prince therefore has nothing to do but to keep his Eyes always open, and to remember what he has obſerved in order to know to the Bottom thoſe about him: But nothing is more rare than Reflection. By heedleſsneſs and wavering one often loſes the Fruit of all his paſt Obſervations. One knows not how to unite many Obſervations together in order to form a ſolid Judgment, and thence ſome have been a long time without having acquired by that Experience more Solidity of Mind, and more Wiſdom to enable them to govern Men than when they firſt began to reign.

Fifth Mean.] XXI. To daily Experience a Prince ought to add that of all Ages, and to learn from Hiſtory what Men now are. But in this

this Study he muſt confine himſelf to great Events, which are rare and leſs inſtructive. It is to the Characters of Men he muſt lend his Attention. 'Tis their Motives, their Intereſts, and the Means they employ to gain their Ends, which he ought principally to examine into. 'Tis to the Differences between ſuperficial and true Merit, between a reſtleſs, ambitious Spirit, which appears great by its violent Emotions, and one really poſſeſſed of truly great Qualities, that he ought chiefly to attend. He conſiders Princes and Subjects. He compares their oppoſite Inclinations, their mutual Faults, their Miſtakes; and he ſees in paſt Reigns good or bad, or mixed, tranquille or violently agitated, what Men are, and what their Rulers ought to be.

Sixth Mean.] XXII. But no Hiſtory is more inſtructive than the Sacred. It is that he ought to make his principal Study. In order to know the Spirits and Hearts of Men to the bottom, judge rightly of their good or their bad Qualities; diſcern their true Virtues, the Vices which put on the Appearances of them; penetrate into the ſecret Springs of their Motions; ſound the Depth of their Thoughts and Counſels; and obſerve the infinite variety of Characters by which Men are diſtinguiſhed. The Books which (*p*) treat of Wiſdom, by themſelves are more capable of inſtructing a Prince in what is moſt uſeful and important in the Knowledge of Mankind than any others. But ſuch reading requires much Reflection, becauſe theſe Books conſiſt of ſhort Sentences, and Obſervations ſeemingly ſimple but pregnant with ſolid good Senſe and profound Inſtruction. What I ſay here of Hiſtory and Holy Writ is merely with

(*p*) Proverbs, Eccleſiaſtes, Wiſdom, and Eccleſiaſticus.

with relation to the Knowledge of Mankind, of the Sources and Means of which I am now ſpeaking. They will be treated of in another Place in a more extenſive manner.

CHAPTER X.

The firſt Advantage a Prince ought to gain by this Knowledge, is to guard himſelf againſt Flatterers. Why Princes are ſo expoſed to Flattery. How odious it ought to be to them.

ARTICLE I.

The firſt Advantage a Prince ought to draw from the Knowledge of Men is to guard himſelf againſt Flatterers.

I. IT is in vain for a Prince to apply himſelf to know Men, if he don't employ that Knowledge to diſtinguiſh them, and to make the ſame Difference between them that Merit does.

II. This Diſcernment ought to begin with thoſe who have the Honour to be about his Perſon; becauſe it is by their Means that he muſt be aſſiſted to judge of others: And the Wiſdom which muſt guide a Prince in the firſt, the Conſequences of which are infinite, is that which diſcovers to him who are ſincere, and who are Flatterers; thoſe who deſerve his Confidence, and thoſe who do not; thoſe who love him, and have juſt Notions of his true Glory, and thoſe who are ſolely attached to their own private Intereſt; thoſe who tell

tell him the Truth, and thoſe whoſe Thoughts are wholly ſet upon deceiving him.

III. If a Prince is happy enough not to confound thoſe two Characters ſo widely different, and to conduct himſelf in every reſpect by the ſame Light which enables him to make that Diſtinction, he will certainly become a moſt accompliſh'd Prince; tho' he ſhould have no other Merit but that of diſcerning the Merit of others, and of refuſing his Ear to every-one who is unworthy of it. For in that Caſe he would find a ſufficient Supply to all he may want in himſelf, in the excellent Qualifications of thoſe whom he intruſts with any Share of his Power; and he would thus unite with himſelf all the good Talents divided among his Subjects, the moſt capable of ſerving him in the Government of the State.

IV. On the contrary, had he in himſelf all the beſt Diſpoſitions for Government, if he is deceived in the Choice of thoſe he employs, and prefers thoſe who think of nothing but of accommodating themſelves to his Humour, to thoſe who are capable of giving him good Counſel; by that one Error he annihilates all that is Good in him, and he cannot but blunder and wander with the bad Guides he has choſen.

V. But what Prince has not been told that he ought to be on his Guard againſt Flatterers? And what Prince hath profited by this ſalutary Counſel? Thoſe who give themſelves up the moſt to Flattery do not know that they do ſo. It is a Diſeaſe that almoſt always produces its miſchievous Effects without giving any Fore-warning, becauſe it begins by blinding one.

VI. They condemn Flattery in Theory, but they are not the leſs ſeduced by it. One would

bluſh

bluſh to own he was a Dupe, and turn'd about any how by thoſe who know the Arts of it, to ſerve their Purpoſes: But one is not the leſs dependent, nor the leſs its Slave, for all that. Every one ſees it, but he alone whoſe Intereſt it is to ſee it. They are ſorry for him; but he is blind enough, to take them for his Friends, who diſhonour and miſlead him.

ARTICLE II.

Why Princes are ſo much expoſed to Flattery.

I. SUCH Blindneſs proceeds from two Cauſes. The ſecret Inclination in all Men, the Great more eſpecially, to ſwallow Praiſe without any Precaution, and to judge favourably of all thoſe who admire them, or ſhew an abſolute Compliance and Submiſſion to their Will.

II. The ſecond is the Reſemblance Flattery hath to ſincere Affection and true Reſpect, frequently ſo perfectly imitated by it, that the wiſeſt may be deceived, if they are not very attentive, and have not been ſoundly warned, either by their own Experience, or by the Obſervations they have been led to make, upon what diſtinguiſhes Flattery from the genuine Reſpect, and ſincere Attachment, of which it is the deceitful Counterfeit.

III. It is then to very little Purpoſe to tell Princes in general, to remove Flatterers far from them, if they don't teach them how to detect them, or how to diſcern them by certain Marks, from thoſe truly deſerving of their Confidence: And it is yet more uſeleſs to point out to them in detail all the ſeducing Arts of Flatterers, if they do not diſcover to them, and make them attend to the ſecret Biaſs which leads them to lend their Ear

to Flattery, and do not endeavour to cure them of it. It is then here we muſt begin, reſerving the Characters and Marks of a Flatterer to another Chapter.

IV. Flattery is a Commerce of Lies and Falſehood, ſupported by Intereſt on one hand, and Pride on the other. He who flatters, has ſome Deſign. He does not endeavour to deceive for the ſake of deceiving; he does it to pleaſe, and he endeavours to pleaſe, that he may gain what he deſires to have. He knows the Perſon who has in his Power to give what he covets, is like himſelf, ſenſible to Eſteem and Approbation; that he hates whatever tends to lower or humble him; that he is accuſtomed to Praiſe, and that he is become by Habitude of a very delicate Feeling, and eaſily offended; that a more reſerved Conduct may diſpleaſe him; that it is of the greateſt Importance to his Intereſt to render himſelf agreeable to him; and that he is ſure of a Denial, if he is leſs acceptable to him than his Rivals, who have ſtudied all the Arts of currying Favour, and all the Inſinuations that Wit can ſuggeſt. In all theſe Matters the Flatterer is not diſappointed; and it is becauſe he is not, that he ſets himſelf to ſeduce the Prince from whom he expects ſome Favour. It is his Intereſt that makes him a Seducer.

V. As for the Prince, it is his Pride which prepares him for being ſeduced, and which had already deceived him before the Flatterer had formed his Scheme. He does not like the Truth, and he does not take it amiſs that he is not told it. He deſires his Faults may be unknown, and they do him the Pleaſure to aſſure him they have been able to find none. He is ſolicitous to have all the Merit he has known, and it is touching him in the

the moſt ſenſible Part to let him know that all the World admires it. He would be perfect without its coſting him any Trouble, and it is an agreeable Surprize to him to be aſſured he is really ſo. He has, notwithſtanding all his Weakneſſes and Wretchedneſs, a violent Thirſt after being admired, and he is pleaſed to be ſooth'd in what he feels weak and contemptible in himſelf, by Marks of Admiration, which perſuade him he does not himſelf know the half of his Worth. His Heart, already corrupted by Falſhood, opens itſelf readily to every new Lye; his Vanity conſents with Pleaſure to the falſeſt Applauſe; and it is indeed his own Pride, and not the Flatterer, which deceives him.

VI. Thus the Prince alone is impoſed upon, for the Seducer is not; and he is even ſo unhappy as to reward the Artifice employ'd to cheat him. The moſt conſiderable Employments are the Price of Flattery. The Recompences due to Merit are given to Falſhood. Favour and Honour are conferred on Diſſimulation, and refuſed to Probity. The Flatterer coins the falſe Money, and the Prince gives it Currency; or rather he offers the Prince falſe Coin, and he receives true; for he raiſes himſelf by miſleading him.

VII. It is impoſſible to take from Princes their Power, or from thoſe who approach them the Deſire of the Favours Princes alone have to beſtow. There will therefore always be an infinite Danger to Princes, of whoſe Favour every Perſon ſtands in need, and whom every one would gain by Adulation. The greater they are, and the more they have in their Power to give, the more are they expoſed to all that the moſt ingenious artful Ambition or Covetouſneſs can invent to ſe-

duce them: And if they are not perpetually as aſſiduous in guarding againſt Flattery, as it is in its Attacks, (*q*) they will at laſt be ſoftened and overcome by a Poiſon for which I know no Remedy.

VIII. It is not difficult for a Prince who has any Degree of Fortitude and Greatneſs of Soul to guard himſelf againſt groſs open Flattery: (*r*) It ſhocks a Perſon of any Delicacy, inſtead of pleaſing him; and it is commonly puniſhed with Contempt, without his being more humble who deſpiſes it, becauſe there is Honour in rejecting Flattery, which the Flatterer had not Wit enough to diſguiſe.

IX. But when it is prepared by a ſkilful Hand, who knows how to ſave the Prince's Modeſty, and at the ſame time content his Vanity, who can at once give him the Pleaſure of Praiſe, and preſerve his Opinion of his Contempt of Flattery; one muſt be very well eſtabliſhed in the Love of Truth to be able to refuſe it Admittance: And indeed it requires no ſmall Degree of Diſcernment to ſeparate from the Approbation due to real Merit, what Flattery artfully intermixes with it.

X. When it is of this kind, that is, when it is ſo cunning, ſo circumſpect, ſo delicate, a Prince who has not as much Judgment as he who flatters him, feels it but does not diſcern it: It pleaſes him, but he does not know it; and his want of Under-

(*q*) Adulatio moribus corruptis perinde anceps, ſi nulla eſt & ubi nimia eſt. *Tacit. L.* 4. *Annal. p.* 113.

(*r*) Tempora illa adeo infecta & adulatione ſordida fuere, ut memoriæ proditur Tiberium quoties curiâ egrederetur græcis verbis in hunc modum eloqui ſolitum: O homines ad ſervitium paratos! ſcilicet etiam illum qui libertatem publicam nollet, tam projectæ ſervientium patientiæ tædebat. *Tacit. L.* 3. *Annal. p.* 99.

Underſtanding concurs with his Vanity to deceive him.

XI. But it fails not to have a very great Influence, even when the Prince diſcerns it, if he has merely Uuderſtanding, and his Heart be not ſound. He then ſees that it is Flattery, but it does not offend him. He is pleas'd to ſee, in the Judgment of another, a more agreeable Image of himſelf, than that which his own Mind preſents him with; and provided nothing is ſaid to him ſo viſibly falſe, that it may be interpreted a Reproach, he finds a ſecret Conſolation from the Lye, for the want of what he cannot have from Truth, and he eaſily excuſes an Error, which embelliſhes and does him Honour.

XII. Ingenious well-dreſs'd Flatteries prepare the way to thoſe of another kind: They are firſt, and moſt eaſily admitted, but they don't find Acceſs alone: They accuſtom the Mind to a certain ſoft way of Addreſs, and leave behind them a certain Liking to it, which ſoon creates a Diſguſt at Truth, and renders every thing agreeable to it, that ſooths and titilates it. Praiſe ſkilfully beſtow'd ſinks deep into the Mind; it remains there even when one thinks he has quite forgot it; it often returns to the Imagination, and that in a more ſeducive manner than when it was firſt receiv'd. It is recollected; the Mind dwells upon it, and all theſe Returns are follow'd with a freſh Enfeeblement of Virtue, and an additional Propenſity toward Flattery (*s*).

(*s*) Adulatorum, & prava laudantium ſermo diutius hæret quàm auditur: nec facile eſt animo dulcem ſonum excutere. Proſequitur & durat, & ex intervallo recurrit. Ideo claudendæ ſunt aures malis vocibus, & quidem primis, nam cum initium fecerunt admiſſæque ſunt, plus audent. *Senec. Epiſt.* 123.

XIII. Thus the only way of ſecuring one's-ſelf againſt it is to ſhut the Ears againſt all ſmooth, inſinuating Speeches, which the Heart never reſpects, if the Ears do not admit them; to have a Timidity in this reſpect, which really preſerves true Courage, and not to imagine one's-ſelf above Temptations, even from groſs Flattery, if one does not ſeverely repel the moſt delicate and indiſcernible.

XIV. For it is with reſpect to Pride, as it is to all other Paſſions; one may check them, but one can never ſatisfy them. It is by refuſing it all Encouragement, that one only can conquer it; one but nurſes and ſtrengthens it by pretending to keep it within due Bounds, and granting it only certain ſmall and allowable Indulgencies; and one brings himſelf under the Neceſſity of giving it full Satisfaction, by attempting to compound with it (*t*). A Prince who once begins to be ſoothed by Flattery will ſoon look upon the Reſerve of thoſe who do not imitate his Adulators, as proceeding from a ſecret Diſſatisfaction with him, a kind of Malignity and Envy, or a Deſire to diminiſh his Glory. He ſpeaks to them with leſs Affability than formerly: He conſults them ſeldom; he refuſes them Requeſts oftner, and with more Harſhneſs: On the contrary, he becomes every Day more open, more familiar, more liberal toward thoſe who praiſe all he does, and are ever ready to applaud whatever he ſays or acts.

XV. That Difference in his Conduct is ſoon obſerved, and thoſe who ſuffer by it immediately learn the Language of thoſe whom the Prince prefers.

(*t*) En jam dementiæ venimus, ut qui parce adulatur, pro maligno ſit. *Senec, Natural. Quæſt. L.* 4.

fers. (*u*) They commence with more moderated Flatteries, but theſe being eclipſed by more exaggerated Praiſes, they do not long keep ſo much upon the Reſerve; and the Court is quickly overrun with Perſons who ſtudy nothing but to deceive the Prince; and inſtead of a noble Emulation to do him real Service, and to excel in Virtue, nothing remains then but the baſeſt Flattery, and vileſt Deceitfulneſs.

ARTICLE III.

How odious Flattery ought to be to Princes.

I. THE blind Prince thus applauds himſelf for what is really his Unhappineſs. He vainly thinks himſelf beloved and admired by every one, while in the mean time he has no-body about him but ſecret Enemies; and when all have conſpired to hide the Truth from him, he believes himſelf well inſtructed in the real Sentiments of his Servants.

II. He knows not that he himſelf has perverted his whole Court, and baniſhed from it Sincerity, and all Senſe of Honour and Duty, all Honeſty and Fidelity; and that there is nothing more oppoſite to Truth than what he is told; that it is by the Rule of Contraries he ought to judge of all he ſees and hears, and of the internal Sentiments and Diſpoſitions of thoſe about him; that he is ſurrounded with (*x*) People ſolely employ'd in preparing Poiſon for him, and in gilding it over with

(*u*) Nemo ex animi ſui ſententia ſuadet diſſuadetque; ſed adulandi certamen eſt, & unum omnium officium, una contentio, quis blandiſſime fallat. *Senec. L. 6. de Beneficiis, Cap.* 30.

(*x*) Apertis & propitiis auribus adulatio recipitnr, & in præcordia ima deſcendit, eo ipſo gratioſa, quo ledit. *Senec. Epiſt.* 45.

an agreeable Appearance, which only ſerves to make it to be ſwallow'd with more Avidity, and to render its Effects more incurable: That the ſame Perſons who before him ſhew the moſt profound Reſpect to him, and the higheſt Admiration of all he does, ſecretly make a Jeſt of his Folly, and deſpiſe him as a vain Creature, whom they lead as they pleaſe by Lyes, and who is ſo blind as to recompenſe the Artifices by which he is deceived.

III. (*y*) One muſt not have been always a Prince, to judge well of what Courtiers and Miniſters inwardly think, when they are moſt profuſe in their Praiſes, and ſhew the moſt implicit Complaiſance to his Will. They abundantly compenſate all their Servility, and low cringing at Court, by indulging a cruel Malignity in ſecret; and after having worn in the Prince's Preſence a Maſk finely embelliſhed by all the Arts of diſintereſted Cunning, they throw it by with Indignation, when they are at liberty, and can freely diſcharge their real Thoughts. This is a ſecond Fault, much worſe in its Conſequences than the firſt; for whoever is baſe enough to deceive his Prince by Flattery, is likewiſe wicked enough to inſult him for what he has either exacted through Haughtineſs, or receiv'd thro' Weakneſs.

IV. Bad Princes have in all Ages of the World been a Proof of this vile Double-mindedneſs. Every-body knew what they were, and every-body praiſed them againſt his Conſcience. (*z*) They were

(*y*) They knew not how to flatter *Otho*, when an Emperor, becauſe he knew by Experience what Evils were brought upon Princes by Flattery. Privato Othoni nuper atque eadem dicenti nota adulatio. *Tacit. L.* 1. *Hiſt. p.* 335.

(*z*) Pavor internus occupaverat animos, cui remedium adulatione quærebatur. *Tacit. L.* 4. *Annal. p.* 137.

Quanto

were fear'd becauſe they were unjuſt, and every-one ſtudied who ſhould flatter them moſt, in proportion to their Fears. Thus nothing could prove more clearly their Unworthineſs to Praiſe, than the Profuſion with which it was laviſhed upon them; and nothing ought to be more ſuſpected by a Prince who knows Men from ancient Hiſtories, than to perceive in thoſe about him an Affectation to praiſe every-thing without Diſtinction, and want of Courage to contradict him on any Occaſion; for it is almoſt a certain Proof that they condemn him privately, and that they tell him the Reverſe of what they think.

V. I know nothing therefore which is more capable of rendering Flattery odious to Princes, than to underſtand it well, and thoſe who empoiſon them with this malignant Vapour: For very little Courage is wanting to be able to abhor Incenſe offered with ſuch real Scorn and Mockery, and by Perſons equally mean and perfidious. One needs only have Pride, a little more delicate than that of the vulgar Sort, to repel Praiſe accompany'd with ſecret Contempt, and which comes from a ſordid, intereſted Heart; and one muſt have very little Diſcernment and Taſte for true Glory, to ſatisfy himſelf with that which is falſe, and at the Succeſs of which the Lyars themſelves laugh, and are highly diverted.

VI. But what yet more deſerves a Prince's Indignation is, that Flattery uſes all its Efforts to rob

Quanto quis illuſtrior, tanto magis falſi. *Tacit. L.* 1. *Annal, p.* 7.

Quantoque magis falſa erant quæ fiebant, tanto plura fecere. *Tacit. L.* 1. *Hiſt. pag.* 421.

Ingenioſior eſt ad cogitandum ſimulatio veritate, ſervitus libertate, metus amore. *Paneg. Tray. pag.* 161.

rob him and his Kingdom of what is moſt eſſential to his own true Happineſs, and that of his People: That is to ſay, of Wiſdom and Equity, Diſcernment of Truth and Falſhood, the Love of Juſtice and Public Good. (*a*) Guards, ſays an Ancient, watch about his Palace to keep at a diſtance his leaſt dangerous Enemies. Flatterers eſcape the Sentinels; they not only get into the King's Cabinet, but into his Heart; and diſſolving all his Fortitude, leave nothing there but Softneſs and Weakneſs.

VII. Flattery carries one from a Diſguſt at Truth to the Hatred of it. It renders Truth inſupportable to him, as well as all thoſe in whom there remains enough of the Love of it not to conceal it from him. It ſuffers none to come near him, but ſuch who ſet themſelves to ſooth him with fair Speeches, and to feed him with Chimeras and Deluſions, by promiſing him for ever Succeſs in all he undertakes; and thus deceiving him into Difficulties and Dangers, the Conſequences of which often ſurvive him. God permits this Seducement, to puniſh by it the Kings who love to be flattered. He ſuffers, according to the Scripture, (*b*) a Lying-Spirit to delude them, and to prevail againſt all Remonſtrances of wiſe and faithful Men, to avenge the Truth they had deſpiſed on other Occaſions. Thou ſhalt prevail, ſaid the Lord to the Lying-Spirit, which offer'd to deceive the King of *Iſrael* by the Mouth of falſe

(*a*) Cavendum præſertim, idque totis animi viribus, ne amicitiæ perſonam extrinſecus circumfuſa incautis obrepat adulatio. Sola quippe hæc nequicquam vigilantibus ſatellitibus imperium deprædatur, regumque nobiliſſimam partem, animum nimirum, adoritur. *Syneſ. de Regno, pag.* 12.

(*b*) 1 Kings, Ch. xxii. 22.

falſe Prophets who flattered him: Thou ſhalt prevail: Go forth and do ſo. (*c*) To ſuch a ſecret Chaſtiſement, a terrible one indeed, is it that the Obſtinacy of ſome Princes muſt be aſcribed, in refuſing to hear any thing that is truly ſalutary, and in abandoning themſelves entirely to the Miſguidance of violent and artful Men, tho' the Proofs they give of their wicked Counſels be palpable and glaring. They have loved Flattery, and it is juſt that ſovereign Truth ſhould puniſh them, by ſuffering them to give themſelves up to it, to their utter Ruin, according to that formidable Denunciation, (*d*) *The Lord hath put a Lying-Spirit into the Mouth of all thy Prophets, and the Lord hath ſpoken Evil concerning thee.*

CHAPTER XI.

The Difficulty of detecting Flatterers: The Means of doing it.

ARTICLE I.

The Difficulty of diſcovering Flatterers.

I. IT was obſerved in the preceding Chapter, that two principal Cauſes contribute to Seduction by Flattery. The firſt is a ſecret Biaſs in every Man, in the Great more eſpecially, to receive Praiſe without any Precaution, and to entertain a favourable Opinion of all who admire them, and ſhew Complaiſance and Submiſſion to their Will.

(*c*) Non vides quomodo illos in præceps agat extincta libertas. *Senc. L.* 6. *de Benefic. cap.* 30.

(*d*) 1 Kings xxii. 22. and 2 Chron. xviii. 22.

Will. The ſecond is the Likeneſs of Flattery to ſincere Affection and allowable Reſpect, which ſometimes are ſo perfectly imitated by it, that without very great Attention one may be deceived.

II. The firſt of theſe Cauſes has been already handled, and ſome Attempt hath been made to point out a Remedy for it, by ſhewing its very hurtful Effects. We are now to conſider the ſecond, and to endeavour to ſhew a Prince, who fears being miſled by Flatterers, how liable they are to be deceived, if they do not give very cloſe Attention to the Characters which diſtinguiſh Flatterers from the ſincere and faithful.

III. A true Friend and a Flatterer are in outward Appearance not unlike one to another. It is in the Heart they differ, and the Heart is inviſible. (*e*) They both deſire to pleaſe, and fear to offend. They both ſtudy the Prince's Inclinations to follow them, or at leaſt that they may not oppoſe them imprudently. They are both aſſiduous, zealous, and reſpectful. Their Expreſſions are often the ſame. Their Attachment appears equal. Their Abilities and Merit frequently do alſo appear equal; nay, ſometimes (*f*) in external Advantages the Flatterer hath the better of the ſincere Friend, who may have leſs Politeneſs, leſs Acquaintance with the World, leſs Eloquence, leſs Addreſs and Inſinuation, not ſo much of Eaſe, and an agreeable Variety in his Manner.

IV.

(*e*) Adulatio quam ſimilis eſt amicitiæ! non imitatur tantum illam, ſed vincit. Doce quemadmodum hanc ſimilitudinem dignoſcere poſſim. *Senec. Ep.* 45.

(*f*) Venit ad me pro amico blandus inimicus. Vitia nobis ſub virtutum nomine obrepunt. In his magno periculo erratur. His certas notas imprime. *Id. ibid.*

IV. Sometimes the Flatterer has been able better to diſcern the Prince's Inclination in innocent Matters which were agreeable to it. He has had better Succeſs in acquitting himſelf of his Commiſſion; he has appeared more diligent, more lively and more aſſiduous. He has hit on the Way of gaining him by a more amiable and engaging Humour. He has better underſtood, and managed with more Dexterity, the Prince's Turn of Temper and Imaginations, by employing certain Manners which have a not eaſily diſcernable Agreement with it; which Correſpondence is what is called Sympathy. Having thus inſinuated himſelf into his Heart, and got all his Prejudices and Paſſions on his Side, a Fondneſs for him is formed there, which will quickly produce Confidence: And if that is gained, the Prince is undone: For he to whom he is ready to ſurrender himſelf, is a Perſon of a dangerous Spirit, who will ſadly abuſe his Influence upon him. He is an Enemy diſguiſed under the Mask of Friendſhip, who will make the Prince's Power ſubſervient to his own Paſſions, and who only thinks of inſpiring his own Inclinations into him under the Shew of yielding entirely to his.

V. How ſhall we ſtop a Prince thus upon the very Brink of a moſt dangerous Precipice! Firſt of all he muſt be warned that he has gone too far, and not only Intreaties and even a ſort of Force muſt be uſed to oblige him to ſuſpend his Judgment, and to examine more deliberately what he hath really found in the Perſon, who hath got ſuch an Aſcendant over him, and what he ought to have looked for in him.

VI. Let the Prince then ask himſelf, if he has truly found very eſſential good Qualities in him, and

and what they are? If he has ſufficiently proved them, and if the Trial has been long and ſevere enough? If he has endeavour'd to ſound the moſt ſecret Receſſes of his Heart? If it is wiſe to give up his Friendſhip and Ear to bare Appearances? If it is by Whim, Caprice, and merely to pleaſe his Imagination, that a Prince ought to determine himſelf in a Choice of ſo great Conſequence to him and his People? If he does not deſerve to be deceived all his Life, for having ſo little Precaution not to be ſo? And if it is to underſtand the Arts of Government, to think ſo ſlightly and ſuperficially of the Merit of thoſe who are fit to aſſiſt him in ſupporting the Weight of Kingly Authority?

VII. After theſe general Advices, the Prince ought to be ask'd, if it is ſufficient in order to avoid Flatterers, to know they ought to be ſhunned, tho' he takes no Pains to diſcover them? He muſt be intreated to tell by what Marks he imagines he can diſtinguiſh them from an upright ſincere Man; if it is by the outward Figure, external Manners, Pleaſantry, or other Qualities, which may be common to Probity and perfidy, and which ought not decide in this Matter? It is fit to ſhew him, that it was by ſuch Appearances that he hath been caught; and thus he may be rendered more diſpoſed to make attentive Obſervations upon the eſſential Characters which diſtinguiſh the Man of Worth, in whom he ought to confide, from the Flatterer to whom he ought never to lend his Ear.

VII. But firſt of all, he ought to be appriſed that there are Flatterers of different Sorts; that ſome are only diſtinguiſhable by one mark, who are ſometimes more dangerous than the others, becauſe they approach nearer to true Merit without

out having it, and they appear more deſerving of his Confidence without being really worthy of it: But there is an univerſal Character inſeparable from all Flatterers, which is that of loving himſelf more than his Prince and the publick Good: That this Mark is the Eſſential difference which diſtinguiſhes them from the honeſt Man; and that it is to this principally that all the reſt muſt be reduced.

ARTICLE. II.

Means of diſcerning Flatterers.

Firſt Obſervation.] I. The Flatterer commonly praiſes all the Prince likes, all he ſays, all he does, and all he has, indifferently, without making any Diſtinction or Choice. The Deſire of rendering himſelf agreeable ſeduces him into this Imprudence, which helps to diſcover him. A wiſe ſincere Man is more diſcreet in his Praiſes, becauſe he has more Honour as well as more Prudence. He commends what deſerves it, and keeps Silence upon other Matters.

Second Obſervation.] II. The Flatterer gives high Encomiums to Actions or Qualities which deſerve none, or much more moderate Praiſes. The Princes, good Mein, his Addreſs in certain Exerciſes, his good Taſte of Dreſs and Equipage, are an exhauſtleſs Subject of Praiſe to him. The Magnificence of a Palace, the Beauty of a Garden, put him in Extaſy. He ought not to truſt a Perſon who judges ſo ill of the Value of Things: Either he is deceived himſelf, or he would recommend himſelf by deceiving. How irreſiſtable is the Wiſdom of one who praiſes from the Heart only thoſe Qualities that give Merit to a Prince; who is very ſparing in his Commendations of

thoſe

thoſe which are common to the Good and Bad, and ſays not a Word of that which is merely Matter of Expence?

Third Obſervation.] III. The Flatterer is ſeldom natural. Deſign and Affectation appear in all he ſays and does. His Intention of perſuading that he is full of the Sentiments he expreſſes, proves the very contrary, to every one who is well acquainted with Mankind. Sincerity expreſſes itſelf more ſimply: It relies upon itſelf, and feels it does not ſtand in need of Art. It's a Mark of Falſity to be at ſuch Pains to cover it. I cannot chuſe but diſtruſt one who ſeems uncommonly ſolicitous, and fearful that I ſhould have any Diffidence in him. (*g*) That is not to imitate Nature and Truth: It is ſtraining to overdo it; and it is only Falſhood which can do ſo.

Fourth Obſervation.] IV. The Flatterer is always ready to imitate whatever he obſerves in his Prince. (*h*) He is as the Shadow which imitates all the Motions of the Body. He humours all his Inclinations. (*i*) He apes his Manners. He is attentive to model his Judgment to his. He has no Judgment of his own; and is always ready to change his Sentiment as ſoon as he perceives the Prince is of a contrary one. To what can ſuch a Perſon be proper? What Aſſurance can one put in the Sentiments he diſcovers? Whodoes not ſee, that to him Truth and Probity are mere Sounds? That the only thing he is invariable in, is the Purſuit

(*g*) Non imitatur tantum illam, ſed vincit.

(*h*) Non ſe ad Regis voluntates flectet amicus non adulator, neque umbræ munus implens, aut nutus, aut motus omnes imitabitur. *Theophilact. Inſtit. Reg. ad Porphyr. Conſtantin. Part.* 2. *C.* 15.

(*i*) Adulantem & ad placitum cujuſque loquentem. *S. Bern. L.* 4. *de Conſid. C.* 4.

purſuit of his own Intereſt; and his ſervile attachment to his Prince's humour, is only an Artifice to make a Fool of his Prince, to ſerve his own Ambition? There is a wide difference between ſo baſe a Mind and ſo faithful a Friend; and Princes are extremely unhappy if they are not able to diſcern it.

Fifth Obſervation.] V. The moſt lucky Moments for a Flatterer, are thoſe in which the Prince is moved by ſome Paſſion; for he fails not to humour it with all his skill, and to juſtify it by his Diſcourſe. He ſets himſelf to diſcover the Prince's weak Side, and to find out if he is ſuſceptible, by any means, of bad Counſel. He artfully lays Snares to try and ſound him, and thus ſearches by what entry he may inſinuate into his Mind any Paſſion that will introduce himſelf. He hopes then to have the ſole Government of him, and to keep at a diſtance all who are leſs officious and complaiſant than himſelf. But it is at theſe Moments the Flatterer unmaſks himſelf, and ſhews his real Face. It is then therefore the Prince ought to ſee that he is an enemy to his true Glory, to his Vertue, his Tranquility, and the Intereſts of the State; and that he ought to baniſh ſuch a one from him with all the Indignation his Treachery deſerves. On the Contrary, he ought to put a high Value on thoſe (*k*) who in his weak Moments, when Anger, Ambition, or Pleaſure begin to ſtir in his Mind, dared to ſpeak to him ſincerely and boldly; who rather choſe to riſk his Diſpleaſure than betray him, and preferred their Duty to all other Conſiderations, even to their Fortunes: For it is evident, that ſuch a Perſon is firmly attached to the

(*k*) Dic illis non quod volunt audire, ſed quod audiſſe ſemper volent. *Senec. L.* 6. *de Benef. C.* 33.

Prince's true Intereſt, without any ſelfiſh views; and it is the Quality in the World that is rareſt and of the greateſt Price.

Sixth Obſervation.] VI. There are Flatterers of all Sorts, as was ſaid at the Beginning; and they ſometimes poſſeſs the firſt Places, without being known to the Prince to be what they really are; becauſe they have more of thoſe groſs Faults of ordinary Flatterers, but have ſome very oppoſite Qualities, tho' they be no better at bottom. A ſure way of knowing ſuch, is to look narrowly into the Uſe they make of their Credit with the Prince and acceſs to him: If they are very much on the reſerve in asking Favours from him to others, for fear they ſhould be placed to their Accompt, and ſhould ſtand for Services they have in their view, and hope for to themſelves; if they never intereſt themſelves for Perſons who have no weight or ſupport, and are incapable of rendering them good Offices on other Occaſions; if they only concern themſelves for ſuch as have ſome ſecret or publick Connexion with them; Such Perſons are ſelfiſh and mercenary, and can never contribute to the true Glory of a Prince, or to his Vertue; ſince they will never give him any Occaſion of putting marks of his eſteem on Merit, but would monopolize to themſelves and their Minions all the Prince's Generoſity and Bounty.

Seventh Obſervation.] VII. Another Character yet more dangerous, and which alſo renders them more eaſily diſtinguiſhable, is their Care to keep at a diſtance from the Prince all who being known to him might gain his Confidence by their Merit. Their anxiety when any ſuch Perſon, in ſpight of their Vigilance, finds acceſs to the Prince, and the Artifices they then employ to prevent

prevent his being heard, diſcover the baſe Jealouſy which inwardly eats them up; are a Proof of their ſollicitude to engroſs the Prince to themſelves, and of their Fears leaſt becoming wiſer he ſhould be diſguſted at them and their Counſels. One who really Loves the Prince cannot uſe him in this Manner. He ſerves him to the utmoſt of his Abilities; but he is charmed that others ſerve him better. He ſearches every where after Merit. He produces it. He makes it known, and looks upon it as Treaſon to rob his Maſter of, or hide from him, a Treaſure that belongs to him. But a Man of ſuch elevated Virtue is very rare in Courts; and conſequently it is ſeldom any but Flatterers are there: And it is the Prince's Fault, who cares very little that his Court ſhould be filled with any other Perſons.

Eighth Obſervation.] VIII. He might detect them if he would, even thoſe who diſguiſe themſelves with the greateſt Addreſs; if he would but attend to their Care not to praiſe any but thoſe who are cloſely leagued with them; by their Silence when the Queſtion is about any other Perſon; or their manner of mixing with the general ſuperficial Praiſes they give ſuch, ſome pretty open hints about eſſential Defects, thus to leſſen them by Words which ſeeming to have eſcaped them without any premeditated Deſign may make the greater Impreſſion; by their confining themſelves always within the narrow Circle of their own private Intereſt, and that of their Favourites. This kind of League and Conſpiracy, never to blame or praiſe but with a view to themſelves, is a Crime againſt the State. By this ſingle Mark ought they to be ſuſpected; and it is of Importance to a Prince to be well appriſed of it.

Ninth Obſervation.] IX. The more modeſt a Flatterer appears, the more reſerved and diſintereſted, the more ought he to be feared; becauſe he is ſo like to what he is not, that he may be Miſtaken for a Man of real Worth. But let it be taken Notice of, whether, when he is Silent, pretends to nothing, and even keeps at a Diſtance, many Perſons are not zealous in ſounding his Praiſe, even when it is not called in Queſtion; let him narrowly examine thoſe who are ever praiſing him, their Diſcernment, their Capacity, their Merit: Let him ſearch whence their Zeal and Ardour for this wonderful Man proceeds: He will find it is a Cabal, a confirmed League which all Artifices are employed to cover. One ſingle diſcovery of this Kind, followed with the Chaſtiſement the Impoſtor deſerves, might enfranchiſe the Prince for a long Time from Flatterers by whom he is as it were kept in cloſe Siege.

Tenth Obſervation.] X. There are Courtiers who if one may ſo ſpeak, never loſe Sight of the Prince, who are afraid to be abſent one Moment from him, tho' they have no Charge at all, or none which demands ſuch aſſiduous Attendance on him. They are Jealous leſt any one ſhould take that Opportunity of advancing his Intereſt to their Prejudice, and ſo deprive them of what coſt them much Care and Trouble to preſerve; becauſe they look upon the Prince's preſent Goodneſs to them as a very precarious Poſſeſſion, and very much expoſed to envy. They have reaſon on their Side in one Senſe, and it is not their Opinion of the Prince's Favour I condemn: But according to their Notion of it, they think of nothing but managing it for their own Intereſt, and to this are all their views confin'd. How then could

ſuch

ſuch have the Courage to riſk loſing an Advantage, the Preſervation of which renders them ſo anxious and indefatigable, to tell the Prince ſomething that would be very much to his Honour, and that his Conſcience ought to induce him to do, but might occaſion their Diſgrace if it happened not to be reliſhed? Their ſolicitous Aſſiduity diſcovers their thorough Baſeneſs. They are afraid of every thing, and of their true Duty more than any Thing elſe,

Eleventh Obſervation.] XI. How many Princes do Perſons loaded with their Favours leave in a fatal Error about Points of the greateſt Conſequence through a criminal indifference about them? They are the firſt to condemn them in ſecret? but they would not for the World have ſaid one Word to undeceive them: And why? It is becauſe it is not their Buſineſs? Do any others accoſt the Prince to ſpeak to him? Does he give his Ear to any other but them? And would they not be inconſolable if he ſhould give it to another? Whence then is it, that they are Silent? It is becauſe they hold their Prince in contempt, and they prefer themſelves to him, and think his true Honour and Good nothing in Compariſon of their vile ſelfiſh Ends.

Twelfth Obſervation.] XII. There is then nothing but Meanneſs, Cowardice, and deſpicable Worthleſneſs in the Flatterer, when he is thoroughly ſearch'd and known, how ever high his Birth may be, or in whatever Eminence Favour may have placed him. This is his indelible Character. He is capable of nothing that is truly Great, Generous, or Salutary to the Prince and the State. His Intereſt keeps him always bowed

down to the Earth. He never raiſes himſelf above the Goods one may loſe by adhering to Virtue, and which muſt ſometimes be ſacrificed to duty. He meaſures himſelf ſolely by the Prince's Diſpoſition. If he has great Sentiments, he piques himſelf upon having them likewiſe; but if he has but very low ones, he ſatisfies himſelf at moſt with condemning them in his Heart, being firmly reſolved never to oppoſe them. Let the Prince therefore judge, after all this, if he really loves him; and if the Benefactions which he accumulates upon his Courtiers are Recompences due to their Zeal for his Glory, and their ſincere Attachment to his Perſon.

CHAPTER XII.

Means a Prince ought to uſe to keep off Flatterers, the Chief of which, is to ſhew a ſincere love of Truth.

ARTICLE I.

Means to keep Flatterers at a Diſtance.

1. AFTER having obſerved how odious flattery ought to be to Princes, and by what Characteriſticks they may diſcover it; to render all theſe Obſervations really uſeful, we muſt conſider what are the proper Methods of keeping at a diſtance from their Perſons and their Court ſuch dangerous Perſons, ſo dexterous in turning themſelves into any Shapes and Forms; for they are even capable of making a profitable uſe to themſelves of a Prince's Averſion to Flattery, by giving

giving high Commendations to a Temper which marks ſuch an Elevation and Nobleneſs of Soul, in order to flatter in a more ſeducive Manner.

Firſt Mean.] II. The ſureſt but the moſt difficult Way of being free from them, and keeping them at a Diſtance is, not to allow them any Place of Retreat in the Heart, (*l*) and to take Care not to be one's own principal Flatterer, one's own Courtier and Paraſite. A Prince will find no dificulty in chaſing them away far from his Court, if he does not liſten in ſecret to the moſt dangerous of Flatterers which is ſelf Love: But in vain will one employ againſt them a feigned ſeverity, if one indulges and kindly entertains within, a Seducer whoſe Language is much more deluſive than theirs, and which always keeps an open Paſſage by which they may enter into the Heart when it is itſelf well received and hath ſo great a Sway.

III. 'Tis common to charge Flatterers with all the Faults Princes commit; but that is only true in Part. They commit Faults becauſe they are flattered; but their greateſt Faults proceed from their flattering themſelves. They tell themſelves more Falſhoods than they hear from any other. They are more ingenious at ſhewing to themſelves all they have in them that is good, and at hiding or diminiſhing their Defects, at palliating or excuſing what they can't conceal, than the moſt artful of their Flatterers; and they carry about with them in their own Hearts a more ſubtle and better pre-

(*l*) Non eſt quod nos magis aliena judices adulatione perire, quam noſtra. Quis ſibi verum dicere auſus eſt? Quis non inter laudantium, blandientiumque poſitus greges, plurimum tamen ſibi ipſe aſſentitus eſt? *Senec. de Tranquilitate animi Cap.* 1.

pared Poiſon than that which others are ever inſinuating into them.

IV. All Men are obnoxious to this Diſeaſe, and there are very few who labour with ſucceſs to Cure it: For who are they who ſpeak ſincerely to themſelves; or dare tell themſelves humbling reproving, condemning Truths? Who is not afraid of himſelf and ſhuns himſelf? Who does not lay himſelf out to eſchew his own Cenſure, and make his eſcape as faſt as he can from his own Heart, leſt he ſhould find it very different from what he would have it thought to be? It is therefore in ourſelves that Flattery dwells; it is from thence we muſt expel it. It is againſt this our hatred ought to be pointed and animated, it is here a Prince ought to begin, if he would exterminate it from his Court.

Second Mean.] V. He muſt not however wait till his ſecret aptitude to flatter himſelf be quite overcome, before he ſets about baniſhing Flattery from his Court. On the Contrary, his Senſe of this Weakneſs muſt induce him to ſhun with great Care whatever may contribute to encreaſe or encourage it: And the more Difficulty he finds in maſtering that Inclination, the more openly and ſtrongly he ought to declare himſelf an Enemy to all that would render his Endeavours to get the Aſcendant of it ineffectual.

VI. (*m*) So ſoon as he perceives that any one would ſound him by Flattery, let him teſtify openly his Diſpleaſure at it; and yet more againſt him from whom it comes. Let him immediately check its Career by a ſevere countenance, let him turn the

(*m*) Ideo claudendæ ſunt aures malis vocibus, & quidem primis. *Senec. Ep.* 123.

the Diſcourſe another way, and ſhew by his Air, or if it be neceſſary by ſomething more, that he is highly offended with a Deſign to ſeduce him, and their Hopes of Succeſs in that Attempt.

VII. An Emperor (*n*), in that reſpect worthy of being imitated by all others, ſerv'd them ſo. (*o*) He had a moſt exquiſite Diſcernment for diſcovering the moſt artfully-couched Flattery. He diſconcerted all its beſt-laid Meaſures the Moment he perceiv'd it, and puniſh'd the Flatterer as guilty of having form'd a Deſign to ſurprize him, and believing him ſo weak as not to be able to diſcover the Artifice. (*p*) He could not bear the exceſſive Reſpect that they were diſpoſed to render him, nor their affected fulſome Expreſſions. He baniſhed them with Ignominy from his Preſence; or if their Rank ſecured them from his Puniſhment, he ridiculed and mocked them.

VIII. *Tiberius*, amidſt many monſtrous Vices, (*q*) had however preſerved the ſame Averſion to Flattery, and the ſame Attentiveneſs to curb it. He interrupted the Diſcourſe, the Moment it began to incline towards Flattery. He pointed out the particular Expreſſions which ſhock'd him, and ſubſtituted more modeſt ones in their room: And he did ſo, not only in Converſation, where it is moſt

(*n*) Alexander Severus.

(*o*) Erat ingentis prudentiæ, & cui nemo poſſet imponere: & quem ſi aliquis urbane tentare voluit, intellectus, tulit pœnas. *Lamprid. in ejus vita, pag.* 214.

(*p*) Si blandius aliquid dixiſſet, vel abjiciebatur, ſi loci ejus qualitas pateretur; vel ridebatur ingenti cachinno, ſi ejus dignitas graviori ſubjacere non poſſet injuriæ, *p.* 211.

(*q*) Adulationes adeo averſatus eſt, ut ſi quid in ſermone, vel in continua oratione blandius de ſe diceretur, non dubitaret interpellare ac reprehendere, & commutare continuo. *Suet. C.* 27.

moſt eaſy to check it, but on public Occaſions, when the Speech was addreſs'd; for even in theſe he made no Allowance for what was offenſive to the Reliſh he had preſerv'd of Truth.

IX. It is certainly ſhameful, that many Princes, whom the true Religion ought to have made Enemies to all Falſhood, ſhould ſo patiently bear with that immeaſurable Flattery, which reigns in all Speeches and Addreſſes to them; ſhould think themſelves honour'd by Harangues, ſome Pagan Emperors would have interrupted, as inſupportable to the Remains of Sincerity and Modeſty, their other Vices had not been able to extinguiſh.

X. I know it is neceſſary to the Public-Weal, that Princes be reſpected, and that one ought neither to ſpeak of them, nor to them, but in a manner ſuitable to their Dignity: But can one imagine that falſe Praiſes, which every-body turns into Reproaches, will gain Princes the Veneration of the People? And do Princes, by ſwallowing them without any Reluctance, think that they can thus impoſe on any Perſon, or that ſuch fulſome Flatteries being receiv'd by them can have any other Effect, but to render the Flatterer, the Flattery, and him who bears with it, very contemptible?

XI. They would gain a very general Applauſe, notwithſtanding many Defects in point of Merit, if they had at leaſt ſome Share of Sincerity: And they would be praiſed from the Heart, if they impoſed Silence upon thoſe who commend them without Meaſure or Judgment.

XII. But theſe two things almoſt always go together, want of Merit, and Pleaſure in being praiſed. A good Prince ought to have the two oppoſite Qualities: He ought to exert himſelf

himſelf to merit Approbation, and at the ſame time to moderate the Teſtifications of it that are rendered to him.

Third Mean.] XIII. He ought to forbid in public as well as in private all that is exceſſive, all that is contrary to Truth. A flattering Speech deliver'd on a ſolemn Occaſion ought to be interrupted by him, if he who makes it hath not profited by the previous Advice ordered to be given him, not to mix with it any thing that was not quite conformable to the Rules of Truth and Decency. An Action of this nature is ſoon known throughout the whole Kingdom. It ſhuts the Mouths of thoſe who think they have Wit, and a Talent at ſaying fine ſmooth Things, but don't trouble themſelves about their Truth or Falſhood. It does Honour to the Prince, ſhewing him to be a declared Enemy to Flattery; and teaches his People, that the way to gain his Favour is by loving Truth as much as he does.

Fourth Mean.] XIV. By the ſame Motive the Prince will reject with Diſdain all the Poems, Epiſtles, and Works of Wit, in which his Character is not treated with due Regard to his Sincerity and Modeſty, and all the Praiſe given him is at the Expence of his chief Merit, conſiſting in his Deteſtation of Flattery.

XV. But above all, he will have a thorough Indignation againſt all thoſe vain Fictions, in which the Names of the ancient Divinities are attributed to him, together with their pretended Powers over Earth and Sea, War and Peace. There is nothing in one View of them more cold and inſipid than theſe Chimeraes, or in the other more ſcandalous and impious. I know that the Names of *Jupiter*, *Mars*, and *Neptune*, are mere Sounds without

without any Meaning; but they are Names by which Men have been deceiv'd into the groſſeſt Idolatry; and the Devil hath ſupported a Kingdom of Superſtition, and procur'd Divine Honours to himſelf, under the Shew of Worſhip rendered to them. It is therefore doing the greateſt Injury to a Prince, to put him in the place of that Uſurper; and he diſhonours himſelf by conniving at ſuch Impiety. Mean time, the Theatres reſound with their Names; Muſic is wholly employ'd about theſe abſurd Fictions; the People are infected with that kind of Idolatry; and Puniſhments rain from Heaven upon a Nation which makes a Jeſt, or thinks lightly of, ſo great a Wickedneſs.

XVI. Let a Prince remember with trembling the terrible Example of *Herod* (*r*), who was ſo ſeverely puniſh'd for receiving with ſome Pleaſure the (*s*) Idolatrous Acclamations of the People at his Oration, "*Saying it was the Voice of a God, "and not of a Man.*" For the Angel of the Lord immediately ſmote him, and he was eaten of Worms, and gave up the Ghoſt, becauſe he gave not God the Glory. The New Teſtament Hiſtory atteſts this Puniſhment: And yet the *Tyrians* were Idolaters, accuſtomed to laviſh in their Flattery the Title of Divinity in the moſt prodigal manner, and *Herod* was a *Jew*, and by conſequence much more excuſable than *Chriſtians* can be.

Fifth Mean.] XVII. All Inſcriptions engraven on

(*r*) He was ſurnamed *Agrippa*.

(*s*) Herodes veſtitus veſte regia, ſedit pro tribunali & concionabatur ad eos, populus autem acclamabat, Dei voces, & non hominis! Confeſtim autem percuſſit eum Angelus Domini, eo quod non dediſſet honorem Deo, & conſumptus a vermibus expiravit. *Acts* xii. 21, *&c.*

on Marble or Braſs ſhould be condemned by the Prince, and changed by his abſolute expreſs Order, if they are not ſimple and ſincere. It is a greater Evil to perpetuate Flattery by durable Monuments, than to ſuffer it in tranſient Diſcourſe, which leaves no Veſtiges of it behind it. It is to render the Scandal eternal, and to teach Poſterity to deſpiſe the Truth, to tranſmit ſuch bad Examples to them. Men are accuſtomed to it; but the Indignation of God does not overlook it, and a Statue with an inſolent Title is a kind of Idol (*t*), which renders odious and abominable in his Sight the Place where it is erected, and the People who do not complain of it.

XVIII. The Prince ought on all Occaſions, and in all Things (*u*), to declare openly againſt Falſehood and Flattery, and to ward off Flatterers. For in vain would he repel them on one Side, and admit them on the other. They would eaſily perceive there was more Affectation in his Conduct than real Hatred of it, if to reconcile him to it it be only neceſſary to change its Dreſs. He muſt reject it in all Shapes, and ſhew an univerſal, unchangeable Abhorrence of them who uſe it: Nay, becauſe they are indefatigable, and not eaſily repulſed, he muſt employ ſome more ſenſible Marks of his Diſpleaſure than Contempt and Diſdain to expel it; and that is not to beſtow any Favour or Place upon a known Flatterer.

Sixth Mean.] XIX. Such a Method would be of great Efficacy, if one could ſtick to it: For it is to

(*t*) Idolum zeli. An idolatrous Image, which provokes God to Jealouſy. *Ezeck.* viii. 5.

(*u*) *Veſpaſian* laugh'd at thoſe who took Pains, by a falſe Genealogy, to make themſelves Deſcendants of *Hercules*. Conantes quoſdam originem Flavii generis ad conditores Reatinos, comitemque Herculis referre, irriſit ultro. *Suet. C.* 12.

to take away from Flattery its ſole Motive, and to ſtarve it. It will ſoon quit Arts which only ſerve to make it miſerable. For it is merely for ſelfiſh Ends, that it fatigues itſelf to purſue a Prince with perpetual fair Speeches; and if it once obſerves that it provokes inſtead of pleaſing him, it will learn another Trade, and eſſay to become agreeable to him by ſomething more ſolid.

ARTICLE II.

The ſureſt Way to repel and baniſh Flattery, is to teſtify a ſincere Love for Truth.

I. IT is evident that all I have hitherto ſaid ſuppoſes the Love of Truth, and cannot be put in Execution if that Love be not ſincere. But it is of Conſequence that a Prince ſhould loudly declare, that he loves nothing but Truth, that he finds no Beauty, no Charm in what has only the Appearance of it; that he is reſolv'd not to be deceiv'd, if it be poſſible to avoid it, in any thing; and that one cannot pleaſe him, but by ſpeaking to him on all Subjects with the ſtricteſt Regard to Truth.

II. Such a Declaration receiv'd on important Occaſions will have two good Effects. It will give Acceſs to Men of Merit, and put Impoſtors to flight. It will open the Prince's Cabinet to the one, for whom his Ears are already prepared, and his Heart well diſpoſed; (*x*) and it will ſhut it againſt the other, whom the Prince has proſcribed as his Enemies.

III. But ſuch a Declaration engages to do much more than may at firſt be imagined. There are Truths

(*x*) His neque palatii nepue aurium fores aperiet. *Theophilact. Inſt. Reg. P.* 2. *Cap.* 16.

Truths which a Prince hearkens to with Delight; but there are others which are very apt to hurt him, if he is not duly prepared for receiving them. All Inſtruction which tends to encreaſe their Abilities finds eaſy Admittance: But Inſtruction that reproves him meets with many and great Obſtacles; and it is with Reſpect to them, that all projected Schemes of Reformation and Perfection fail, and evaporate into Smoke.

IV. There are few Princes of whom it may be ſaid, as St. *Ambroſe* did of the great *Theodoſius* (*y*), *I loved him becauſe he hated Flattery, and delighted in being reproved:* An extraordinary Encomium, which comprehends in it all the Virtues! There are few Princes who can ſay with *David* (*z*). *Let the Righteous ſmite me, it ſhall be a Kindneſs; and let him reprove me, it ſhall be an excellent Oil, which ſhall not break my Head; i. e.* as the Flatteries poured on their Heads by Paraſites and ſelfiſh deſigning Men. There are very few who are of the ſame Opinion with the wiſe Man, (*a*) *Faithful are the Wounds of a Friend, but the Kiſſes of an Enemy are deceitful.* But this Subject deſerves to be treated at greater Length; and to that Effect the following Chapter is deſtined.

CHAP-

(*y*) Dilexi virum, qui magis arguentem quam adulantem probaret. *S. Ambr. de obitu Theod. n.* 34.

(*z*) Corripiet me juſtus in miſericordia, & increpabit me: oleum autem peccatoris non impinguet caput meum. *Pſal.* cxli. 5.

(*a*) Meliora ſunt vulnera diligentis, quam fraudulenta oſcula odientis. *Prov.* xxvii. 6.

CHAPTER XIII.

How rarely the Love of Truth is ſincere, and able to ſurmount the Obſtacles which commonly hinder Princes from diſcerning it.

ARTICLE I.

The Love of Truth is very rarely ſincere.

I. NOTHING does more Honour to a Man, eſpecially if he be in a high Station, than the Love of Truth, becauſe when it is ſincere it is a Proof of an excellent Spirit, deſirous of being conducted by Reaſon, and of an upright, well-diſpoſed Heart, which is ſolely bent upon what is good. But the more Honour this Diſpoſition does to a Man, ſo much the eaſier is it for him to ſuffer himſelf to be dazled by a counterfeit Semblance of it, and to perſuade himſelf, upon too ſlight Grounds, of his being really Maſter of what, were he poſſeſs'd of it, would truly merit very high Commendation.

II. In vain will one endeavour to inſpire any Diffidence in this Point into one who thinks he feels it, and reckons himſelf better acquainted with his own Sentiments and Inclinations, and with what he loves, than all thoſe who would make him doubt of it: But it is Opportunity which diſcovers what is in the Heart, and what lay hid there, under a Deſire that had not taken deep root in it, or went no farther than the Surface.

III. As much as we talk of Truth in general, the Mind is carried towards it by a natural Inclination, but the Heart only deſires it becauſe it does not

not imagine it hath any Contrariety to it. The Moment it is felt to reproach or condemn one, it is uneaſy at having ſeen it, and hardly can forgive thoſe who brought it before their Eyes. (*b*) *I adjure thee*, ſaid a King of (*c*) *Iſrael*, (the King *Ahab*) to the Prophet *Micaiah*, *that thou tell me nothing but that which is true, in the Name of the Lord.* Who would not conclude from theſe Words, that the King's Intention was ſuch. The Prophet gave him an Anſwer contrary to his Expectation (*d*), and the King ordered him to be caſt into Priſon. See there the Bottom of a Heart detected. The Prince would gladly have united the Honour of loving the Truth with a more ſincere and more deeply-rooted Deſire of being flattered: The Event ſeparated them; but the Moment before one might very readily have been deceived by ſo goodly a Semblance of honeſt Intention.

IV. See another Example yet more proper to diſcover the Doubts of the Heart, which is ſecretly an Enemy to Truth, at the very time that it perſuades itſelf it loveth nothing but Truth. (*e*) The Captains of the feeble Remains of the People of *Iſrael*, who remain'd in *Judea* after the Deſtruction of *Jeruſalem*, intreated the Prophet *Jeremiah* to aſk the Lord, whether it pleaſed him that they ſhould continue to live in their own Country, or that they ſhould ſeek a Refuge to themſelves in *Egypt*. The Prophet promiſes them to do ſo; and they aſſure him in the ſtrongeſt Terms of their Reſolution to obey: (*f*) *The Lord*, ſaid they, *be a true*

(*b*) 1 *Kings* xxii. 16.
(*c*) King *Ahab* to the Prophet *Micaiah*.
(*d*) 1 *Kings* xxii. 27.
(*e*) *Jerem* xlii.
(*f*) *Ibid.* v. 5 and 6.

faithful Witneſs between us, if we do not even according to all things for the which the Lord thy God ſhall ſend thee to us. The Prophet conſulted the Lord during ten Days, after which time he aſſembled the Heads of the People, and forbad them in the Name of God to go into *Egypt*, aſſuring them of his Protection, if they put their Truſt in him, and remained in *Judea:* And then theſe Men, who appear'd ſo ſubmiſſive and devout, became blaſphemous againſt the Anſwer of the Lord to them by his Prophet: (g) *Thou ſpeakeſt falſly*, ſaid they to *Jeremiah*, *the Lord our God hath not ſent thee to ſay, Go not into* Egypt *to ſojourn there. But* Baruch *ſetteth thee on againſt us, for to deliver us into the Hands of the* Chaldeans, *that they might put us to Death, or carry us away captive into* Babylon.

V. What an odd Change, may any one ſay, who is not acquainted with, or has not ſufficiently attended to the natural Duplicity of Man's Heart? Can one paſs ſo ſpeedily from Submiſſiveneſs to Rebellion? What is become of this Deſire, ſo ſincere and ſo ſolemnly declared, to know the Truth and to obey it? There is no Change here; they have only laid aſide the Veil which cover'd their reigning Diſpoſition. The Love of Truth was but an Idea floating in their Brain. The Deſire of following their own Inclination alone was real: But they knew not that, and approv'd themſelves for a tranſient Thought, that having no Root, Trial ſoon diſſipated.

VI. It is ſo almoſt with all Men, who only anſwer very confidently for their Love of Truth, and ſincere Attachment to it alone; becauſe they have not conſidered what a Sacrifice it may ſometimes demand

(g) *Jerem.* xliii. 2, 3.

demand of them, and what Oppoſition there is between it and their corrupt Inclinations. (*b*) They love the Light, but not its Rebukes and Cenſures. They conſult it in hopes of being approv'd by it; but they do not heſitate to treat its Reſponſes as imprudent and exceſſive, and by conſequence falſe, if they are contrary to their Deſires.

VII. The higher Men are raiſed above others the more liable are they to this Deluſion; for they feel perfectly the Greatneſs there is in the Character of an upright Man, who deſires in good earneſt to be inſtructed in the Truth; but they do not feel all that hinders them from truly profiting by ſuch Inſtruction. And this Difference in their feeling perſuades them that they ſincerely love the Truth; that if they ſee it not, it is not ſo much their own Fault, as it is theirs who do not tell it to them; and that none can do them a greater Pleaſure than by diſcovering it to them.

VIII. But thoſe who are charg'd with making it known to them think very differently upon the Matter. They ſeldom ſee their Advice follow'd: They perceive, on the contrary, that it commonly gives Offence, if they do not varniſh the Truth with Expreſſions that ſcarce let it be ſeen. They are obliged to ſtudy a thouſand Artifices to make one Word ſucceed; and frequently have Occaſion to repent having gone ſo far, becauſe it is taken amiſs.

IX. It is generally own'd that the Time one may expect to be heard by a Prince is in his younger Years, and before he mounts the Throne: That when they are no more in any

(*b*) Amant lucentem, oderunt redarguentem. *S. Aug. L.* 10. *Conf.* 23.

Dependance they will hear nothing; and that as they advance in Age the deeper they plunge themſelves in that thick Night, which the Light of Truth cannot penetrate: That then all the Fruit of a happy Education is inſenſibly loſt, becauſe it is no longer ſupported; and that a thouſand Errors prevail at laſt over the Truths which were ſown in their infant Minds.

ARTICLE II.

The Love of Truth is ſeldom ſo ſtrong in the Minds of Princes, as to be able to ſurmount all the Obſtacles which lie in their way to the Knowledge of it.

I. THE Errors which have been mentioned, beſides the Root they have naturally in the Heart, are inſpired into Princes either by Men deſigning to impoſe upon them, or by others who are themſelves deceived. The former make Flattery ſubſervient to their Intereſts; the latter, without any bad Intention, follow their falſe Opinions. Amidſt ſuch Perſons does a Prince live, and he is unhappy enough to be jointly deceived by both.

II. He almoſt never hears any thing that is truly ſalutary and uſeful, or exactly conformable to Truth. All the Images of things they preſent to his Mind are falſe. The Names of Good and Evil, and of the Paſſions and Virtues, are perverted before him: And ſeducive Diſcourſe is backed with more ſeducive Examples. All the Avenues by which Truth can enter into his Mind are ſhut upon it; and in ſuch a Situation little will it ſerve a young Prince to have ſome ſmall faint Love of Truth, and a general Fear of being deceived.

III. If it ſhould happen that this Fear is more

real

real and ſincere in one Prince than it is in others, he will take Precautions againſt being deceived: But what will theſe be? Does he know that he nouriſhes in his Breaſt a ſecret Confidence in his own Light, which will render them all ineffectual? Will he ſeek Information about what he thinks he underſtands better than any other? Will he be humble enough to confeſs his Ignorance of ſeveral things relating to his State? Would it vex him to diſcover more Capacity and Wiſdom in another, than he is himſelf Maſter of?

IV. But ſetting aſide all theſe Defects, ſo natural, ſo peculiar to the Great; who is the Prince that would not imagine it giving too much Advantage to a Perſon, to conſult about his Conduct; and apprehend ſuch Confidence in him may make one take too much Freedom with him, and tempt him at laſt to abuſe his Docility and Openneſs?

V. Kings will not have any one ſpeak to them, but when they think it fit. They are offended when they are treated with more Liberty. And this Silence is kept becauſe one does not know when ſpeaking would be agreeable; ſo that they cannot have Advice, but from thoſe they think fit to conſult. And if they do not think at all, or if they think wrong about their Duty with perfect Tranquillity of Mind, the Evil is incurable; the Prince deceives himſelf, and all are conſtrained to leave him in the undiſturbed Poſſeſſion of his Errors.

VI. Thoſe who appear the beſt diſpoſed to inform themſelves about the Truth, of whom do they aſk it? Of the Perſons with whom they are beſet on all Hands, whoſe Intereſt it commonly is to hide it from them, becauſe they themſelves gain by the Prince's Error; or they are in cloſe Con-

nexion with thoſe whoſe Advantage depends upon his not being ſo clear-ſighted; or becauſe they are afraid to run the riſk of expoſing themſelves to his Secrecy and Prudence, of which they are commonly very diffident? Such Conſiderations ſo reſtrain and tie up the wiſer Part, that they ſay little or nothing; and thus the Prince gets very little Inſight into Matters by all his Queſtions.

VII. Beſides, Enquiries of this Sort are very ſuperficial and imperfect. The Prince deſires to be inform'd about certain Matters, and to ſuch a Degree only, and not univerſally and fully. One may be inclined to tell him more, but he does not give Opportunity; he is taken up about one Duty, and neglects all the reſt. Princes have Zeal by Fits; it abides not: And except what happens to ſtrike them at particular Moments, every thing elſe is held for nothing by them.

VIII. They are ſeldom capable of profiting by a few Words, which ought to attract their Attention, and which, duly pondered, might be of very extenſive Uſe in guiding their Conduct. They cannot comprehend the Importance of ſome Advices prudently wrapped up, which relate to themſelves, or to Perſons in great Power. And one dares not explain himſelf more clearly without an expreſs Order: They put him upon the Scent; they open a Window to him, and he has no more to do, but to uſe his Eyes and look out: But he is diſſipated and indifferent, and his Inſtructor becomes ſo too after his Example.

IX. Where can Advices be of greater Utility, than with reſpect to the Prince's perſonal Faults? But what Matter is ſo tender and delicate? And who will have Succeſs by touching it? Kings are highly provoked if one appears to have look'd narrowly

narrowly into their Conduct, and to have diſcover'd more than they inclined. They may receive a firſt Advice perhaps pretty tranquilily, but a ſecond would be very ill receiv'd. They ſeem to remember the Freedom taken, more than the Service intended. They ſhew their Reſentment, either by indirect Hints, or by very ſevere Railleries. They for the future keep at a diſtance, and uſe them with more Diffidence and Severity; and a faithful Servant ſees the Favour transferred to others, who are more ſervile and complaiſant, which he had loſt by his Sincerity.

X. 'Tis true, a Prince who pretends to love Truth, and values himſelf in it, ſometimes aſks Queſtions about his Conduct of his favourite Domeſtics, and enquires what they think of him; but it is only to his Admirers he propoſes ſuch Queſtions; it is to Perſons whoſe Underſtanding he knows to be very confin'd, and to whom this apparent Love of Truth is a new Subject of their Admiration. 'Tis not of menial Servants, or thoſe who have Penſions from him, who may by one Word loſe their whole Fortune, that a Prince ought to enquire about his Defects, and how he executes his Duties. The more he confines himſelf to ſuch Inſtruction, the greater Riſk he runs of remaining always in profound Darkneſs. He ought to conſult Perſons of Abilities, who are quite diſintereſted, truly generous, and full of Zeal for the Prince, and the true Intereſt of his Kingdom; and he ought to be diſſatisfied when he meets with nothing but Praiſe.

XI. It is not enough that a Prince ſeeks after Truth with Sincerity; he ought to do it even with Anxiety, otherwiſe it ſhuns him, it flies from him, not of itſelf, ſince on the contrary, it pre-

vents Men, and makes Advances to them; but becauſe of many Impediments concurring to repel and keep it at a Diſtance from him. It is for this Reaſon the wiſe Man adviſes (*i*) *to buy the Truth but not to ſell it*, becauſe it muſt often coſt very much to get it and to keep it, and nothing ought to be ſpared for the one or the other.

XII. But the great Secret, with regard even to getting at it, is to know how to profit by it when one has found it. I am ſpeaking of that which comes by the Advice and Miniſtry of another. He muſt receive it with Joy and Thankfulneſs, and prove the Sincerity of this Sentiment, by making good Uſe of the Advice received. By this Means the Source of it is preſerved open: It comes from all Quarters; and the Wiſdom which is able to diſtinguiſh the Uſeful, rejects what is not, and overlooks nothing that is neceſſary.

XIII. This was the Practice of a wiſe Emperor. (*k*) He took it in good part (*l*) that every Perſon told him his real ſentiments freely. He heard him with Attention, and made a proper Uſe of his Information, when he was ſhewn any thing that might be changed or reformed in the Government: Very different in that reſpect from *Tiberius*, (*m*) who, tho' an Enemy to Flattery, could not endure Liberty, and feared Counſels

(*i*) Veritatem eme & noli vendere ſapientiam. *Proverb.* xxiii. 23.

(*k*) *Alexander Sever.*

(*l*) Moderationis tantæ fuit, ut ſibi ab omnibus libere quæ ſentiebant dici cuperet: & cum dictum eſſet, audiret; & cum audiſſet, ita ut res poſcebat, emendaret & corrigeret. *Pag.* 24.

(*m*) Anguſta & lubrica oratio ſub Principe qui libertatem metuebat, adulationem oderat. *Tacit. L.* 2. *Pag.* 74.

ſels and Advices at the ſame Time that he teſtified a great Averſion to Praiſe. One could not know how to deal with him, or what was the Middle between Truth and Falſhood capable of ſatisfying him. But this Character, which appears very ſingular, is that of all Princes who have too much Senſe and Spirit to ſuffer Flattery, but yet will not allow Advice to be given them they don't ask; and who look upon the Zeal of thoſe who would give them Light as impertinent Freedom. Such are but few in Number, for almoſt all Princes have a ſtrong Diſpoſition and Likeing to be praiſed. (*n*) But all who are above that Lowneſs of Mind, without ſincerely loving Truth, without ſeeking after it, without receiving it with Pleaſure when it is diſcovered to them, expoſe themſelves to the Danger of retaining their Faults, and of never attaining to any very eminent Virtue.

(*n*) Non vides quemadmodum illos in præceps agat extincta libertas? *Senec. L. 6. Benefic cap.* 30.

CHAP-

CHAPTER XIV.

To preſerve the Love of Truth, and in order to be well inſtructed in it, a Prince ought to attach himſelf to Perſons who love it. The Character of ſuch. The Uſe that ought to be made of their Merit.

ARTICLE I.

To preſerve the Love of Truth, and to be well inſtructed in it, the Prince ſhould attach himſelf to the Perſons who love it.

I. IT is evident by all that has been ſaid, that Princes of the beſt Intentions find great Difficulty in getting at Truth, either becauſe they do not ſeek it with ſufficient Application and Zeal, or becauſe the Perſons environing them, conſpire to conceal it from them. The only Remedy againſt theſe two Inconveniencies is to make Choice of ſome Friends who have no other Intereſt but that of the Prince, who have received from him not only Liberty but expreſs Orders to tell him all they think; and whom he may conſult on every Occaſion with unreſerved Confidence.

II. But I conjure the Prince above all, to take careful heed that ſuch Perſons be not attach'd to him, by any other Ties, beſides thoſe of an equally tender and reſpectful Affection: I cannot otherwiſe anſwer for their Fidelity: And if the Prince on his part, does not place his Confidence in them from a ſincerely grateful Senſe of their Merit and true Friendſhip, I cannot anſwer for it, that they

they will be really uſeful to him. The Correſpondence muſt be mutual, the love of Truth muſt be the Baſis of a firm and durable Union: And on both Sides, Intereſt muſt be comprehended to be the ſame; otherwiſe all would be but Farce and Ceremony, and both would ſoon be tired and diſguſted.

III. Princes whoſe Minds are intirely poſſeſſed by Ideas of their Majeſty will not underſtand this. They think it to be lowering themſelves to make a Friend of a Subject. They demand Homage, and diſpence with all the reſt; they have no Notion of any thing but their Authority, and ſubſtitute it in the room of every thing elſe.

IV. They know not what they loſe (*o*) by remaining entrench'd in their own Grandeur, and as it were cut off from all Commerce with Mankind. That Haughtineſs which makes them renounce all human Sentiments, degrades inſtead of elevating them, and their Contempt of Friendſhip, the moſt precious Jewel in Life, only ſhews that they are not worthy nor capable of it.

V. Thoſe who have better underſtood the true Grandeur of a Sovereign have entertained very different Sentiments. (*p*) They have been perſuaded that of all a King poſſeſſes, nothing comes up to the Pleaſures and Advantages of Friendſhip,

(*o*) Severior illa gravitas vos domo penitus clauſos, & a vobis ipſis quaſi obſeſſos detinet. Quamdiu ergo humanam conditionem aſpernamini, ne hominis quidem perfectionem attingitis. *Syneſ. de Reg. pag.* 19.

(*p*) Nam quæ ulla Rege dignior poſſeſſio quam amici conſortium? Quis ſecundarum rerum particeps jucundior? Quis in adverſis fortunæ caſibus tolerandis ſtabilior? Quis in laudando ſincerior. Quis in acriter objurgando minus moleſtus? *Synes. de Reg. pag.* 11.

ſhip, which adds to their Happineſs by intereſting itſelf in it, and diminiſhes their Pains by ſharing them: Such a Friend, is always ſincere when he praiſes, and reſpectful when he reproves, and faithful and conſtant whatever Changes all other Things may undergo.

VI. It is not becauſe they do not know (*q*) the vaſt Value of ſuch a Bleſſing that they are indifferent about it: For had they a juſt Idea of it, they would never think themſelves happy while they were deprived of it, and they would place their Glory as well as their Felicity in acquiring and preſerving it. It is therefore of great Importance to a Prince to know what a Friend worthy of him means; and that with the Picture I am to draw of ſuch a one always before his Eyes, he ſeeks during his whole Life with moſt earneſt Application after thoſe who ſhall appear to him to reſemble it.

ARTICLE II.

The Character or Portraiture of ſuch Perſons.

Firſt Quality] I. HIS firſt Quality is profound Secrecy, againſt all Temptation, and that coſts him him no Pain, not ſo much as any deep Reflection either to acquire or maintain it. He will be cloſe without appearing to be ſo. He will not ſhew by a myſterious Air, that he is carefully hiding ſomething of Conſequence. He will firſt ſuffer a Part of it to peep out, contenting himſelf to veil the

(*q*) Exoleverat priſcum mortalium bonum amicitia, (*ſaid a great Man to the Emperer* Trajan) cujus in locum migraverant aſſentationes, blanditiæ, & pejor odio amoris ſimulatio. Tu hanc pulſam & errantem reduxiſti. Habes amicos, quia amicus ipſe es: neque enim, ut alia ſubjectis, ita amor imperatur. *Paneg. Traja. p.* 234.

the reſt. He will never border upon what he ought to be ſilent about, nor ſuffer himſelf to be brought by Queſtions to theſe dangerous Confines. He will put a Stop to them all at firſt, leſt his Anſwers to ſome, and his Silence with regard to others, ſhould give any Hints towards a Diſcovery; and for this end he will accuſtom all, even his beſt Friends, never to ask him any Queſtions about the Prince's Affairs, or Matters with which he is intruſted by him. If this firſt Quality be wanting or not ſo perfect as I have now deſcrib'd it, no other Accompliſhments can render him worthy of the Prince's Amity, who would otherwiſe be oblig'd to be upon his Guard, to be diffident, and confine himſelf within cautious Bounds; all which is abſolutely incompatible with the unlimited Confidence I am now treating of.

Second Quality.] He ought to have a great Capacity for managing and foreſeeing Affairs. He will give none but wiſe Counſels, and be equally removed from Raſhneſs and from Slowneſs. He ought to be able to guard againſt Dangers by private Precautions, and to find Remedies for inconvenient Emergencies. He will not be rendered uncapable for Action when it is neceſſary, by Surprize and Aſtoniſhment, nor abandon himſelf upon ſuch Occaſions to uſeleſs Grief and Vexation. He will maintain his Tranquillity, but more by Reaſon and Prudence than by Conſtitution; and will thus be always in a Condition to conſole his Prince by his Wiſdom and Capacity of giving Advice, and finding out proper Expedients.

Third Quality.] III. Far from deſiring any Thing for himſelf, he will abſolutely claim nothing for his Family or Friends. He will continue always ſuch: Being in Favour won't change him.

him. The King's Confidence will poſſeſs him juſt as it found him; and he will not endeavour to preſerve it by any other Methods, but thoſe which merited and procured it to him.

Fourth Quality.] IV. This Diſintereſtedneſs will be founded upon a ſincere Averſion to all Places and Employments. He will be afraid of them as commonly fatal to Virtue, as environed with Perils and Temptations to many Vices. But he will ſhun them, not with a ſtudied and affected Diſſimulation, but from Conſcience and Prudence. It will not therefore be to get more that he refuſes leſs. His Modeſty will not be an aſſumed one to catch and inſnare his Prince. It will be ſincere and genuine ſuch as Time will not be able to efface; but, on the contrary, will ſhew him to be a thorough Enemy to all Hypocriſy and Diſguiſe.

Fifth Quality.] V. He will have a moſt tender reſpectful Regard for the Prince; but he will always be ready to retire when the Prince pleaſes. He will never think of rendering himſelf neceſſary to him. He will not form any ſecret Connexions with Perſons of Power and Might to eſtabliſh him the more ſecurely in his Place. He will be wholly regardleſs about what may happen to him. He will continue in it through regard to Providence which called him to it. And the ſame Principle will enable him to retire with Pleaſure and Contentment when it reſtores his Liberty to him. He will not, ſo to ſpeak, take root at Court but will always feel leſs Uneaſineſs in returning to his Privacy, than he had in quitting it.

Sixth Quality.] VI. The Confidence the Prince honours him with, will only ſerve to make him more humble. It will make no Alteration in his

his State; but preſerve the ſame Exterior, the ſame Simplicity, the ſame Modeſty, becauſe he will retain the ſame inward good Sentiments. He will take no Advantage of any thing the Prince may tell him, to oblige him to tell him more; he will only obſerve if he cools, and becomes more reſerved; and in ſo doing, he will not give way to vain Diffidences, or miſtake ſome little Inequalities of Temper, for a total permanent Change, with reſpect to him. His only Attention will be to make the Prince, if it is poſſible, wiſer and better; and to watch over himſelf, leſt his Care about another ſhould ſlacken his Diligence to improve himſelf.

Seventh Quality.] VII. To whatever Degree the Prince's Confidence in him, and the Authority he gives him, may ariſe, he will never promiſe any thing till he has conſulted him. He will never affect to ſhew any Power of his own. He will not attribute the Prince's Favours to his own Credit, to his Sollicitations, or to his Addreſs in managing the Prince. And he will never endeavour to throw all the Odium of Denials upon his Sovereign. He will never affect to appear in his Place, or to ſeem more equitable, more gracious, and ready to oblige than him. He will not flatter the Prince, but he will know how and when to be ſilent. He will not ever be juſtifying his Conduct; but contenting himſelf with having done his Duty to the King privately, he will not boaſt in public of having done it.

Eighth Quality.] VIII. Nothing can be more oppoſite to his Character, than to ſell his Intereſt with his Maſter, his Recommendations and good Offices. He will hold in utter Abhorrence ſuch deteſtable Corruption, and ſet himſelf with all his

Might

Might to baniſh it from Court. No Perſon ſhall be able to vaunt of having prevail'd on him to accept of the ſmalleſt Gift, or of having in the leaſt degree added to his Riches. He will be as delicate about ſmaller as greater Matters. No Preſent, under whatever Pretence, or in whatever Shape, ſhall find Entrance into his Houſe. He will take Care that his Domeſtics be as pure from Bribery as himſelf: If they are not, they ſhall be turned away as ſoon as their Miſbehaviour is detected, and he will take the ſureſt Meaſures to find them out. The Prince alone ſhall have the Right of rendering him any Service or Favour: But if he, whoſe Portraiture I am now drawing, is ſuch as I would have him to be, he will ever have the Liberty from his Prince to refuſe his Offers.

Ninth Quality.] IX. He will undertake with Satisfaction to recommend the Poor, and thoſe who have no Protection. He will become their Advocate, after having judged of their Demands. He will conſider it is neceſſary the Prince be inform'd of the Matter; for he will not apply to him, when an Affair may be ſet to rights by other means. He will think he has obtained himſelf all that Perſons without any Intereſt have obtained by his Means; and take it well that the Prince place to his Account all the Favours he grants to the Poor at his Interceſſion.

Tenth Quality.] X. He will know no other Good, but that of the Public, and of the Prince. Theſe two Things, inſeparable in their Nature, will be to him in place of every-thing. To theſe will he direct all his Thoughts, Cares, and Actions. He will not be happy, but in proportion as he has contributed toward them. Nor will he be afflicted, but in proportion to the Obſtacles he finds

finds to ſuch Endeavours. He will find no Conſolation for having left his Retirement, but in the Hopes of ſuch Succeſs; and if ever he happens to return to it, he will ſubſtitute his Prayers to God for theſe Bleſſings, to theCares from which he is diſcharged.

Eleventh Quality.] XI. Sincere Piety muſt be the Foundation of theſe excellent Diſpoſitions; without it they can neither be perfect nor ſtable. He will have in all his Actions a View and Motive much nobler than his Actions themſelves. He will ever have him before his Eyes, to whom the Prince is but a Servant. 'Tis to him he will be earneſt to approve himſelf. It is in him he will place all his Hopes, and he will not accept of any Reward here, becauſe he expects from him another Recompence more ſuitable to his Virtue.

ARTICLE III.

The Uſe a Prince ought to make of ſuch a one.

I. Would a Prince, who ſhould be ſo happy as to find a Perſon of ſuch Virtues, think himſelf diſhonour'd by treating him as his Friend? (*r*) What can he have in his Dominions that is comparable to ſuch a Treaſure? And to whom will he give his Eſteem, his Affection, and in a word, his moſt tender Friendſhip, if he does not judge him worthy of it?

II. What Advantage may he not reap from a Perſon of ſuch univerſal Merit? (*s*) With whom can

(*r*) Tunc maxime imperator, cum amicum ex imperatore agit. Etenim cum plurimis amicitiis fortuna principum indigeat, præcipuum eſt principis opus amicos parare. *Paneg. Traj. p.* 234.

(*s*) Fidele conſilium, aſſidua converſatio, ſermo comis, & ſine

he adviſe more ſafely? To whom can he unboſom himſelf with more Freedom? Who will intereſt himſelf more ſincerely in whatever may be confided to his Wiſdom and Diligence? What Converſation can be more amiable than ſuch a one's? Where will one find ſuch undiſſembled Approbation, when he truly merits it? (*t*) And if one has any Faults, where can he find ſo much Light united with ſuch Prudence and Love to point them out to him?

III. (*u*) In an elevated State, in which one is expoſed to a thouſand frivolous Admirers, who know not in what real Happineſs conſiſts, how neceſſary is it that a Prince have about him a Perſon of Judgment and Integrity, to bear him up againſt the Torrent of popular Errors; who may tell him in ſecret the very Reverſe of all he hears in public; who may put him in mind what he is; what is his true Grandeur; what Eſtimate he ought to make of all the Advantages he is reckon'd Maſter of? Without this incorruptible Friend, the Enchantments of Falſhood would at laſt prevail; for one becomes accuſtomed to think and judge with the Multitude: But Truth, being ſeaſonably manifeſted to him, diſſipates the Alluſion which was beginning to gain Ground, and diſpels all the Clouds, which the Prejudices of Men had already ſpread about him.

IV.

ſine adulatione jucundus; aures, ſi deliberare velit, diligentes; tutæ ſi credere. *Senec. L. 6. de Benef. Ep. 29.*

(*t*) Non cenſor odioſus, ſed jucundus monitor. *Theophilact. p. 2. c. 16.*

(*u*) Monſtrabo tibi cujus rei inopia laborent magna faſtigia: quid omnia poſſidentibus deſit: ſcilicet ille, qui verum dicat, & hominem inter mentientes ſtupentem, ipſaque conſuetudine pro rectis blanda audiendi ad ignorantiam veri perductum, vindicet a conſenſu, concentuque falſorum. *Senec. L. 6. de Benef. cap. 30.*

IV. (*x*) It is hardly poſſible to retain in great Proſperity equitable and moderate Sentiments; they are two things almoſt oppoſite, to appear to be happy here, and not to perſuade one's-ſelf that he is really ſo. The ſecret Inclination of the Heart, which loves to fix itſelf, and to find its Contentment here, exceedingly weakens all Ideas of more real and ſolid Good, but of which the Senſes cannot judge. (*y*) A Prince therefore ſtands in need of an Advocate, who will plead for his Reaſon againſt his Senſes, who will recal him to his Strength and Firmneſs, when he begins to ſtagger and waver, and who not being expoſed to the ſame Danger with him, diſcerns it better, and is awakened by it.

V. For there are Dangers, whoſe Conſequences are very fatal, but which lie hid, and are ſo difficult to be diſcern'd at firſt, that he who is ready to fall into them rarely perceives them. There muſt be another who alarms him; becauſe, to be able to ſee Danger on theſe Occaſions, one muſt have no Intereſt in diminiſhing it to one's-ſelf, and have had no hand in bringing it about by a ſecret Weakneſs, that hath already got deep Poſſeſſion of his Heart.

VI. Then is it neceſſary, that an attentive, firm Friend, put himſelf between the Prince and that Danger, ſhew him whither he is going to precipitate himſelf, and even pull him with ſome Violence from the Brink of ſuch a hazardous Precipice; chuſing rather to diſpleaſe his Paſſion for a

(*x*) Quaſi iſta inter ſe contraria ſint, bona fortuna & mens bona: ita melius in mal s ſapimus, ſecunda rectum auferunt. *Senec. Epiſt.* 24. *p.* 597.

(*y*) Neceſſe eſt admoneri, & habere advocatum bonæ mentis. *Senec. ibid.*

Moment, than diſpleaſe him for ever, by allowing him to ruin himſelf by his Negligence. By this Proof will the Prince know how much ſuch a Perſon merited being ſought after, and if it was to ſtoop below his Dignity, to attach himſelf by a ſincere Friendſhip to a Perſon of ſuch bold, diſintereſted Affection toward him.

VII. But independently of all that hath been ſaid, how can a Prince by himſelf be ſufficient for all theſe Things? And how can he find in himſelf alone, all that other Men ſeek for in their Friends? (z) Does Sovereignty extinguiſh Nature, or give a new one? Hath one no longer any Paſſions or Weakneſſes after one becomes a King? Has one never any more need of Conſolation, or of Strength, after he is once upon a Throne? Is a Prince eelaffected, doubtful, or diſpirited? Does he never nothing agreeable in unboſoming his Uneaſineſs to another? Or is it a Matter of Indifference whether Kings, for that effect, chuſe a faithful Friend, or take the firſt that offers, without making any Diſtinction?

VIII. Princes, by having placed their Glory in not needing Help from any one, are indeed ſometimes reduced to that, and ſometimes to what is yet more unworthy of them. As they are but Men, notwithſtanding all their Haughtineſs, and frequently very weak Men, that yield in ſecret to Uneaſineſſes they diſſemble in public; they diſcharge their Breaſts either to Women very little capable of ſupporting them, or to Domeſtics of no Worth, and very undeſerving of their Confidence;

(z) Permittite illi, *ſaid the Emperor* Antoninus Marcus Aurelius, *who wept at the Death of one who had aſſiſted in raiſing him,* ut homo ſit: neque enim vel Philoſophia, vel Imperium, tollit affectus. *Jul. Capitol. in vita Antonini Pii, pag.* 139.

dence; and they deprive themſelves of all the Comfort, and all the Aſſiſtances they would find in a Friend duly accompliſh'd for being ſuch.

IX. Were it not neceſſary on their own Account, yet it is to the right Government of the State. For his chief Buſineſs is to aſſiſt the Prince in diſcerning the Merit of Perſons of all Ranks, and by that means in filling all Places with Men of adequate Abilities and Virtue; to acquaint him with Abuſes of Importance; and to ſuggeſt to him proper Remedies againſt ſuch; to help them to diſcover Flatterers and mercenary Perſons, and keep them at a Diſtance. We have ſeen in the preceding Chapters, that all this is eſſential, and that no Part of it can be executed by Men who have any Intereſt at their Heart but the Prince's, or any other Views but public Good. It has therefore been demonſtrated (*a*), that without ſuch Friends as have been pourtraited, no Prince can worthily diſcharge his Duties, or ever be well inſtructed in the Truth.

X. How, for inſtance, can a Prince, who only conſults Miniſters or Courtezans, eſcape the Snares laid for him by the Conſpiracy even of a ſmall Number of Perſons, who poſſeſs the firſt Places about him, and the chief Employments; whoſe Intereſt it is to play to one another's Hands, to conceal from him a Part of what he ought to know, and to agree together in many Points, notwithſtanding their different Intereſts, and their ſecret Hatred and Jealouſy one of another, in

(*a*) Naturæ defectum ſupplens amicos in communionem adſciſcit, vim quodammodo ſuam multiplicans. Ita enim fiet, ut & omnium occulis videat, & omnium auribus audiat, omniumque animis in unum conſentientibus conſilium capiat. *Syneſ. de Regno, pag.* 11.

order to render themſelves ſole Maſters of all Affairs, and confine the Prince's Confidence wholly to themſelves; and hold (*b*) him, as it were, captive, in the narrow Circle within which they have impriſoned him?

XI. One ſolely attached to the Prince, were he ſingle, and without any other like him, would be capable of breaking and diſconcerting that fatal Combination againſt their Maſter's Liberty: and if he be ſeconded by any other of equal Probity, what Artifice, what League, would be able to hide itſelf, or ſupport itſelf againſt ſuch ſagacious and incorruptible Detecters and Oppoſers?

XII. This preſent therefore is the principal Queſtion, ſince all depends upon it. The Prince cannot be too attentive to it, nor weigh its Conſequences too maturely. If he is ſo happy as to find ſuch Men as have been deſcribed, he ought to put the higheſt Value upon them, and attach them to him by the only Ties worthy of them, which are thoſe of Confidence and Friendſhip; and if he has not as yet found any ſuch, he ought to employ all Means to find them out, and never to give over the Search till he has had Succeſs.

(*b*) Claudentes principem ſuum, & agentes ante omnia ne quid ſciat. *Lamprid. in vit. Alexand. pag.* 223.

CHAP.

CHAPTER XV.

Perſons truly worthy of a Prince's Confidence are rare; but they may be found, and what is the Mens of preſerving them.

ARTICLE I.

Perſons truly worthy of a Prince's Confidence are rare.

I. I AM perſuaded, while I was ſpeaking (*c*) of the Qualities which a Prince ought to honour with his Friendſhip, it was ſaid by many to themſelves, But where are ſuch Men to be found? They are very rare, if they be at all to be found. I agree to it that they are extreamly ſcarce: But the Rarity ſhould only ſerve to raiſe their Price, and to ſhew how unjuſt and unhappy a Prince would be, if he placed his Grandeur in neglecting them; in confounding them with the common Run of Mankind; not to mention keeping them at a Diſtance, and preferring before them thoſe who have not their Merit.

II. This however happens to the quarter Part of Sovereigns. (*d*) They have every thing but faithful Friends. The Opulence and Splendor which ſurround them hide ſecret Indigence from them. They take all thoſe for their Friends, who are dependent upon them for their Fortunes; and they fancy themſelves the Object worſhipped by that Crowd of Admirers, who love nothing but them-

(*c*) In the preceding Chapter.

(*d*) Neminem tam alte ſecunda poſuerunt, ut non illi eo magis amicus deſit, quia nihil abſit. *Senec. L. 6. de Benef. cap. 29.*

themſelves; and are very capable of paying Adoration to Power, when they deſpiſe him who is poſſeſs'd of it. Private Perſons might be much happier, if they knew how to profit of the Advantages of their Condition, to diſcern whether it is to them, or to their Wealth, court is paid; becauſe they have infinitely leſs to ſatisfy the Deſires of thoſe who profeſs Friendſhip to them: (*e*) It muſt however be acknowledg'd, that there are few ſincere Friends in any Rank of Life; that hardly are a few Examples of it to be found in a whole Age; and by conſequence Princes, whom there is more Temptation to deceive by a falſe Shew of affected Friendſhip, commonly never know what it is; inſomuch, that their Palaces would begin to be abandon'd and empty, if no Entry was allow'd there to any but faithful Servants.

ARTICLE II.

They are to be found, and how.

I. WE muſt not however imagine that Sincerity and Friendſhip have wholly left the Earth. (*f*) They would find firm Friends, if they were themſelves capable of Friendſhip: But one is loved as he loves. They are wholly taken up with their own dear ſelves; and they do not deſerve to meet with any but ſuch as imitate ſuch a ſelfiſh Example. If a Prince could raiſe his own Mind above that vile Lowneſs which keeps him bow'd down to himſelf; and had noble Sentiments of public Good,

(*e*) Neſcis quantum ſit pretium amicitiæ, ſi non intelligis multum te ei daturum, cui dederis amicum, rem non domibus tantum, ſed ſæculis raram; quæ non alicubi magis deeſt, quam ubi creditur abundare. *Senec. L. 6. de Benef. c. 33.*

(*f*) Habes amicos, quia amicus ipſe es. *Paneg. Traj.*

Good, and toward all who may be capable of aiding him in his great Deſigns; I am ſure he would find Perſons worthy of his Eſteem, and even of his Heart. (*g*) 'Tis rather thro' Incapacity for, or want of Friendſhip, that Princes fail of finding Friends, than becauſe there are none to be found. There are ſome deſerving of their Truſt and Amity; but they do not know them. There are even many to be found, if any one ſuch Perſon coming into Credit applies himſelf to diſcover them: But Flatterers beſiege the Prince, and Flatterers will take Care not to make known to him any Perſons who are hearty Enemies to Flattery.

II. What I ſay may be proved by Examples from the Hiſtory of great Princes, who meriting faithful Friends, have met with ſuch. I ſhall not quote to exemplify this, neither *Charles* the Great, nor St. *Lewis*, who form'd Friendſhips with Men of the greateſt Probity. I will ſatisfy myſelf with Examples of *Roman* Emperors, who tho' Pagans, yet knew how to make an excellent Choice of Friends; becauſe ſuch Examples are more likely to animate a Prince, or at leaſt to make him aſhamed, if he does not imitate them.

III. (*h*) The Emperor *Antoninus* had attached to himſelf ſuch faithful and diſintereſted Friends before his Acceſſion to the Throne, that the Change of his Rank made none in their Conduct. They continued always the ſame Enemies to Ambition and Avarice, equally zealous for his true Intereſt, and equally remote from any Diſpoſition to

(*g*) Multos tibi dabo, qui non amico, ſed amicitia caruerunt. *Senec. Epiſt.* 6.

(*h*) Amicis ſuis in imperio ſuo non aliter uſus eſt quam privatus: quia & ipſi nunquam de eo per fumum aliquid vendiderunt. *Jul. Capit. in vit. Anton. Pii, pag.* 140.

to abuſe the Credit and Confidence with which he honour'd them.

IV. (*i*) Before him, *Titus* had been no leſs happy in the Choice of his Friends, becauſe he was no leſs careful and exact in a Matter of ſuch Concernment. (*k*) And after him, *Marcus Aurelius* knew how to bring to him a great Number of Men of Merit, and of Knowledge, whoſe Advice he not only ſought about Affairs of all kinds, with great Pleaſure, but to whoſe Judgment he thought it reaſonable, and therefore honourable, often to ſubmit his own.

V. (*l*) *Alexander Severus* beſtow'd no leſs Care and Attention to ſearch throughout his Empire for Perſons worthy of his Confidence to be his Counſellors, tho' he was himſelf a very wiſe Prince, and had a Mother *Mammea*, capable of giving him ſufficient Help by her ſage Counſels, if he happen'd to ſtand in need of Advice in any Affair. *His Friends*, ſays his Hiſtorian, *were Men of Probity and Integrity, full of Honour, Virtue and Sincerity, attach'd to their Prince, to whom they were very reſpectful, and to whom they drew Reſpect from all his other Subjects. Far from being mercenary, they did not ſell their Favour, or make Gain of any thing.*

(*i*) Amicos elegit, quibus etiam poſt eum principes, ut & ſibi, & Reipublicæ neceſſariis, acquieverunt. *Suet. in vit. Titi. c.* 7.

(*k*) Æquius eſt, *ſaid he*, ut ego tot & talium amicorum conſilium ſequar, quam ut tot & tales amici meam unius voluntatem ſequantur. *Jul. Capitol. in vit. Marc. Antonini, pag.* 147.

(*l*) Alexander & ipſe optimus fuit, & optimæ matris conſiliis uſus eſt, & tamen amicos ſanctos & venerabiles habuit, continentes, religioſos, amantes principis ſui, & qui de illo nec ipſi riderent, nec riſui eſſe vellent: qui nihil venderent, nihil mentirentur, nihil fingerent, nunquam deciperent exiſtimationem principis ſui, ſed amarent. *Lamprid. in vit. Alexand. p.* 223.

thing. They profeſs'd the Love of Truth, and they never diſſembled. They laid themſelves out with Zeal to anſwer the Prince's Expectations from them, and to carry on his generous Deſigns. The Prince put entire Confidence in them, and they merited it by their invariable Adherence to his true Intereſt.

VI. Is it then conceivable, that there ſhould no longer be any ſuch Perſons in the World but in Idea, ſince there have been ſo many ſuch, even under Heathen Princes? For my Part, I am perſuaded, that if a Prince was like thoſe Emperors who found ſuch Friends, very many would be like their Friends. It is not Merit which is wanting in an Age or Nation, but due Attention to diſcover it, Knowledge of its Worth, and Skill to employ it. It is paſſed by, without being diſcerned; and when it is known, Princes underſtand not what Advantage to make of it; nay, they often reject it, as ſomething very apt to be troubleſome and incommodious to them.

VII. If the Prince himſelf be not a Perſon of very great Merit, he does not know what Merit is. He muſt firſt poſſeſs in himſelf the Qualifications he ſeeks after in others, and be even more perfect than the Friends he would aſſociate to himſelf, to be able to diſtinguiſh them in a Crowd, and engage them to him. Every-thing is equal in the Eyes of one of little Underſtanding; to a Perſon of a mean, low Mind, all Perſons appear of his own pitiful Size: Good Taſte, and clear Diſcernment, are very rare Qualities; and certain Eyes are taken with ſhowy Tinſel rather than pure Gold.

VIII. So ſoon as a Prince ſhall declare his Deſire to find out Perſons of a ſuperior Character to the Bulk of Mankind, ſuch Perſons will not be a Rarity.

Rarity. He may not perhaps find at firſt the the moſt perfect, but he will come at ſuch by Degrees, one Man of Probity knows others. A diſintereſted Man is by that one Quality capable of ſeeking out one of greater Ability than himſelf, and of making him known to the Prince without any Emotions of Jealouſy. The firſt is the moſt difficult Step, but tho' the firſt Trialsſhould have but ſmall Succeſs, at leaſt he ought to wiſh and hope to ſucceed: For it is, beyond all Compariſon in this Caſe, a much greater Evil not to ſeek than not to find.

IX. When a Prince has upright Intentions, and ſincerely aſks of God to direct him to a fit Counſellor, God hears his Prayer: So the holy Scriptures aſſure us: But it ſuppoſes that his good Life is conformable to his Prayer, and that he who aſks ſuch a Grace will put a very high Value upon it when it is accorded to him. It is for this Reaſon that the Scripture begins, by ſetting forth the unſpeakable Advantages of a faithful Friend; and then adds, that the Way to obtain ſuch a Bleſſing, is to fear and honour God, who alone can give him a Perſon of ſuch Merit. (*m*) *A faithful Friend*, ſays the Holy Spirit, *is a ſtrong Defence, and he that hath ſuch an one hath found a Treaſure. Nothing doth countervail a faithful Friend, and his Excellency is invaluable. A faithful Friend is the Medium of Life, and they that fear the Lord ſhall find him.* Here is the ſure way of finding him: But then the Prince muſt thoroughly commprehend what a true Friend is and what a miſerable thing it is not to have one.

X. One

(*m*) *Eccleſiaſt.* vi. 14, 15, 16.

X. One Friend of this Stamp, and as perfect as the Scripture repreſents him to be, may ſupply the Place of many: And the wiſe Man admoniſhes us to diſtinguiſh him carefully from thoſe who may have a Part of his good Qualities without having them all. (*n*) *Be at Peace with many: Nevertheleſs have but one Counſellor of a thouſand. If thou wouldſt get a Friend prove him firſt, and be not haſty to credit him.*

XI. A Prince ought when he has found ſuch a one to reſerve him for himſelf, without giving him any Charge that may ſeparate him from him. Others, very inferior to him in Wiſdom or Virtue, may diſcharge Truſts very faithfully which are leſs expoſed to Temptation: But to poſſeſs the Prince's Confidence is a Truſt of the higheſt Importance, and therefore it ought not to be depoſited but in the ſecureſt Hands.

XII. But it muſt be obſerved, That this Perſon, whom the Prince prfers to all others, will not prefer himſelf to any one, if he has all the Merit he is judged to have. He will be a Support to the Prince's other Friends. He will endeavour to procure due regard to their Talents and good Qualities; and, far from being jealous of their Influence, he will be deſirous that all Affairs may be done with Counſel, and that nothing be decided by Favour; and that the Prince may not only be enabled to judge well, but that it may always be he who determines.

He will with this View refuſe every Charge or Employment, that he may have no other Authority

(*n*) Multi pacifici ſint tibi, & conſiliarius ſit tibi unus de mille. *Eccleſ.* vi. 6.

rity but what his Wiſdom gives him, and that he only may be regarded in proportion to his Uſefulneſs.

ARTICLE III.

Means to preſerve him.

I. THE Queſtion is, how a Prince may preſerve to himſelf ſuch a Friend, and the few who are like him, and cloſely united with him. This is more difficult than is imagined; and Experience daily teaches us, that if a faithful Friend be rare, the Wiſdom which is neceſſary to preſerve him is yet more ſo.

II. A Prince muſt be on the Watch againſt a thouſand Artifices that will be employed to diſcredit his faithful Servant. No Stone will be left unturned to diminiſh his Opinion of him, to diſguſt him at him, and render him odious to him; all Methods will be tried to make the Prince think he has made a Pupil of himſelf, and put himſelf under the Guardianſhip of a Perſon who is inwardly ambitious, and applies himſelf to know him that he may lead him, and who, to render himſelf indiſputably neceſſary, abuſes his Prince's Confidence. Such Perſons will endeavour to bring his Diſintereſtedneſs into Suſpicion, being but a Cover to his pernicious Deſigns, which will diſcover themſelves when it is out of the Prince's Power to put a Stop to them. They will be attentive to all he ſays and does, to miſinterpret and miſrepreſent all. They will magnify his ſmalleſt Faults. They will ſtir up all Sorts of Perſons to ſpeak againſt him in ſecret, and even in publick. The Great, the Miniſters, all Perſons in Power, who fear him and look upon him as their

their Enemy, becauſe he is ſuch to all their Paſſions, will conſpire ſo aſſiduouſly and indefatigably againſt him, that the Prince will at laſt ſuffer himſelf to be ſhaken. And as it will coſt but one Word to diſmiſs a Perſon who has no Place, he will the more eaſily determine himſelf to diſcard him. He will thus deprive himſelf of the only Perſon who was attach'd to him, and ſacrifice him to the Cabals and Calumnies of his implacable Enemies, becauſe they are really ſuch to the Prince's true Glory and the public Good.

II. The Prince on ſuch Occaſions muſt immediately ſhew a Firmneſs that will keep all about him in Awe; and ſtop the Mouths of the firſt who ſhall dare to ſpeak, that none may be ſo raſh as to follow their Example. If notwithſtanding ſuch Precautions, any continue to lay Snares for the Prince to ſound and ſhake him, he ought to declare openly that ſuch Artifices ſhall never ſucceed, but on the contrary augment his Regard for the Perſon attached, and his Diffidence of his Calumniators. Such a Declaration, ſupported by a conformable Behaviour, will quickly put an end to all malicious Surmiſes againſt his Friend: Or if they ſhould not, the Diſgrace of ſome ſubaltern Tool, who adventures to meddle in this Matter, of whom it is proper to make an Example, tho' in itſelf of no great Conſequence, yet will be remarkable enough to make every one take heed to himſelf, and be upon his good Behaviour.

IV. After this firſt Shock, what is moſt to be apprehended, is the Inconſtancy of the Prince himſelf; not merely that which proceeds from Conſtitution, tho' even that may be of very great Conſequence if it is not attended to; but chiefly in that in which there is a great Mixture of Affectation

tation. The Great are very liable to this Fault if they have not very much of ſolid Merit. They are commonly very inclinable to put a Value upon the Honour of their good Graces, and they purpoſely affect ſuch Inequalities in their Behaviour, that it is very difficult to know how one ſtands in their Affection. Nothing at one Time is more amiable and engaging than their Converſation, or more inſinuating than their Manner; but next Day one is hardly taken Notice of. The ſame Perſon, to whom a few Days ago ſo many obliging Things were ſaid, on another Occaſion is ſcarcely vouchſafed a Look, but is quite neglected, while in the mean Time the Prince affects to addreſs his diſcourſe to Perſons of very little Merit, as it were on purpoſe to make him reflect, that when he ſpoke to him with ſo much Affability and Goodneſs, he really had no greater Value for him than for any other.

V. One, who pays his Court to a Prince for ſelfiſh Ends, bears all theſe Inequalities very patiently, and becomes inſenſible to them, becauſe he has Views and Motives which more nearly touch him than ſuch Trifles of which he is not Maſter, and that he ſatisfies himſelf with deſpiſing in ſecret. But a Perſon, who cannot be retained but by good Uſage, and who would think himſelf more happy in his Retirement, where he might fully enjoy his Liberty without very ſenſible Uneaſineſs, that a Prince ſhould, as it were, puniſh him To-day for having given him ſo much of his Confidence Yeſterday, and having carefully obſerved the Prince's Fear that he ſhould think himſelf greatly valued by him, he at length delivers from the Prince that Apprehenſion by retiring.

VI. Princes who have not this Fault, which is moſt

moſt aſſuredly quite unworthy of a Royal Mind, (*o*) are ſometimes too full of their Grandeur, and ſet themſelves to keep others conſtantly in Mind of it. They meaſure all their Words and Steps. They never quit their authoritative Air. They never as it were deſcend from the Throne, and cannot lay aſide for a Moment their Idea of the Diſtance between King and Subject.

VII. Such a one may know how to command, but he cannot know what it is to love: And when one is incapable of loving, can he have Friends? Or does he deſire to have ſuch perfect ones as have been deſcribed? Does a Prince loſe any thing of his Grandeur in really forgetting it for the ſake of one who always remembers it? May not he truſt himſelf to turn for a few Minutes? Or why be ever putting one in Mind of his Duty who never forgets it? (*p*) A haughty, overbearing, proud Air, locks up the Heart, and quite ſtifles all its Thoughts. Confidence ſhews itſelf by the Freedom it gives; and when a wiſe diſintereſted Perſon is kept under perpetual Conſtraint, he ſoon ſees that the Prince would have him for a Slave and not for a Friend.

VIII. Two very different Conditions: But Princes rarely attend to the Difference, and can take more Satisfaction in one they may treat as they pleaſe, than in another of a

(*o*) Eſt proprium ſuperbæ, magno æſtimare introitum, ac tactum ſui liminis pro honore dare.—Amicum vocas cujus diſponitur ſalutatio? Aut poteſt hujus tibi patere fides, qui per fores maligne apertas non intrat, ſed illabitur. *Senec. L.* 6. *de Benef. C.* 34.

(*p*) Neque enim ut alia, ſubjectis, ita amor imperatur: neque eſt ullus affectus tam erectus & liber, nec qui magis vices exigat. *Paneg. Trj.*

more generous and liberal Turn. They are often offended at the delicacy of the latter as if it was Pride; and becauſe they place Humility in cringing before them, and in yielding ſubmiſſively to their Humour, they are ſhocked at the contrary Diſpoſition, as if it could not ſpring from Virtue.

IX. Thus commences the Prince's Diſguſt at a Perſon of the firſt Rank who is uneaſy to him by a well guarded Behaviour, which tho' not exacted is however due. Diſguſt paſſes into fear of him as being too wiſe, too uniform and decent in his Conduct. His Demeanor is look'd upon as a Cenſure. The Care he takes to avoid Faults is imagined to make him too attentive to thoſe committed before him. The Prince repents of his having ſpoken too freely to him. He fancies ſuch a one can read in the Heart what he is not told. He finds himſelf more at his Eaſe when abſent, and quite fettered by his Preſence. All this is felt on both Sides; but it does not continue long ſo: For a Separation ſoon puts a Period to it.

X. A Good Prince never falls into this Error. He is faithful in his Friendſhip, (*q*) and as he examines well to whom he gives it, ſo he changes not. (*r*) He gives a real Place in his Heart to whom he profeſſes Affection; and ſees him with freſh Satisfaction. He is pleaſed that he ſhould know all, and give his Judgment of all. He preſerves with him juſt ſo much of his Dignity as Decency requires, and lays aſide all the reſt as

(*q*) Amicitias neque facile admiſit, & conſtantiſſime retinuit. *Lamp. Auguſte au raport de Suetone. C.* 66.

(*r*) In pectore amicus, non in atrio, quæritur. Illo recipiendus eſt, illic retinendus, & in ſenſus recondendus, *Senec. L.* 6. *de Beneſ. C.* 34.

as unneceſſary. He looks upon what is wanting in Birth as ſufficiently made up by Merit. He does not think it humbling himſelf below his Rank, to converſe in an agreeable familiar manner with one ſuperior to him in many more eſſential Reſpects, tho' inferior in his Condition: And there he enters into the Sentiments of a great Emperor (*ſ*) who condemned with Indignation the ill-placed Haughtineſs of the Great which deprives them of the moſt innocent Pleaſure in Life, by bereaving them of friendly Commerce with Perſons of greater Merit tho' of a lower Rank.

XI. With ſuch a happy Diſpoſition of Mind a Prince can conſider the Poſſeſſion of a Friend as a Treaſure that it is not in any one's Power to rob him of. But after all this I am not without Fears, nor can I be quite eaſy, till I am aſſured that the Prince gives no Admittance to any Paſſion: For it is only on theſe Terms that ſuch a Friend as I wiſh him can continue long with him. He will become uſeleſs, and at laſt odious, if the Prince departs from Virtue, and refuſes to hearken to the wiſe Advices he will give him. Their Minds will then become as oppoſite as the Paths they purſue. There will no longer be any Liberty or any Confidence. Flatterers will crowd upon the Prince, and put themſelves between him and his Friend. They will widen the fatal Se-

(*ſ*) In colloquiis humilimorum civiliſſimus fuit, deteſtans eos, qui ſibi hanc voluptatem humanitatis, quaſi ſervantes faſtigium principis, inviderent. *L' Emp. Adrien au rapport de Spartien dans ſa vie pag.* 130.

(*t*) Tu amicos ex optimis legis: hos provehis & oſtentas, quaſi ſpecimen & exemplar, quæ tibi ſecta vitæ, quod hominum genus placeat. *Paneg. Traj. p.* 130.

paration by all the Arts they can deviſe, and endeavour to render the Evil incurable.

XII. It is on this Account that the Scripture, when it promiſes a Prince to give him a faithful Friend if he aſks ſuch a one of God and is ſincerely pious, warns him that he muſt preſerve his Friend by the ſame Means which procured him. (*v*) *A faithful Friend is the Medicine of Life, and they that fear the Lord ſhall find him. He that fears the Lord ſhall direct his Friendſhip aright; for as he is, ſo ſhall his Friend be alſo.*

XIII. Let a Prince therefore remember, if he pleaſes, that he ought to be more diffident in him ſelf than any other: That he will loſe the Aſſiſtance and Counſel of a faithful Friend when he loſes all Reliſh for Virtue; but, on the contrary, that he ſhall be happy during his whole Life, if he knows how to preſerve His Friendſhip by the Innocence of his Manners and by his Tractability, who is ſo capable to gain him the Love of all Perſons of real Merit. I conjure him to compare well theſe two States, and I do not doubt but he will agree to it, (*x*) that nothing can equal his Happineſs

(*v*) Qui metuunt Dominum invenient illum (amicum fidelem) Qui timet Deum æque habebit amicitiam bonam; quoniam ſecundum illum erit amicus illius. *Eccl.* c. vi. 16, 17. [*In this manner St.* Bernard *ſpeaks of Pope* Eugene]

(*x*) Quid me beatius, quidve ſecurius, cum ejuſmodi circa me vitæ meæ & cuſtodes ſpectarem, ſimul & teſtes? quibus omnia mea ſecreta committerem, communicarem conſilia; quibus me totum refunderem, tanquam alteri mihi. Qui, ſi vellem aliquatenus deviare, non ſinerent, formarent præcipitem, dormitantem excitarent. Quorum me reverentia & libertas extollentem reprimeret, excedentem corrigeret. Quorum me conſtantia & fortitudo nutantem firmaret, erigeret diffidentem. Quorum me fides & ſanctitas ad quæque ſancta, ad quæque honeſta, ad quæque pudica, ad quæque amabilia & bonæ famæ provocaret. *S. Bern. L. 4. de Conſiderat.*

pineſs if he can aſſemble about him ſome Perſons truly deſerving his Confidence, to be the Guardians as well as Witneſſes of his Virtue, to whom he may with Security impart his Secrets and all his Deſigns; from whom he hath no reſerve, and to whom he can ſpeak as to himſelf; who will not permit him to make a wrong Step; who will pull him back from the Brink of a Precipice; who will awaken him when he becomes unwatchful; whoſe Modeſty will be a continued Leſſon againſt Pride, and whoſe Freedom will prove its Remedy; whoſe Courage and Steadineſs will inſpire the ſame good Qualities into him; whoſe Sincerity and Fidelity will be the moſt powerful Exhortation to Aſſiduity and Conſtancy in all his Duties, to the Practice of all the Virtues, that is to all that can procure Eſteem or Love to a Prince.

CHAPTER XVI.

It is of infinite Conſequence to a Prince, not to believe Reports too ſlightly; to declare himſelf an Enemy to Informers; and to puniſh Calumny.

ARTICLE I.

It is of great Importance to a Prince not to be too ready to give Ear to Reports.

I. IT will be impoſſible for a Prince to preſerve one Perſon of real Merit about him, or to refuſe his Confidence to thoſe who will make a very bad Uſe of it, if he receives without great

Precaution the Impreſſions many will oblige themſelves to give him, and if he believes on too ſlight Evidence, what will be ſaid to them in ſecret.

II. This however is the Fault of all the Great; ſo that one may ſay of every Age what St. *Bernard* ſaid of thoſe in his Time, (*y*) That none were ſufficiently cautious not to receive imprudently the Reports made to them, to the Diſadvantage of the Abſent: That none gave himſelf the Trouble to ſound them to the bottom; and that none underſtood, how unjuſt it is to take up Prejudices againſt Perſons, often very innocent, upon the Accuſation of their invidious Enemies.

III. The bad Conſequences of this unhappy Credulity are infinite, and this ſingle Fault, if it is not remedied or guarded againſt, may occaſion incredible Miſchiefs to a State, in ſpight of the good Intentions of him who governs it.

IV. It is not therefore ſufficient to admoniſh Princes of it in general: The ſecret Sources of ſuch a dangerous Readineſs to believe bad Reports muſt be laid open to them; and the Means pointed out by which they may eſcape the Snares prepared for their Credulity. It is fit to repreſent to them, in the livelieſt Manner, how much they diſhonour themſelves, and to what Crimes they expoſe themſelves, by becoming Miniſters to the Paſſions of thoſe who deceive them, and making

(*y*) Eſt vitium, cujus ſi te immunem ſentis, inter omnes quos novi, qui cathedras aſcenderunt, ſedebis, me judice, ſolitarius. Quia veraciter ſingulariterque levaſti te ſupra te, juxta prophetam. Facilitas credulitatis hæc eſt: cujus callidiſſimæ vulpeculæ magnorum nemiuem comperi ſatis caviſſe verſutias. Inde eis pro nihilo iræ multi, inde innocentium frequens addictio, inde præjudicia in abſentes. *S. Bern. L. 2. de conſid C.* 14.

ing that Authority ſubſervient to Calumny, which they have received chiefly to ſuppreſs and puniſh it.

ARTICLE II.

Whence the exceſſive Credulity of the Great proceeds.

I. THE Goodneſs of Princes is ſometimes the Cauſe of this Credulity. They judge of the Sincerity of others by their own; and the more generous they are, the leſs do they ſuſpect the baſe Malignity of thoſe who give them falſe Information. This is what *Ahaſuerus* ſaid to excuſe himſelf, for having too raſhly believed the Calumnies of *Haman* againſt the *Jews*. (z) Oftentimes, ſaith he, alſo fair Speech hath cauſed many who are in Authority to be Partakers of innocent Blood, and hath enwrapped them in remedileſs Calamities; beguiling with the Falſhood and Deceit of their lewd Diſpoſition *the Innocence of Princes*. They too readily imagine others to be like themſelves, and ſo are impoſed upon, becauſe they are themſelves incapable of any Deſign to deceive.

2. But ſuch an Excuſe doth not at all clear a Prince who ought not to ſacrifice a whole Nation to the Accuſation of a ſingle Perſon; but is obliged to examine into it with great Cautiouſneſs, becauſe he is Judge: A Prince, who ought to have more Difficulty in believing ill of one Perſon than of many, and who being the Protector of all under

(z) Aures principum ſimplices, & ex ſua natura alios æſtimantes, callida fraude decipiuntur. *Eſther* xvi. 6.

der his Care, cannot without terrible Injuſtice oppreſs ſome becauſe he believes others ſincere.

III. The Propenſity of Princes to believe bad Reports, more commonly ariſes from their exceſſive Diffidence, and from their Aptitude to augment mere Surmiſes into certain Evidence. A mere Shadow of Probability ſtrikes them, and ſoon converts itſelf into a real Proof. As they know few Perſons for whoſe good Conduct they would be anſwerable, and Experience having ſhewn them how little Ground they had to truſt ſome they had a good Opinion of, they imagine it is not judging raſhly of others to claſs them in the ſame Tribe; and eſteem it the ſafeſt Rule they can follow not to be deceived, to put the worſt Conſtruction on every Thing. We have elſewhere obſerv'd how unworthy this Maxim is of a wiſe Prince who does not look upon Virtue as an empty Sound; but being himſelf truly virtuous, is perſuaded he is not the only good Man in the World.

IV. Indolence joins with the Diffidence of Princes. They will decide, but they will not take the Trouble of examining. The ſhorteſt Way therefore is to believe, and let Conſequences alone. The Fault they think in that caſe falls upon the Accuſer. He muſt anſwer for all the Conſequences of his Information; for themſelves, they think, they do well, to put a Stop to Evil, real or apparent; and they rather chooſe to expoſe themſelves to the Danger of running too faſt, than to that of being too tardy to ſuppreſs Evil.

V. It flatters not a few to give Examples of their Authority. And whoever offers them a new Opportunity of ſatisfying that Paſſion touches them on the weak Side. They delight in puniſhing, making

making themſelves feared, and in giving Proofs of their Power. They are even ſo weak as to fancy that they thus evidence their Vigilance and Attention to the Affairs of Government: And theſe two miſerable Motives hold their Ears open to whatever artful Men feign, or think fit to tell them.

VI. Others are credulous meerly becauſe they have both Judgment and Diſcernment. They retain all their Life ſome Share of the Weakneſs of Infants, to whom every thing appears real, becauſe they can judge of nothing. The firſt Perſon who accoſts them fills up the whole Compaſs of their narrow Underſtandings; and the Place being wholly occupied, there is no room for other Reflections to enter into it.

VII. All theſe ſecret Sources of an imprudent Credulity are a ſhameful Reproach to a Prince: But the moſt humbling and at the ſame time the moſt terrible of all is, (*a*) that Blindneſs with which God ſometimes puniſhes the Contempt of Truth, and of Perſons capable of telling it. Then one hears Falſhood with Joy: He doubts, he examines, he enquires no more; but he follows without any Remorſe all the violent Counſels of a Seducer: Deceivers only are liſtened to, the contempt of Reaſon and of Mankind; and whatever might undeceive, only ſerves to irritate them.

ARTICLE

(*a*) Eo quod charitatem veritatis non reciperunt, ideo mittet illis Deus operationem erroris, ut credant mendacio. 2 *Theſſ.* ii. 10.

Effuſa eſt contemptio ſuper principes & errare fecit eos in invio, & non in via. *Pſ.* cvi. 40.

ARTICLE III.

The Remedy againſt Informers: To know them well.

I. To prevent ſuch an Evil, and remove the Source of it, a Prince ought to fit himſelf to be able to diſtinguiſh an Informer; to diſcern his Arts, to ſtudy his Scope and his Deſigns; and in fine, to compare himſelf with ſuch a Miſcreant, that he may ſee if it is by ſuch an Impoſter a King ought to be governed, and if it is to execute the black Deſigns of this Traitor a King is inveſted by God with Power.

II. A Delator (*b*) is a ſecret Accuſer, who ſhuns the Light and Evidence of Trial; who will be believed on his own Word, or that of his Accomplices; who would exclude Innocence from Acceſs to the Prince, and deprive it of all Methods of juſtifying itſelf; who wiſhes the Accuſed may always be ignorant of the Crime imputed to him; who adviſes the ſhorteſt and moſt expeditious Ways of puniſhing it; who avoids as much as he

(*b*) Clandeſtinos & ſuſurratas delationes non recipias: magis detractiones cenſueris; & hanc velim generalem tibi conſtituas regulam, ut omnem, qui palam veretur dicere quod in aure locutus eſt, ſuſpectum habeas. Quod ſi, te judicante, dicendum coram ille renuerit, delatorem judices, non accuſatorem. *S. Bern. L. 4. de Conſid. C. 6.*

Delatores, genus hominum publico exitio repertum, & pœnis quidem nunquam ſatis coercitum. *Tacit. L. 4. Annal, p. 118.*

Specie obſequii regit, *Tacit. L. 3. Hiſt. p. 381.*

Egens, ignotus, inquies, dum occultis libellis ſævitæ principis adrepit, (*This is the Picture of one of the Chief Informers*:) mox clariſſimo cuique periculum faceſſit, potentiam apud unum, odium apud omnes adeptus, dedit exemplum quod ſecuti ex pauperibus divites.

he can, the ordinary Tribunals, where all is done according to Law, and eſtabliſhed Forms; who transfers to one ſingle Perſon, whom he hath taken care to repreſent to the Prince as the only one in whom he can put Confidence in that Matter, the whole Diſcuſſion and Execution of it.

III. There is nothing more horrible, and at the ſame time more exact, than the Picture of this Monſter that hath been drawn; and I conjure the Prince to remember it well, that he may know ſuch a one by theſe Features, in ſpight of all his Artifices to diſguiſe himſelf.

IV. The moſt ſucceſsful of which is an apparent Zeal for the Intereſts and Glory of the Prince. He begins with flattering Praiſes to prepare the way to the Prince's Ear. He is fill'd with Admiration, deeply penetrated with Reſpect, and aſſerts profound Modeſty and Reſerve. After which he diſcovers his good Intentions. An important Hint given in ſecret is a Proof of them. And he retires with Aſtoniſhment, that there ſhould be People capable of having leſs Attachment than himſelf to a Prince ſo worthy of it. He leaves him with this Whet in his Mind; and, in proportion to the Succeſs of his firſt Accuſations he becomes more hardy in offering new ones.

V. 'Tis never for himſelf, or his own Intereſts he ſpeaks. The Prince is the ſole Object of all his Thoughts. It is againſt his Inclination, which is to do Good to all the World, that he is conſtrained to ſay what may hurt any one; but ſuch is the Nature of the Evil, that he cannot be ſilent: The public Good abſolutely requires a Remedy againſt it. (*c*) See an Example of it in *Haman* to *Ahaſuerus*

(*c*) *Eſther* iii. 8, 9. Ex contemptis metuendi, perniciem aliis, ac poſtremum ſibi invenere. *Tacit. L.* 1. *Annal. p.* 37.

Ahaſuerus. The Jews *are diſperſed among the People in all the Provinces of thy Kingdom, and their Laws are divers from all People, neither keep they the King's Laws; therefore it is not for the King's Profit to ſuffer them.* His Hatred againſt *Mordecai*, and againſt the whole *Jewiſh* Nation on his Account, does not appear. The Prince's Intereſt, and the Public Good are the Pretext, and yet to his ambitious Reſentment are the Prince and the public Intereſt ſacrificed.

VI. It is ſo with all thoſe who deſire the Prince's Confidence, to ſucceed in their unjuſt Deſigns. They ſeem zealous, ſollicitous, attentive about their Duty, but it is in order to devour the Innocent more ſurely. *David* himſelf was deceived by ſuch. (*d*) He fled before *Abſolam*, and wanted all Neceſſaries. *Ziba*, Servant to *Mephiboſheth*, Son to *Jonathan*, *David*'s moſt ſincere and diſintereſted Friend, came to offer him ſome Refreſhment with an apparent Zeal, but in reality, to ruin his Maſter, and to obtain his Goods by Calumny, in accuſing him of remaining at *Jeruſalem*, in hopes that God would reſtore to him the Kingdom of his Father. *David*, too attentive to the Service of *Ziba*, and to his ſeeming Fidelity, took all that pertained to *Mephiboſheth*, and thus recompenſed a Traitor with the Spoils of the moſt virtuous and zealous of his Friends.

VII. An Accuſer affects a falſe Appearance of Humanity; he compaſſionates the Perſon accuſed; he will not preſume to penetrate into his ſecret Intentions, which are not perhaps ſo criminal as his Conduct. He appears to be cautious, and not to tell all; and by that affected Moderation, which is at Bottom pure Malice, he gives an Air of Probability

(*d*) 2 *Kings* xvi. 3, 4.

bability to his Calumny, by which the Prince is deluded. (*e*) His Diſcourſe is ſmooth as Oil, but it is to make a deeper Impreſſion.

VIII. The Informer knows the Diſpoſition of all Men to believe Evil, and that of Princes in particular to Suſpiciouſneſs. He knows that Calumny, tho' it ſhould not be entirely credited, leaves a ſecret Impreſſion upon the Mind, and ſpreads certain Clouds over the Probity of the Accuſed, which render him ſuſpected. That is enough to him. He will make his Advantage of it in Time: And when any Office, Recompence, or Mark of Honour is to be diſpoſed of, he will put the Prince in mind that ſuch a Perſon is not quite clear from certain Suſpicions; that it is ſafer to chuſe another; that Juſtice demands that Perſons ſhould be preferred to him, whoſe Character or Virtue were never called into Doubt. The credulous Prince looks upon this Maxim as equitable, which, being artfully managed, will exclude his moſt faithful Servants, of whom it will be ſufficient to have ſuggeſted, without any Proof, ſomething very diſadvantageous to their Character, to bring them under Suſpicion; and will fill all Places and Employments with Perſons the moſt unworthy of Truſt, and the moſt dependant on the Delators, becauſe they will be the only ones they have ſpared.

IX. It is a Maxim among them, that a Falſehood hath always ſome Effect at Court; that it is rarely ſearch'd to the Bottom; that it is enough it but comes to the Prince's Ears; that the firſt Step is almoſt always remedileſs, becauſe Princes do not like to own they were deceived, and more eaſily

(*e*) Molliti ſunt ſermones ejus ſuper oleum, & ipſi ſunt jacula. *Pſal.* liv. 22.

eaſily forgive thoſe who have ſeduced them to act contrary to Juſtice, than thoſe who endeavour to make ſuch wrong Conduct obſerved.

X. They uſe this baſe Art to give a Face to the want of Evidence, they put it upon the dangerous Addreſs of the Accuſed in hiding their wretched Deſigns, The more Cunning they have, ſay ſuch Deceivers, the more profound and cloſe they are. They know how to avoid all that may diſcover them, and they only appear innocent, becauſe they are criminal with great Art and Caution.

XI. But what Degree of Innocence or Sanctity is ſafe, if it is by want of Evidence that Crimes are proved? Can one believe that ſo groſs an Impoſture could deceive any Prince? And yet nothing is more certain than that it does. They are impoſed upon every Day in this bare-faced Manner. The Calumniator betrays himſelf by acknowledging want of Proof. One needs only hear him with Attention to find him out. But a ſecond Calumny is employ'd to cover and ſupport the firſt, and the Prince believes, upon the Word of a Traytor, that Virtue is Hypocriſy, becauſe it appears Virtue; and that ſincere Zeal is Perfidy, becauſe it cannot prove it is inward Sincerity.

ARTICLE IV.

What is the Scope and Deſign of Delators.

I. BUT the Deſign of Calumniators in endeavouring to ſeduce the Prince by (*f*) ſecret Accuſations againſt Perſons of Merit is yet more deteſtable than Calumny itſelf; for their Intention is to remove from the Prince all who are faithfully devoted to him, and incapable of entering into any

(*f*) Ut ſagittent in obſcuro rectos corde. *Pſal.* x.

any Engagement contrary to his Intereſt; who will not depend on any but himſelf, or owe any Obligation but to his Bounty; who would have Courage enough to tell him the Truth on every Occaſion, and to detect thoſe to him who attempt to deceive him; who are Enemies to all mean baſe Meaſures, to all clandeſtine Intrigues to ſell the Prince and his People, to all Concuſſions and Robberies, to all the ſhameful Paſſions which love Darkneſs, and fear the Light.

II. Their Scope is to extirpate Virtue by rendering it odious to the Prince, to bring Merit into Contempt and Indigence, to render all great Qualities ineffectual, and abſolutely unprofitable; to cut off every way of obtaining Employments but by Intriguing, Corruption, and Villany; to monopolize to themſelves all the King's Power and Authority, and to leave him no more than the mere Appearance of Royalty; becauſe while he but ſeems to do all, they in reality reign in his Place, all being given upon their Recommendation, and as they direct.

III. Thus they make the Goodneſs of the King, and his Confidence in them, ſubſervient to their Vanity; they repay him with the vileſt Ingratitude, being ſecret Enemies, who have no other View but to oppreſs his Subjects, and to deprive him by falſe Calumnies of all who ſerve him with Fidelity, and are truly deſerving of Praiſe. It is thus King *Ahaſuerus* ſpeaks (*g*) from Experience; and the Holy

(*g*) Multi bonitate principum & honore abuſi ſunt in ſuperbiam. Et non ſolum ſubjectos regibus nituntur opprimere, ſed datam ſibi gloriam non ferentes, in ipſos, qui dederunt, moliuntur inſidias, nec contenti ſunt gratias non agere beneficiis, ſed Dei quoque cuncta cernentis arbitrantnr ſe poſſe fugere ſententiam. Et in tantum veſaniæ protuperunt, ut eos, qui credita

Holy Spirit would by this Example admoniſh Princes of the pernicious Deſigns of Informers by preſerving on Record in the ſacred Writings theſe memorable Words; *Many, the more they are honour'd with the great Bounty of their gracious Princes, the more proud they are waxen; and endeavour to hurt not our Subjects only, but not being able to bear Abundance, do take in hand to practiſe alſo againſt thoſe that do them good.* Such is a Delator, ſuch are his Artifices, and this is his Deſign. Let us now propoſe ſome effectual Remedies, ſome ſalutary Precautions againſt ſo great an Evil.

ARTICLE V.

By what Precautions and Means a Prince may remove far from him all Delators.

I. ONE cannot ſay to a Prince, Give Ear to nothing: Never receive ſecret Hints and Advices: Always confront the Informer with the Accuſed: Make the Accuſations public. Such Counſels would be very imprudent, and frequently very pernicious to the Prince and his People; and we have ſeen on the other hand of what Conſequence it is, not raſhly to believe, and neither to give Acceſs nor Credit to Informers.

II. But between the two Extremes there is a prudent Middle, which is to hear, but not to believe what is not proved. And in this View, the chief Thing is to regard Proofs only, and not to be influenced by mere Diſcourſe: To ſet aſide all Com-

credita ſibi officia diligenter obſervant, & ita cuncta agunt, ut omnium laude digni ſint, mendaciorum cuniculis conentur ſubvertere, dum aures principum ſimplices, & ex ſua natura alios æſtimantes, callida fraude decipiunt. *Eſther* xvi. 2, &c.

Compliments, all Praiſes, all flattering Inſinuations, and even Eloquence itſelf; and rather to miſtruſt all ſuch Preambles, which ſhew more Cunning and Artifice than Sincerity: To pay very little Regard to Conjectures, Surmiſes, Probabilities, which prove nothing, and which Imagination is apt to heighten, but are always ſuſpicious to a Perſon of equal and ſolid Judgment.

III. Next one ought to canvaſs ſoundly what he hears, but if the Author of the Information is not a Perſon very well known, one muſt make uſe of him to get to the Bottom of the Matter: Even when he is convinced that his Informer is a Perſon of Sincerity and Candour, he ought however to employ another with him in the Enquiry; but in ſuch a manner that the one may know nothing of the other; or if the ſame Commiſſion be given to many, none of them ought to know that any other is charged with it.

IV. The Prince on theſe Occaſions muſt call to his Aſſiſtance all his Knowledge of Mankind; compare the Accuſed with the Accuſer; penetrate into the hidden Intereſts by which both may be actuated; diſcover their Connexions, examine who employs them, whence they have their Inſtructions, who may gain by the Succeſs of the Accuſation; judge of his Genius, his Character, and his Knowledge or Capacity.

V. But above all he ought to put himſelf in his Place to whom bad Offices have been rendered, to know what is due to him; for it is not allowable to treat him otherwiſe than one would be treated were it his own Caſe. The moſt mighty King owes this to the meaneſt of his Subjects. He has heard what hath been ſaid, but it is quite without Proofs; he ought not to ſupply what is wanting

by Suſpicions: he ought to add nothing to them; and the Accuſed has a Right, after ſuch an Accuſation, to all he may have merited before he was accuſed. It would be Injuſtice to him not to conſider him as innocent. A Prince would expect to be ſo treated were he a private Perſon, and it is this Expectation that ought to be his Rule.

VI. There are certain Caſes in which one may without Danger oppoſe the Accuſed, and in which it ought to be done. It is reaſonable to hear him who is chiefly intruſted in the Matter, eſpecially where Proofs are defective. Sometimes one Word diſſipates a Calumny, and all the Suſpicions that were formed; and for not going to the Source, Time is often loſt in fruitleſs Reſearches, and Prejudices are fortified.

VII. But when Innocence is diſcovered, and Calumny is diſproved, the Author of it ought to be puniſhed in ſuch a Manner as may intimidate all thoſe who might otherwiſe adventure upon the ſame Wickedneſs. There is but this one effectual Remedy; but it is ſufficient. (*b*) No-body will lie to a Prince, when he finds he cannot do it with Safety, and who will avenge himſelf on the Delator for the Injury done him in attempting to deceive him, and make him the Miniſter of his Perfidiouſneſs. This is the greateſt Outrage that can be committed againſt a Prince; and one that does not think it ſuch is little touched with his true Glory, and with the Affront put at once upon his Diſcernment and his Equity.

VIII.

(*b*) Fiſcales calumnias magna calumniantium pœna repreſſit, ferebaturque vox ejus: Princeps qui delatores non caſtigat, irritat. *Sueton. in vit. Domitiani. C.* 9.

VIII. It belongs to a Prince to judge of the Puniſhment ſuited to a Calumniator. According to the Rigor of Juſtice it ought to be the ſame that the Crime would have merited had it been proved: And there are Occaſions on which this is neceſſary. (*i*) But to terrify others it is ſufficient to exclude for ever the Caluminator from his Preſence; to ſpeak openly of him as he deſerves; to baniſh him (*k*); to turn him out of his Place if he has one; to teſtify in a publick Manner his Hatred of ſuch abominable baſe Artifices; and to declare himſelf an irreconcilable Enemy to whoever ſhall dare to have Recourſe to him for the future.

IX. Thus *David* did. He did not ſatisfy himſelf with rejecting Calumny with Indignation, and all the clandeſtine Methods of accuſal, ſo common to Delators; but he purſued the Delator as his capital Enemy, and left him no Azile or Retreat in his Kingdom. *I was*, ſaith he, *in my own Houſe with a ſimple guileleſs Heart and all evil Deſigns were far from my Thoughts* (*l*). See whence his Hatred of Calumny proceeded. *I hated hidden cunning Men* (*m*): *A malignant Heart could find no Acceſs to me. He kept at a Diſtance from me, and I had no Communication with him. I was a declared Enemy to all who whiſper Evil againſt their Neighbour. I could not bear the Proud and Haughty* (*n*); *my Eyes*

(*i*) Alexander Severus *puniſhed Calumny with Death.* Lamprid. *p.* 218.

(*k*) Trajan *baniſhed thoſe, who by their Calumnies had cauſed the Baniſhment of others. He made them be put into Barks, and to be carried where the Winds ſhould drive them.* Paneg. Traj. *p.* 105.

(*l*) Remove a te os pravum, detrahentia labia ſint procul a te. *Prov.* iv. 24.

(*m*) *Thus in the* Hebrew.

(*n*) *Thus in the* Hebrew.

were toward the Sincere and Candid, to keep them about me. He alone who lived in Simplicity and Innocence was admitted into my Service or Favour. I ever hated falſe lying Lips. I ſet my ſelf watchfully to exterminate the Impious (*o*), *and I could not ſuffer the Wicked to dwell in the City of my God.*

X. See there a Pattern for Princes to imitate; but one little attended to: And yet what could be more glorious for a King than to chooſe Men of Merit, to fill his Palace and his Court with them, and to baniſh from him all Evil-ſpeakers, Backbiters and Calumniators, and to declare himſelf an Enemy to Lying and Falſhood, and to drive them out of his Kingdom by ſome Examples of juſt Severity?

XI. What, on the other hand, is more ſhameful, more miſerable, than the Situation of a Prince who hearkens to Falſhood, and ſhuts his Ears againſt Truth; and who by ſuch Conduct renders himſelf worthy of having none but wicked unfaithful People about him? (*p*) *If a Ruler hearkens to Lies, all his Servants are wicked.* He thinks himſelf honoured, but he is the Scorn of thoſe who ſell him. (*q*) *He is in the midſt of People worſe than Robbers, who by their Deceits bereave him of the Knowledge of the Truth, the moſt precious of all Treaſures*, and who by ſuch Wickedneſs not only put it out of his Power to do Juſtice, to make a good Choice, or to diſcharge any of his Duties as he ought; but puts him under the Neceſſity of delivering up his State a Prey to Delators *i. e.* to the baſeſt and the moſt corrupt of Men; to be the Executioner of all their Injuſtice, and Cruelty

(*o*) *Thus is the* Hebrew.

(*p*) Princeps qui libenter audit verba mendacii, omnes miniſtros habet impios. *Prov.* xxix. 12.

(*q*) Potior fur, quam aſſiduitas viri mendacis. *Eccluſ.* xx. 17.

Cruelty, to oppreſs all Perſons of Merit who fall under their Diſpleaſure, to extinguiſh all the Virtues which are offenſive to him, to promote all the unworthy Actions they recommend; to be only powerful in oppoſition to faithful Servants, and to ſubject both him and his State to as many Tyranies as there are Impoſtors who abuſe his Credulity.

CHAPTER XVII.

A Prince ought to take Advice: Be able to diſtinguiſh and follow the beſt. Qualifications neceſſary to that.

ARTICLE I.

A Prince ought to take Counſel.

I. ALL that hath been hitherto ſaid is deſigned to enable a Prince to diſcern thoſe capable of aiding him by their Counſels, to direct him to the proper Means of attaching good Counſellors to him, and to precaution him againſt thoſe who would ſeduce him, from giving them his Ear.

II. But all thoſe Advices which have been given him will be to no Purpoſe, if he does not like to take Counſel, and if he ſhould refuſe to hear what the Scripture ſays to him, (*r*) *Be not wiſe in thine own Eyes; fear the Lord and depart from Evil, and lean not to thine own Underſtanding.* Nothing more is wanting to ruin him,

(*r*) Ne ſis ſapiens apud temetipſum: ne innitaris prudentiæ tuæ. *Prov.* iii. 7, 8.

than a vain Confidence in his own Light; and it would he a Proof that he is already very far wrong, if he ſhould imagine he has no need of the Wiſdom of others: For (*s*) the Fool is known by his Satisfaction with himſelf and his Perſwaſion that he can do nothing that is amiſs; whereas the wiſe Man principally appears ſuch by his readineſs to take Advice.

III. It is the wiſeſt of Kings who makes this Obſervation, and who had better Ground than any other to content himſelf with his own proper Prudence. Such Modeſty is the Fruit of eminent Wiſdom: For one muſt have a very large ſhare of it to feel that he has not enough. A Prince of a narrow Underſtanding is full of high Thoughts of himſelf; the leſs Capacity he has, the more indocile he is. An (*t*) attempt to give him Counſel appears to him upbraiding him for want of Underſtanding; and he is offended at it as a high Injury, that you allow him to be Maſter of all, and yet do not allow him to have an Underſtanding ſuperior to all.

IV. A Prince of a nobler Mind thinks quite otherwiſe: He knows that the leaſt Hint from another gives a great opening; that one Man cannot ſee an Object on all Sides, nor reunite all Views of it into one; that being fond and dazl'd by one's own thoughts we are often ſeduc'd by the Appearance only of Truth. He is always ready to hear every thing; to give due Weight to what is ſaid to him; to compare it with his own Apprehenſions of the Matter: For in this conſiſts that

(*s*) Via ſtulti recta in oculis ejus. Qui autem ſapiens eſt, audit conſilia. *Prov.* xii. 15,

(*t*) Ne alienæ ſententiæ indigens videretur, in diverſa ac deteriora tranſibat. *Tacit. L.* 15. *Annal.*

that docile Mind (*u*) which *Solomon* prayed to God for, *to enable him to reign with Wiſdom and Juſtice*: A Heart which hears and deliberates; a Heart which ſearches after Truth and does not raſhly preſume he has found it: A Heart not ſwelled with Pride, and whom Obſtinacy does not render inflexible, nor Prejudices untractable: A Heart, in one Word, open to Inſtruction and ſenſible of its need of good Counſel. Whoever has received ſuch a Heart of God is capable of reigning; but whoever believes himſelf wiſe, hath not received it, and is on that account incapable of governing.

V. It is Wiſdom itſelf which teaches us that the Way to find it is to ſeek it in the Company of the well-inſtructed. (*x*) *Wiſdom dwelleth with Prudence, and is to be found in the Counſels of the Underſtanding.* 'Tis therefore to fly from Wiſdom to avoid Counſel and Deliberation; and it is at leaſt Raſhneſs to hope to attain it while one neglects the ſureſt way he hath pointed out to us for finding it.

ARTICLE II.

How to know the beſt.

I. BUT the whole does not conſiſt in asking Advice; the greater Difficulty lies in diſcerning, among many Advices, which is the beſt; in fixing on it, and following it. There are Princes who are more ſuceptible of bad Counſel, and more ſtruck with bad Reaſons to ſupport it, than with other Advice which would, were itfollowed, prove very

(*u*) Dabis ſervo tuo cor docile, ut populum tuum judicare poſſit. *L.* 3. *C.* iii. 9.

(*x*) Ego ſapientia habito in conſilio, & eruditis interſum cogitationibus. *Prov.* viii. 12.

ſalutary. They want Diſcernment, and they chooſe ill.

II. There are ſome who remain unreſolv'd and quite ſuſpended amidſt ſeveral different Opinions; or between the Conveniencies and Diſadvantages of one Advice. They have no Reſolution, and dare not determine.

III. There are others who are ſucceſſively drawn from Side to Side, who chooſe and repent their Choice, and are thus continually contradicting themſelves, and making moſt unaccountable oppoſite Changes. They have not Firmneſs of Mind, and they have no ſooner determined than they abandon their Choice.

IV. There are ſome who are always led, who do not make one Step but as they are conducted, and who ſee all thro' the Eyes of thoſe in whom they confide, who know how to turn them as they pleaſe. They have no Underſtanding, and others chooſe for them.

V. There are ſome who confine themſelves to certain Perſons for Advice, and would be much more capable of judging if they would take Inſtruction from leſs intereſted and leſs ſuſpected Perſons. They want Prudence, their Choice is precipitant.

VI. In fine, there are ſome who are happy enough in avoiding all theſe Faults, and it is of great Importance to a Prince to know how he may have the ſame good Succeſs.

ARTICLE III.

The Qualities neceſſary to that.

I. IT depends much upon the Judgment, which ought to be excellent in order to be a wiſe Conductor. But it is God alone who gives it. No Inſtruction

Inſtruction can ſupply the want of it; no human Aſſiſtance can cover this Deficency. All one can do is to labour to perfect the Foundation laid by Nature; to cultivate a happy Genius, to improve, to extend it: And that is what I propoſe in this Work, and in this Chapter in particular.

Firſt Quality.] II. The firſt Quality of the Underſtanding neceſſary to enable a Prince to diſcern the beſt Counſels, and to follow them, is Soundneſs of Judgment. It conſiſts in diſtinguiſhing the probable from the true; in going directly to the Scope or Point in Queſtion; in diſcerning what is eſſential in an Affair; not ſtopping at Circumſtances of little Moment; in ſevering from the Queſtion all that is ſuperfluous, obſcure, or that overloads it: In accurately examining if every Argument is concluſive; if the propoſed Means lead ſurely to the End; in what Counſels differ, and whether this does not happen becauſe ſome have loſt ſight of the End which muſt unite all Counſels about it.

Second Quality.] The ſecond Quality of the Underſtanding is Solidity: That is to ſay, to be an Enemy to all falſe Fables, weak Expedients vain feeble Reſources, Remedies that only ſerve to palliate the Diſeaſe, Manners which have only a tranſitory Uſefulneſs, and are neither ſuitable to the Dignity of the Prince, nor to the true Intereſts of the State.

IV. When Perſons who conſult have but a ſuperficial Underſtanding, or when Affairs are in a bad Situation, that one thinks he cannot move too faſt, he often falls into the Inconveniences I have mentioned. A Prince therefore ought to be attentive, not to ſatisfy himſelf with frivolous Expe-

Expedients, with Craft, Subtleties, and vain Promiſes to amuſe the People. He ought to be aſſured of falling a few Days after into the ſame Perplexities; and of drawing no other Advantages from his firſt Counſels but that of having loſt his Credit by failing in his Word.

Third Quality.] V. The third Quality of the Underſtanding is to be extenſive; able to compare all; to ſee at once united all that he ought to judge of; and to ballance the Inconveniences and Conveniencies, the one againſt the other; an Underſtanding which does not limit itſelf to one thought, and fix on that; or judge by Prepoſſeſſions, by Paſſion, by a raſh Engagement, or by a ſtrict Attachment to his own Sentiments.

VI. There are ſome who have naturally a very confined narrow Mind, and whom one Thought ſo fills, that a ſecond cannot enter till the firſt is gone. Their Ideas follow, never range themſelves into a Line as it were facing each other. Every one perſuades in its Turn, becauſe it is alone, and ſuch as would ſuſpend or diminiſh its Impreſſion are not preſent to the Mind. But the Influence of each laſts no longer than the flying Fancy that produc'd it. Another ſucceeding to it brings a new View and quite new Reflections with it; and thus the Mind is always governed by whatever preſents itſelf to it, without ever being ſufficiently enlightened.

VII. It is difficult to remedy this natural Defect: I doubt if it be poſſible: But Princes often fall into it, tho it be not natural to them. (*y*) They ſuffer themſelves to be prepoſſeſſed, and they confine themſelves to what they have ſeen. It is their

(*y*) Conſilii, quamvis egregii, quod non ipſe afferret, inimicus, & adverſus peritos, pervicax. *Tacit. L.* 1. *Hiſt.*

their Will and Humour rather than their Judgment that determines them. They ſhut themſelves up and ſadly impriſon themſelves by refuſing Admittance to Light and Inſtruction. And by this Means they throw themſelves into very great dangers, without reflecting that it is always ſhameful to make a bad Uſe of Reaſon, and not to ſearch with Care into all that might enlighten it.

Fourth Quality.] VIII. The Fourth Quality of the Underſtanding is Firmneſs: Which conſiſts in not ſuffering one's ſelf to be ſhaken by reaſons already examined, nor by Inconveniences which have been judged not ſo Important as thoſe that one would avoid; (z) in not deliberating longer when Action is abſolutely neceſſary; in not being confounded at an unexpected Danger; in not yielding to the laſt who ſpeaks; and not being alternately toſſed from one oppoſite Side to another by contradictory Opinions.

IX. That Quality depends much on the preceding ones; Soundneſs, Accuracy, and Solidity of Judgment. It is only a Virtue when it is armed with them: otherwiſe it is unreaſonable Obſtinacy. But if it be the Fruit of Wiſdom; nothing is ſo neceſſary to a Prince, whoſe Determinations ought to be ſteady and durable, becauſe they ſhould be formed with ſo much Knowledge and mature Deliberation, that nothing can happen which was not foreſeen, and for which a Remedy is not provided.

Fifth Quality.] X. The fifth Quality of the Underſtanding, eſpecially in a Prince, is to be able to decide and determine by his own ſuperior Judgment: Not

(z) Dies iterum verbis terens. *Tacit. L. 4. Hiſt.*

Not to ſuffer himſelf to be moved by external Springs; or to be determined preſently becauſe others determine him; but having felt the Weight of the Reaſons given to him, and underſtanding their Strength; is able himſelf to enter into the Difficulties, and having had a full Explication laid before him, of all the Motives of the Counſels offered him, is capable of taking his Reſolution himſelf, when Opinions are divided. Such a Prince rather conſults others out of Caution and Prudence, than Weakneſs; and often ſees by his proper Sagacity all that hath been ſuggeſted to him; he choſes to take all the Aſſiſtance he can have from the Wiſdom of others, yet frequently ſees farther than any other can.

XI. Without this ſuperior Ability, to which indeed the Right to hold the Scepter belongs more than to any other thing, a Prince never governs, but is always governed. He is led and turn'd about any Way by ſome one or other, becauſe he is incapable of guiding himſelf; and which is worſt of all, 'tis commonly a very bad Leader who gives him the Hand. It is ſome cunning Perſon who hath taken hold of his Weakneſs and got Poſſeſſion of his Ear. (*a*) 'Tis an ambitious Servant who reigns in his Place; which the wiſe Man places among the worſt Diſorders that can befal a State. It is one who makes his Intereſt of the Prince's Weakneſs, and excites himſelf to increaſe it.

XII. A young Prince ought not in the Begining to uſe this ſuperior deciſive Judgment I have been ſpeaking of, but he ought to have it; and ought to hear the Counſels offered him only that he

(*a*) Per tria movetur terra, per ſervum regnaverit, *Prov.* xxx. 21, 22.

he may himſelf be able to give good ones. He ought to feel, in giving himſelf up to the Opinions of others, that it is becauſe he finds their Reaſons ſolid and perſuaſive. They lay Affairs before him, but he judges with his own Eyes: They point out what they take to be the beſt Road, but he himſelf examines it: They tell him what they think ſhould be done, but he will know their Reaſons and judge of them. Thus he ſoon becomes as wiſe as his Inſtructors, and by his Care to conſult them, and to acquire by that means a more extenſive and penetrating Underſtanding than theirs, ſoon ſurpaſſes them.

Sixth Quality.] XIII. The ſixth Quality is to be humble and modeſt, to hear all, and to profit by all; to attend graciouſly to all that is ſaid to him; not merely to allow all to ſpeak, but to ingage them by an obliging Manner; to prefer a good Advice to all other Services; to eſteem the Fidelity and Application of thoſe who aſſiſt him with their Counſels; to reſpect the Wiſdom and Prudence of experienced old Age; (*b*) to be perſuaded that he may always learn a great deal by conſulting them, and thus preſerve to the laſt the deſire of growing in Wiſdom, and by Conſequence of being inſtructed.

Seventh Quality.] XIV. In fine, the laſt Quality of ſuch a Mind as a Prince ought to have, is Prudence and Caution, *i. e.* to be able to judge well of thoſe whom he conſults, whether he is himſelf well inſtructed; if it is in an Affair in which he hath any Intereſt; if his Fidelity is as certain as his Capacity; not to determine himſelf in an Affair by the ſingle Advice of one who hath the

(*b*) Fili, a juventute tua excipe doctrinam, & uſque ad canos invenies ſapientiam. *Eccl.* vi. 18.

the principal Superintendency of it; to conſult about the Finances, another than him who hath the Direction of them; and about War, Commerce and Eccleſiaſtical Affairs in the ſame Manner: To give due weight in Affairs to ſuch as are intruſted with them, but not to content himſelf with it: To be perſuaded that it is often a ſure Way of being deceived, to confine himſelf in each Affair to the Judgment of thoſe charged with it; and that on the contrary, it is a very proper way to have faithful and well inſtructed capable Miniſters, to conſult even about the Adminiſtration of every other.

XV. I have already ſaid, that theſe Qualities cannot be perfect in a young Prince, but that he ought to have them to a certain Degree: Otherwiſe all Advices upon this Subject are uſeleſs, and contrary to the wiſe Man's Precept. (c) *It is to ſpeak to one in a ſlumber, who when he awakes will ſay, What is the Matter? who was diſcourſing to me, and about what?*

XVI. The beſt Mark that a Prince hath received ſuch a Spirit as I have been deſcribing from God, is his Deſire to have one of that Character. In which caſe all that remains is to cultivate and improve it: For he then knows what it is, and how to go about to perfect it: One need only point out the Way to him; he will liſten and will take hold with great Earneſtneſs on all that is propoſed to him that is reaſonable, according to that Scripture-ſaying, (d) *Give Inſtruction*

(c) Cum dormiente loquitur, qui enarrat ſtulto ſapientiam; & in fine narrationis dicit; quis eſt hic. *Eccl.* xxii. 9.

(d) Da ſapienti occaſionem, & addetur ei ſapientia: doce juſtum & feſtinabit accipere. *Prov.* ix. 9.

Inſtruction to a wiſe Man, and he will be yet wiſer: Teach a juſt Man and he will increaſe in Learning.

CHAPTER XIII.

The Prince ought to intereſt all his Subjects in his Grandeur, by ſhewing that he ſincerely intereſts himſelf in their Happineſs: To be beneficent and liberal: Means to be ſuch.

ARTICLE I.

The Prince ought to intereſt every one in his Grandeur,

I. IT is a very important Piece of Knowlege to a Prince to know the Heart of Man, and the Secret of gaining the Aſcendant over it. One may render himſelf amiable to all without diminiſhing his Grandeur in the leaſt Degree, and on the other hand, one may make himſelf unwiſely hated and deſpiſed by aiming at being great. He ought to know how to ſeize Men by the moſt ſenſible Part, and to be attentive to diſcern their true Intereſts in order to govern them; for it is Intereſt that governs them.

II. All Men have almoſt the ſame Sentiments of Grandeur. They deſire it for themſelves; they fear it in others; they envy it, and cheriſh in themſelves a ſecret Deſpight againſt it.

III. But they ſubmit to it, becauſe it is neceſſary, and they hope to be protected by it, know-

ing

ing that it would be a much greater Evil to have no Governor, or to have many.

IV. The Prince who knows theſe Diſpoſitions of Mankind does not ſhew his Greatneſs but on the Side that appears uſeful and neceſſary. He attracts every one's Attention to that Part of it; and turns away their Eyes from viewing it in a Light that offends them, becauſe they all deſire it, but know they cannot have it.

V. He ſtudies to make them feel not ſo much his Power and Grandeur as his Goodneſs and Protection; and to hide from them whatever his Dignity has in it peculiar to himſelf, by communicating to them all the Benefits of it; and endeavouring to extinguiſh in them all other Sentiments but thoſe of Love and Gratitude.

VI. (*e*) Then every one intereſts himſelf in a Power from which all receive Advantage. Every one thinks he has a Share of it, and participates of it. Every one chooſes it ſhould be lodged in ſuch generous beneficent Hands, and wiſhes it may always be ſo well placed. Every body is ready to ſacrifice all things, even Life, to ſupport and defend it. All Intereſts are thus united in that of the Prince. It is every ones own private Good, it is his own Happineſs he loves in liking him; and one is bound to the Prince by as many cloſe, ſtrong Ties, as there are Advantages he likes and receives from him.

VI. The People in this caſe do not feel the Grandeur of the Prince but by its uſefulneſs to them. (*f*) They would be grieved if the Prince was leſs

(*e*) Illius principis magnitudo ſtabilis fundataque, quam omnes tam ſupera ſe ſciant quam pro ſe facient. *Senec. ad Polibium.*

(*f*) Nec magis ſine te nos eſſe, felices, quam tu ſine nobis eſſe potes. *Paneg. Traj. p.* 208.

leſs powerful and leſs elevated, becauſe he would be leſs in a Condition to diffuſe its benign Influence. (*g*) They ſee him with Joy above them and would give him that high Rank if he was not; as we ſee the Sun with Joy, becauſe it is above us to enlighten us, and fructify the Earth; as we ſee the Clouds ſuſpended in the Air, becauſe they are then to ſend down upon the Earth fruitful Showers. The Majeſty of a Prince has nothing in it which does not draw Love and Reſpect. Envy is changed into Admiration, Fear into Confidence, a Diſpoſition to murmur into Thankfulneſs, the ſecret Deſire of Independency into a ſerious Love of Obedience.

XIII. Thus every one hath the Prince deeply imprinted on his Heart, and thus all raiſe a Throne to him in their Affections, far more honourable and worthy of him than that external one with which Princes content themſelves. They think of him as they ſpeak, and better than they ſpeak out. They do not fear him, but for him (*h*). 'Tis from their Conſcience they praiſe him, and offer up good Wiſhes and Prayers for him. In every Family Parents ſpeak of him to their Children as of a common Father. In private and free Converſations all mutually congratulate one another, upon their having a Prince to rule over them ſo worthy of governing other Men, by his conſtant and ſincere Attachment to their beſt Intereſts.

IX. What an immenſe Difference is there

(*g*) Regis ſignum notamque penes beneficentiam conſtituimus. Ea re nihilo magis defatigabitur, quam ſol ſuos in ſtirpes atque animantia radios effundens: nec enim lucere laborioſum eſt. *Syneſ. de Reg. p.* 29

(*h*) Quis ſecurior quam rex ille, quem non metuunt, ſed cui metuunt ſubditi. *Syneſ. de Reg. p.* 13.

between a Prince of this Character, whoſe earneſt Deſire is that all Mankind may be as happy as himſelf, and that they may be ſo by his Means, nay, that they may be more ſo than himſelf; and a Prince who would be happy alone, and at the Expence of univerſal envying? How many ſecret Enemies hath the latter? How many Things does he want to make him happy? How much does he leſſen his Power by not reigning in the Affections and Hearts of his Subjects? With what a low Thing does he ſatisfy himſelf, in being contented with the mere Outſide of Power? Within what pitiful Bounds does he confine his Grandeur, if he renounces the Love of his People? And what would it have coſt him to deſerve to be loved, but to make a right Uſe of his Grandeur?

X. He needs only add to that Goodneſs, (*h*) the Pleaſure of being Great for the ſake of others, and partaking of Happineſs with good Company. He needs only have a more exquiſite Taſte of Royalty, and not ſatisfy himſelf with what bad Princes may have; and which being merely external does not come up to the noble Ambition of a Prince, who would be great in all Senſes, and yet more by Merit and juſt Eſteem and Love than by Power.

XI. He needs only underſtand how to make a right Uſe of the Diſpoſitions in all Men's Breaſts which preſent him with a proper Handle in order to ſubject them to him by Means which open an Entrance to him into their Hearts. That acceſs

(*i*) Eadem de illo homines ſecreto loquuntur, quæ palam.—Hic princeps, ſuo beneficio tutus, nihil præſidiis eget: arma ornamenti cauſa habet. *Senec. L. 1. de Clement. C. 13.*

ceſs is open to Beneficence not to Force. It is to ſhut it, to employ Force inſtead of good Deeds. It is an abſurd Attempt to reign over Men in ſpight of them: It is to forget or not to know what Men are, and what he ſhould be who would govern them.

ARTICLE II.

To be beneficent and liberal.

I. SOME of the *Roman* Emperors underſtood better than the reſt in what the Art of reigning conſiſts; and they knew better how to increaſe and augment their Grandeur by intereſting in it all under their Command.

II. One of thoſe Princes (*l*) held it as a ſacred Rule (*m*) not to ſend any one away diſcontented, to oblige every one, either by good Deeds, or by ſuch gracious Manners as was equally engaging: To give when he could; to promiſe what he could not immediately do. And Hiſtory has preſerv'd nothing more precious than what he ſaid one Day (*n*) upon reflecting in the Evening that he had not rendered a good Office to any one that Day. *My Friends*, ſaid he, *I have loſt this Day:* As if he had ſaid, I ought not to live but for others; and To-day I have had the Unhappineſs only to live for myſelf. I have been all Day in the Condition of a private Perſon, and have done nothing worthy of my Dignity and Station.

(*k*) Felix abunde ſibi viſus, ſi fortunam ſuam publicaverit. *Senec. L.* 1. *de Clement. C.* 13,

(*m*) Admonentibus domeſticis, quaſi plura polliceretur, quam præſtare poſſet: non oportere, ait, quemquam a ſermone principis triſtem diſcedere. *Suet. in vit. Titi. C.* 8.

(*n*) Recordatus quondam ſuper cænam quod nihil cuiquam toto die præſtitiſſet, memorabilem illam, meritoque vocem edidit: amici, diem perdidi. *Ibid. C.* 8.

III. Another Prince (*o*) had preſcribed the ſame Rules to himſelf. He diſtinguiſhed every Day by new Acts of Generoſity; and did not think himſelf happy, or a Prince, but in proportion to his Opportunities of doing Good. (*p*) No Day paſſed without his giving Marks of his Clemency, Goodneſs, Humanity, Compaſſion and Liberality, without exhauſting himſelf, or loading the Public.

IV. It is needleſs to examine in what ſuch great Qualities would terminate, and what would be the Iſſue of them. The darkneſs of Superſtition had from theſe Princes the beſt Motives of Virtue, and the Scope that makes good Actions chiefly eſtimable: But amidſt all this Obſcurity they ſaw how great one is, when one only deſires to be ſo for the Benefit of others, and how truly ſuperior one is above all Men when he intereſts them all in his Grandeur and Power.

ARTICLE III.

Means to be ſuch.

I. WITH ſuch Diſpoſitions all that is to be feared, is being ſeduced by the Pleaſure it ſelf of gaining their Affections by good Deeds, and exhauſting the Source by an indiſcreet Profuſion. It is pleaſant to reign by Liberality, but one can no longer reign in this Manner than his Bounty laſts, and it is a great Art not to drain the Fountain.

II. A

(*o*) *Alexander Severus.*

(*p*) Dies denique nunquam tranſiit, quin aliquid manſuetum, civile, pium faceret: ſed ita ut ærarium non everteret. *Lamprid. in vita Alex. p.* 211.

II. A wiſe Prince never falls into the Error of affecting Popularity. He preſerves Order and Dignity in every Thing (*q*). He does not ſquander his Favours. He diſtributes them (*r*). He does not laviſh them without Judgment and Choice. He knows how to put a Value on them, and how to make them eſteem'd. His Deſign is not to confound Conditions, Services and Merit, but to diſtinguiſh them. He will not give Power to Perſons of Diſtinction by putting them on a Level with thoſe of no Merit. (*s*) He makes his Bounty a Recompenſe, and not a mere Favour. He gives to Virtue, and does not encourage Slothfulneſs or ſoft Indolence, and he conſiders a Benefit ill-plac'd not merely as loſt, but as a Fault that falls upon the Prince, and ſhews his want of Diſcernment.

III. As he deſires to aſſiſt and recompenſe Merit, and not to corrupt or pervert it, he proportions his Liberality to the Exigencies of Virtue. He will not pour out on one Man what would ſatisfy the Needs of many. He does not place Magnificence in promoting any private Perſon, tho' ever ſo deſerving, to a high Fortune; but in raiſing out of a mean State thoſe who are deſtitute of all Protection, and yet have Merit. He propoſes to bring Probity into Honour and Reputation, and not to draw Envy upon it. And his Deſign is to multiply Men of Worth by his

(*q*) Habebit ſinum facilem, non perforatum, ex quo multa exeant, nihil excidat. *Senec. L. de Beat. vit. C.* 23.

(*r*) Donabit cum ſumno conſilio, digniſſimos eligens: ut qui meminerit, tam expenſorum quam acceptorum rationem eſſe reddendam. *Ibid.*

(*s*) Donabit ex recta & probabili cauſa; nam inter turpes jacturas malum munus eſt. *Ibid.*

Care to do them Good, and not to prompt and ſeduce them by placing them in opulent Circumſtances.

IV. He knows that Virtue, when it is genuine, is modeſt, diſintereſted, and content with a little. He is not afraid of afflicting it, by giving it no more than is neceſſary. He knows its Sentiments and its Moderation; and he begins to be doubtful of its Sincerity, when he perceives more Avidity, or leſs Moderation attending it than he imagined. He then diminiſhes his Liberality, to put ſuch in mind of the Conditions on which he beſtowed it; and if that Leſſon has not its due Effect, he abſolutely withdraws it.

V. Above all, the Prince enquires what he is able to do, and does not ſuffer the Fund of his Bounty to be exhauſted. He moderates his Beneficence by Juſtice; and he (*t*) chuſes to give leſs to ſome, that he may exact leſs from others. He knows his Riches are bounded, and that by Conſequence his Bounty muſt be ſo too. He will not have the Publick to groan for being made a Sacrifice to particular Perſons; and he would think a Largeſs very diſhonourable to him if it ſhould coſt a Tear to the Poor.

VI. (*v*) He does not place his Glory in a falſe Magnificence. He thinks leſs of appearing liberal, than of really being ſo. And he willingly renounces the Reputation of being beneficent, when he cannot be ſuch by lawful Means. He knows it

(*t*) Congiarium das de tuo, alimenta de tuo.—Sciunt dari ſibi quod nemini præreptum. *Paneg. Traj. p.* 87.

(*v*) Reges gentium dominantur eorum, & qui poteſtatem habent ſuper eos benefici vocantur: vos autem non ſic. *Luc.* xxii. 25.

it muſt be given to him before he can give. (*x*) He compares the Source of his Revenues with the Uſe he makes of them, and he fears with reaſon that the Deſire of obliging many may render him leſs attentive to a more preſſing and indiſpenſible Duty, which is to content himſelf with what is neceſſary and to preſerve that to every one.

VII. But when the Prince has really a benevolent Diſpoſition (*y*) he finds a thouſand ways of ſatisfying it, by denying himſelf many things which others regard as neceſſary to Grandeur. One has but few Wants who is ſincerely affected by thoſe of others. He buys very few things for himſelf, if he likes to give; and keeps few uſeleſs things about him, when he well knows what Uſe to make of them.

VIII. The Palaces of Princes are fill'd with many things of great Price, which lie hid in their Cabinets, that might be employ'd to very ſerious and important Purpoſes. Luxury and Curioſity are bottomleſs Abyſſes: They ſwallow up every thing; they are inſatiable, and every Superfluity appears neceſſary to them; and as one cannot reſolve to be liberal, but after he has ſatisfied all his expenſive Paſſions, whatever is called Bounty falls heavy on the Public. And (*z*) thus the State, which is ſcarcely ſufficient to ſupport what is neceſſary to the Prince, ſinks under the Largeſſes, which come after his Superfluities and augment them.

(*x*) Plurimum iſta res habet difficultatis, ſi modo conſilio tribuitur, non caſu & impetu ſpargitur. *Senec. Loc. cit.*

(*y*) Tantas vires habet frugalitas principis, ut tot impendiis, tot erogationibus ſolo ſufficiat. *Paneg. Traj. p.* 120.

(*z*) Ærarium ſi ambitione exhauriamus, per ſcelera ſupplendum. *ſaid Tiberius. Tacit.*

IX. The Liberality of which Goodneſs is not the Source, is a Waſte that leads to Avarice and cannot ſubſiſt but by its Arts: But when it Springs from true Benevolence, it always returns the Characters of it, and knows no lawful Ways to ſatisfy its Deſires but prudent Oeconomy, and and a ſevere Exactneſs in retrenching all uſeleſs Expence. But this Matter, which is of great Importance, ſhall be returned to in another Place. We have now eſtabliſh'd the Principles; we ſhall afterwards ſee the Application of them.

CHAPTER IX.

Of the Courage, Greatneſs and Elevation of Mind, or Magnanimity, becoming a Prince. Of the Uſe and Extent of theſe Qualities.

ARTICLE I.

Of the Courage becoming a Prince.

I. WHAT we have already ſaid in the laſt Chapter in particular, is ſufficient to have led our Thoughts to the Conſideration of the Sentiments becoming a Prince, how great, noble and elevated they ought to be; how ſuperior to all private Intereſt; conſtant and firm to what is good, and incapable, of being ſurmounted by any Obſtacle, or of being prevented by any Paſſion. But it is proper to take a cloſer View of what we have only glanc'd at; and ſhew the Prince that he cannot be truly great, nor intereſt the People in his Grandeur, but by a Courage, and Elevation of Mind,

Mind, and a Magnanimity ſuitable to his exalted Dignity. Theſe Virtues are often confounded, tho' their Objects be different. I ſhall diſtinguiſh them; but ſtill with Relation to a Prince, of whom I ought not to loſe Sight.

II. The Courage becoming him, and of which I would ſpeak, does not confine itſelf to that which is ſhewn in War. The latter but makes a part of it, not the whole; inſomuch that one may diſplay the greateſt Intrepidity in a Battle, and not have the Courage that makes a Prince great.

III. Warlike Bravery at other times than in War is of little Uſe, and thoſe who are poſſeſſed of it, and whoſe Victories have rendered them famous, were exceedingly weak and feeble on other Occaſions, and with regard to other Objects. One is aſtoniſhed to ſee, when he is alone and without an Army, how great a difference there is between a General and a Great Man: What Meanneſs and Lowneſs ſuch Men have in them; what vain Fears and deſpicable Sentiments: How they are overpower'd by Jealouſy, or governed by Intereſt: How they debaſe themſelves, and what cowardly Cringers they become, to preſerve the Authority they are afraid of loſing.

IV. There is then Reaſon to demand what is become of their Courage, and even to ſuſpect that it was never genuine; and that Example, Shame, want of Senſe of Danger, or hopes of avoiding it, Ambition, Vain-glory, or ſome ſuch Paſſion has corrupted the Source of it.

V. Courage ſprings from a much purer one, and is not poiſoned by any Mixture of Motives unworthy of it. It is a Diſpoſition which ſacrifices all Fears to that of failing in Duty:

A Firmneſs, that preſent Danger, even unforeſeen, awakens and animates, and is invincible by any Thing but Juſtice and Reaſon; or rather which only combats for them in War or in Peace, in publick or ſecret. Such a Courage is equal in the ſmalleſt and in the extremeſt Dangers. It is the Strength of the Soul. It ſupports the Mind againſt all unjuſt Fears capable of ſhaking it; and one cannot count upon the Probity or Merit of any Perſon but in Proportion to his Courage.

VI. It is therefore evident that Aſſurance cannot aim at any thing truly great, but will rather abandon it on the firſt Occaſion, if he has not Courage ſuitable to his good Inclinations, and capable of maintaining Virtue. But what a Monſter is a Prince at the Head of a Nation full of Honour and Merit, whoſe nobleſt Function it is to ſeek after, value and recompenſe Courage, and to inſpire others with it by his Example, or revive it when it begins to droop, who is himſelf without ſtrength of Mind, and eaſily diſconcerted and overwhelmed by Fears unworthy of him?

VII. The whole State depends upon him; what will become of his Kingdom if he is feeble, and ſtaggers, and ſinks under its Weight. He ought to expoſe himſelf to any Perils of whatever Kind for it; be its bold Protector, and an Example of true Bravery and public Spirit, and of every Virtue to it. It is therefore in the Prince's Heart that the firmeſt Courage ought to reſide. 'Tis his Interpidity that is his State's greateſt Security. It belongs to him, when Timidity is univerſal, to oppoſe that general ſinking into Cowardice, and not to yield but to ſuperior Force.

VIII.

VIII. It is the Prince's Duty and Buſineſs to project and enterpriſe whatever is requiſite to publick Good; to reform Abuſes, and to ſuppreſs Injuſtice; to reduce into Order, every thing that diſturbs it, and to humble into due Submiſſion to his Authority, all Pride and Diſobedience. But what can a timid cowardly Prince do, who is always full of Doubts and Fears, whom every Danger diſconcerts and confounds: A Prince whoſe whole Attention is toward finding out prudential Maxims, or what hath the Appearance of ſuch, to juſtify his effeminate Indolence or Timidity? If he undertakes any thing, how will he be able to go through with it? How can he ſurmount Obſtacles? Or what will be the Event of ſuch feeble Efforts, ſo diſproportion'd to the Vigour and Steadineſs with which they are reſiſted? For no ſolid Good can be eſtabliſhed but by a Perſeverance and Magnanimity, which nothing can ſhake. 'Tis eaſy to undertake, but it is difficult to execute. And Evil almoſt never wants Protection, whereas Good hath always powerful Enemies. Either therefore a Prince muſt be an idle Spectator of Miſchief, and content himſelf with inactive fruitleſs Wiſhes for Good, or he muſt overpower by his Courage whatever oppoſes itſelf to his Zeal for it.

IX. Sometimes very ſudden and unexpected Commotions ariſe in a State, which require a ſpeedy Remedy, and a very elevated Degree of Courage, a noble Vigor of Mind, to reſiſt and quell them. The leaſt Symptom of Fearfulneſs would in ſuch Caſes be of very fatal Conſequence; and let me add that inward Fear, however hid and diſſembled under a contrary Appearance, will ſuggeſt very feeble Counſels. On theſe Occaſions

ſions it is the Tranquility of the Prince, which alone can enable him to keep all about him to their Duty and in due Reſpect: Let him ask Advice with Dignity, and judge of it with Sincerity; and thus teach by his Example thoſe with whom he conſults, to deliberate mutually, and without liſtening to Fear, becauſe its Reaſonings are falſe; and it cannot look beyond what puts it into Fright and Conſternation.

X. This is ſo much the more neceſſary in Time of War, to which it is juſt to deſire an End, that cannot however be obtained but by Courage and Firmneſs of Mind. If a Prince too early deſponds, if he appears dejected, ſuch Weakneſs of Mind ſoon infects all about him. They ſee as he ſees, they think as he thinks; which is, to put the ſpeedieſt Period to a War, which hath already overcome his Patience and Courage; and by an Imprudence, which is the common Attendant of Fear, they imbolden the Enemy; not being able to hide their own Diſpiritedneſs and Conſternation, they render the adverſe Party more fierce and untractable.

XI. Inſtead of ſuch a cowardly Diſpoſition, which only ſerves to darken the Underſtanding, to precipitate Reſolutions, to remove all ſalutary Counſels out of ſight; and to anticipate Evil, he ought to recal all his Courage, and together with it all his Reaſon. He ought attentively to conſider all the Means Prudence and Valour can ſuggeſt; to look upon all that is cowardly and diſhonourable as impracticable; and thus to merit Peace by forcing the Enemy to offer it, otherwiſe he diſgraces himſelf to his great Diſadvantage; and like thoſe who look giddy when they look from an elevated Place, and ſo fall down thro' fear

of

of falling, he blindly precipitates himſelf into the greateſt Misfortunes, through fear of being reduced to them.

XII. The Time of making theſe Reflections upon Danger is not when Danger is preſent. One ought to deliberate well before he expoſes himſelf to it: But when it is come, there is no more room for Deliberation. Temerity and Preſumption invert this Order. (*a*) They will not hear previouſly to Danger, and when it happens they liſten to every thing. To them every Enterprize is eaſy before undertaken; and every thing becomes impoſſible ſo ſoon as they engage in it. The Part true Courage Acts is quite the Reverſe. Before advancing upon any thing, it examines all Circumſtances with full Deliberation: It will ſee all; it will uſe all Aſſiſtance to diſcover what may eſcape its own Sight: It inſtead of diminiſhing augments to itſelf all Dificulties; adding, to what Prudence can foreſee, a thouſand poſſible Accidents which cannot be foreſeen; and then it computes its Strength: It weighs the Means: It examines the Neceſſity and Juſtice of a War without fearing it, (*b*) but of which it would not be the firſt Author. He hath a due Diffidence of theſe ſecret Paſſions, which may mix themſelves with his Deliberations, and peremptorily Demands of his Counſellors the ſtricteſt Attention to the Juſtice which only ought to determine him; and when Reſolution is taken, he (*c*) without any Precipitancy loſes not a Moment: And thus he puts himſelf in a State for executing his

(*a*) Ignariſſimus quiſque & in periculo non auſurus, nimii verbis, linguæ feroces. *Tacit. L.* 1. *Hiſt. p.* 318.

(*b*) Non times bella, non provocas- *Paneg. Traj. p.* 65.

(*c*) Fortiſſimus in ipſo diſcrimine, qui ante diſcrimen quietiſſimus. *Tacit. L.* 1. *Hiſt. p.* 334.

his Deſigns with much leſs Difficulty than was reckon'd upon in the Deliberations about them.

XIII. (*d*) True Courage therefore is very oppoſite to that Raſhneſs which either never examines, or does it very ſlightly; and we may ſee from what hath been ſaid, that a narrow-minded Prince, whoſe Views are very ſhort and confin'd, can never have real Courage. He takes his Meaſures from what he ſees; and ſeeing but a little way into Matters he is not intimidated. It is in vain to tell him there are real Dangers in an Enterprize; he treats ſuch Suggeſtions as the vain Alarms of a frighted Imagination, becauſe he cannot ſee them: But when he is moved from the narrow Center which limited his Sight, and diſcovers unexpected Circumſtances, his falſe Confidence is changed into Fear, and he is all at once as diſmay'd as he was but the Moment before precipitate.

XIV. I would much rather chooſe that a Prince had no Courage at all, than that he had one of this Complexion. For a timid Prince, if he be prudent, will keep off Dangers by his Foreſight and good Conduct; whereas the other ſeeks after them and multiplies them, and is not able to avoid any one; becauſe no Experience makes him wiſer; and in different Circumſtances he is always as ready as ever to ſee leſs than there is, and to promiſe himſelf more than he is able to do: For there are few Defects of the Mind ſo irremediable by Education and Inſtruction as a narrow Capacity and a feeble Heart.

XV. Thus, in all I have ſaid and am to ſay, I ſuppoſe a Prince to have received an excellent Genius, and a Heart full of Courage which only

(*d*) Cui cauta potius conſilia cum ratione, quam proſpera ex caſu placent, *Tacit. L. 2. Hiſt. p.* 344.

only wants to be cultivated and perfected; the ſecond being very improveable.

XVI. Much may be added to natural Strength of Mind by Reflection, by good Counſel, and much more by Experience; and that Experience ought to commence very early. A Prince muſt be accumſtomed from his tendereſt Years not to be moved by any ſuddain unforeſeen Accident, by any unexpected Obſtacle; by any Evil, in one word, which Prudence can redreſs. His firſt Cares ought to be skillfully formed that way, that is, to ſeek Remedies from Patience and Wiſdom: And inſtead of burſting into vain Complaints, and ſuffering his Mind to be overpowered by Fear and Deſpondency, which cannot alter Events, to apply himſelf wholly to find out a Remedy, if there be any for it; or if there be none, to fortify his Mind and bear with Patience what neither depends on his Will nor his Reaſon to prevent.

XVII. Without this Patience Courage cannot carry one very far: But Patience itſelf is a feeble Reſource if it ſtand in need of Witneſſes to it, to ſupport and animate it, and is not as firm and reſolute in private as it affects to be in publick. There are a thouſand Caſes in which a Man muſt alone by himſelf bear the whole Burden of his Uneaſineſs and Diſſatisfaction. He would be always weak if he always wanted Support from others; and indeed it would rather be in that Caſe the Courage of another than his own that upholds him.

XVIII. But mere human Patience is but a weak Support, and if the Heart hath nothing but that to conſole it, it muſt be very feeble and unhappy. In order to have true Courage one muſt be able to profit by Calamities, from the Knowledge of the

their true Origin, Cauſe and End. One muſt ſuffer with pious Reſignation, humbling himſelf under the Hand of God, and be able to tranquilize his Mind by religious Conſiderations. He muſt ſuffer with a ſincere Senſe of his Weakneſs, acknowledge that Patience and Courage come from God: For what proceeds from Pride is only a uſeleſs Effort, and adds to one's Trouble inſtead of quieting and ſtrengthening the Mind.

ARTICLE II.

Of the Elevation of Mind becoming a Prince.

I. BY Courage, which ſurmounts all unreaſonable and vain Fears, the Prince is prepared for a more ſublime Diſpoſition, which I call Elevation of Mind, becauſe I have no more proper Term to expreſs it by, in order to ſignify its double Effect upon the Underſtanding, and the Heart giving great views to the one, and noble Sentiments to the other.

II. The Holy Spirit has pointed out this Diſpoſition, as conſtituting the Character of a Prince worthy of his Dignity. For after having (*e*) promiſed that the fooliſh and imprudent ſhall no more aſcend the Throne, he adds, *That the King God will give in his Mercy ſhall have Sentiments worthy of a Prince.* He in a few Words puts an infinite Diſtance between a Prince only elevated by his high Station, and one who having a truly elevated Mind is worthy of his Dignity: And he reduces all the Difference between them to that of their Views

(*e*) Non vocabitur ultra, is qui inſipiens eſt, princeps ea quæ digna ſunt principe cogitabit. *Iſai.* xxxii. 5,—8.

Views and Deſigns. The one thinks baſely, the other nobly; the one has narrow mean Ideas like thoſe of a private Perſon, low Sentiments, pitiful Deſigns, and vulgar Inclinations; the other has nothing but what is grand and ſublime becoming a Prince, who is ſuch in every Thing, and never forgets he is in a very high and elevated Station, to which his Views and Sentiments ought to be correſpondent.

III. This narrow confined Spirit, ſo oppoſite to the Elevation I am ſpeaking of, is much more common among Princes than is imagin'd, often through bad Education, or a natural Diſpoſition to Meanneſs, or thro' the Difficulty of maintaining long a great Mind without having any Pattern or Example of it before one: For even with good Inclinations, one is not able to go very far, when he is quite ſingular, and ſees nothing about him but what is mean and low.

IV. This natural Lowneſs of Mind is almoſt incorrigible, and beyond Remedy: But when one has received of God an elevated and noble Heart, he may guard himſelf againſt degenerating into Meanneſſes and low Taſte, which ſadly vilify ſo many Princes: And there is no better Safeguard againſt ſuch Corruption than an exact Knowledge of a mean Spirit, and a Heart reduc'd into vile Servitude by narrow Sentiments, and of the groſs Faults againſt all the Ends and Rules of Government, of which ſuch a Character is the fatal Source.

V. A Prince without an elevated Mind will undertake nothing great, or will not be able to execute it. He may make ſome Sallies at times when he is puſh'd, but he falls back into his natural Temper, as ſoon as that foreign Impreſſion is gone. His Life will be fill'd with Inequalities and In-

conſiſtencies, but will every where have evident Marks ſtamp'd on it of his true Inclinations, in diſtinction from ſuch as it may be endeavoured to inſtil into him.

VI. His good Intentions, if he has any, will terminate in things of no Importance. He will give his chief Attention to the Duties which belong rather to a private Subject than to a Prince. He would do all by himſelf, and will embaraſs himſelf with minute Particulars, which he ought to transfer the Care of to others. He will always appear inſufficient for his Affairs; he will appear enſlav'd, being wholly at the Diſpoſal of others, not at his own, and will do nothing but fatigue himſelf with uſeleſs Labour.

VII. He will make a bad Choice of his Confidents, becauſe he will be afraid or diſtruſtful of Merit. He will even be afraid of being govern'd, and ever be ſo. He will be delicate to Exceſs about his Authority, and yet let it be uſurp'd by Perſons who will leave him the Shadow of it, and enjoy the Reality. He will always be on his Guard againſt thoſe who may give him good Advice, and give himſelf up without any Precaution to artful Men who know and abuſe his Weakneſs.

VIII. The leſs Knowledge he has, the leſs will he be acquainted with himſelf; and the more limited he is in his Views, the more ſatisfied will he be with himſelf. He will be full of his own imagined Merit, applaud himſelf in ſecret, and be always open to Flattery. Thus he will ſeek for Flatterers among thoſe who reſemble him, and he will find ſome, who without being like him, will encourage him in his Error.

IX. He will pique himſelf upon excelling in things of no Uſe to a Prince. He will have a hundred

hundred good Qualities for a private Perſon, but not one belonging to a King. He will deſign, paint, engrave, love Muſick, and play on ſeveral Inſtruments. He will employ himſelf in curious Reſearches, as Aſtronomical Obſervations and Calculations, or the abſtract Sciences, which are of no real Uſe. He will lock himſelf up with obſcure Adepts, to learn ſome Chymical Secret, either vain or hurtful. He will never find himſelf at his Eaſe or at Liberty, but with Perſons who have neither Birth nor Merit to recommend them, and will refuſe to Affairs of the laſt Importance, the time he throws away upon idle Amuſements.

X. If withal he be ſuſceptible of ſuperſtitious Impreſſions, and liable to be impoſed upon by Impoſture covered over with the fair varniſh of Piety, he will be the Tool of thoſe who can employ his Credulity, to promote their ambitious and cunning Ends; and who having themſelves no Conſcience will however take firm hold of his, by raiſing vain Scruples in his, of which they will make at Times proper for their Views a very fatal Uſe in reſpect of his Intereſt and that of his People. See here a Part of thoſe diſmal Conſequences of a Prince without true Elevation of Mind; and it is ſufficient, methinks, to have pointed them out tranſiently to an intelligent thinking Prince, to warn him againſt them.

XI. But a low mean Mind is not the only Danger he ought to fear and avoid; and falſe Elevation is another Extreme to be carefully ſhunned when one is ſenſible of his being born for great Things. All that appears grand is not realy ſo; yet whatever hath the Appearance of Grandeur invites and attracts. Men have aſſumed the

Notion of Glory to many things which do not deſerve it: But the true is often leſs known and leſs ſought after than the falſe. The Swoln and Puffed up counterfeit real Greatneſs; and it requires no ſlight Attention to diſcover them.

XII. (*f*) An elevated Mind which is reſtleſs and impetuous, is apt to miſtake in this Matter; ſuch a Mind may be deceived by an empty Phantom, and purſue it to the very Brink of Ruin, and may ſacrifice his own Quiet, and his People to a vain Hope of Glory and Grandeur, that will plunge him into Lowneſs and Contempt, inſtead of raiſing him out of it. For, beſides that it is truly ſhameful to exert great Efforts for a frivolous End, the Love of falſe Glory always indicates an ignorant Mind and corrupt Heart.

XIII. True Elevation of Mind does not conſiſt in diſcerning, and doing what an irregular Imagination or popular Prejudices repreſent as great and magnificent. It does not conſiſt in attempting difficult Projects for the ſake of their Difficulty. It is not (*f*) excited by the Idea of marvelous, or by the Pleaſure of ſurmounting what appears impracticable, as Hiſtory has obſerved of *Nero*, (*g*) to whom every thing that appeared incredible preſented itſelf under the Semblance of truly grand and noble.

XIV. It attaches itſelf to what is practicable, uſeful to the Public, durable, and compared with the Expence it coſts, far ſuperior to it in its Advantages.

XV. It would never have choſen for its Object

(*f*) Sublime & erectum ingenium pulchritudinem ac ſpeciem excelſæ magnæque gloriæ vehementius quam caute appetebat: mox mitigavit ratio & ætas. *Tacit. vita Agricol.* 45.

(*g*) Incredibilium cupitor. *Tacit. L.* 15. *Annal. p.* 278.

ject, either the Pyramids of *Egypt* ſo often very foolſhly celebrated, or the (*b*) Obeliſks cut with ſuch Expence and Labour, for no manner of Uſe to the Public. A Mauſoleum of an enormous Structure, ſuch as the Pyramids were, and a Stone of an extraordinary Height, ſuch as were the Obeliſks, have nothing great in them to a truly elevated Soul: It can perceive nothing but Meanneſs in all the Works of which unprofitable Faſtouſneſs is the ſole End.

XVI. A Perſon who knew *Alexander*'s Taſte for every thing extraordinary, and in appearance impoſſible, promiſed, (*i*) if he would be at the Expence, to cut Mount *Athos* into a Coloſſal Statue repreſenting a Giant, who ſhould hold in one of his Fiſts a City of a vaſt extent. The Prince did not accept the Offer, becauſe the City would have been without Water: But had it not been for that Inconvenience he would have conſented to the Project, and have look'd upon the Expence of forming Mount *Athos* into a human Figure, as well employ'd. Whereas to a wiſe Man, not infected with a pernicious Taſte of falſe Glory, it would have appeared a ridiculous mad Proſpect.

XVII. Princes are ſeldom potent enough to undertake ſuch ſurpriſing uſeleſs Schemes, as their Imaginations often preſent to them: But there are few who can diſtinguiſh falſe from true Glory, and do not place a part of their Grandeur in forcing Nature to uſeleſs Purpoſes; in turning Rivers into new Channels, to ſatisfy their Caprice; in carrying Water to a ſingle Houſe by Aqueducts of a vaſt Length;

(*b*) Pliny *relates with what Expence they were cut in the Quarries of* Egypt.

(*i*) *Plutarch. in vit. Alexandri.*

leveling Mountains to enlarge their Proſpects, without the Peoples having any ſhare in the Matter, but that of having contributed immenſe Sums towards it, for which he is now covered with Earth, but an account ſhall one Day be demanded by the Judge of Kings.

XVIII. A Prince who, (*k*) according to the Holy Scripture, hath Sentiments worthy of the Rank in which God hath placed him, does not divided his Glory with Architects and other Artiſts. He does not affect Expenſiveneſs to be great. He does not enter into vain Emulation with vain Perſons. He does not think of diſtinguiſhing himſelf by things in which Good Princes will very readily yield to him, and the Bad ſurpaſs him. He has in his Mind a Greatneſs which cannot be counterfeited by Pride, nor equalled by Pomp. It reſides at the bottom of his many noble perſonal Qualities: It conſiſts in the Grandeur of his Sentiments, and inſtead of depending on any foreign Support, it is that which ſets all to work, and gives Life and Motion to all

XIX A Prince of a ſuperior Spirit, and great Heart, is wholly ſet upon rendering his People happy and flouriſhing; upon diſcovering Merit, and employing it ſuitably; upon protecting Letters and the Learned; upon diſtributing prompt and ready Juſtice; upon proportioning the Habits of his People to the Services in the Provinces, and of particular Perſons whence they are drawn; upon repairing ancient Cities, and reſtoring them to their primitive Glory and Splendor, or making Commerce flouriſh by the Credit of his State in foreign Countries, and by the Privileges and Immu-

(*k*) *Iſai.* xxxii.

Immunities he grants to his Subjects; upon purſuing not vain and chimerical Ideas, but wiſe and uſeful Deſigns; upon not ſuffering reaſonable Schemes to become abortive for want of Courage and Perſeverance; by rendering his Conduct amiable to neighbouring Nations; and by meriting the Eſteem and Confidence of other Princes, whoſe Admiration he excites by his Virtue, and whoſe Jealouſy he extinguiſhes by Equity and Moderation.

XX. Theſe are the principal Characters of that true Elevation of Mind which a Prince ought to have to a certain Degree, and by which he ought to direct all his Actions. And the nearer he attains to it, the better will he learn by Experience what that Grandeur of Soul is, which is a yet more perfect and royal Diſpoſition.

ARTICLE III.

Of Grandeur of Soul, or of the Magnanimity becoming a Prince.

I. IT does not merely deliver a Prince from vain Fears, and inſpire him with great Views and noble Sentiments; it raiſes him above his Paſſions; and, ſubjecting them under his Feet, puts the Scepter in his Hand, and the Crown on his Head: For it is that which, properly ſpeaking, makes him a King, and ſets him on the Throne, from which he indeed deſcends when he does not maintain the Authority it had given him.

II. The firſt Enemy it ſubmits to him is Luſt after what does not belong to him, and it goes to the very Source of every thing capable of ſhaking him, diſturbing his Peace, ſeducing him

into Injuſtice, perverting what is good in him, and bereaving him of what he poſſeſſes of truly great. I view, ſays this noble Quality, what belongs to others with the ſame Tranquility you do your own Poſſeſſions. Do not covet that which you have no Right to have; be always above Jealouſy; conſider how much you would degrade yourſelf by a baſe Cupidity, that would excite in your Mind unjuſt and unworthy Sentiments.

III. The ſecond Enemy it ſubdues is the Thirſt of Praiſe, and the Inſtabilities in the Heart of a Prince; a genuiue and fruitful Principle of great Actions. Purſue Reality, ſaith it to him, be not entirely taken up about the Shadow. Think of doing well, and not appearing to have done well. Keep your Eyes fixed on your Duty, and what Conſcience requires and approves, and ſuffer not your Attention to be divided between yourſelf and your Spectators. If you are only good ſo far as your Goodneſs may be known, you will never be what you ought to be, and your Merit will be but the Shadow of Virtue. Be pleaſed that there is no great Forwardneſs to praiſe you: The Silence of Flatterers is a true (*l*) Mark of a good Prince, and he muſt be truly great when it is permitted to be ſilent about him. Leave it to Poſterity to render Juſtice to you. Do not prevent by vain Anxiety the Diligence of Hiſtorians (*m*). They will be faithful in proportion as

(*l*) Cum jam pridem novitas omnis adulatione conſumpta ſit, non alius erga te novus honor ſupereſt, quam ſi aliquando de te tacere audeamus. *Paneg. Traj. p.* 162.

(*m*) Contemptor ambitionis, & infinitæ poteſtatis domitor, ac frænator, animus ipſa vetuſtate floreſcit; nec ab ullis magis laudatur, quam quibus minime neceſſe eſt. *Paneg. Traj. p.* 164.

you have been modeſt; and the Way to make them credited, is your giving yourſelf no Trouble about what they may write.

IV. To the Love of Praiſe ſucceeds the Fear of Blame, and an exceſſive Senſibility with reſpect to Cenſure and Reproach. This Enemy is yet more formidable and powerful than the two former; becauſe it is eaſier to ſurmount Ambition and the Deſire of Fame, than to bear without any Diſturbance the Cenſure of an innocent Life and Ingratitude for Benefits. But Magnanimity triumphs over this Enemy likewiſe, and reduces it under the Prince's Feet. Do you hope, ſays it, to pleaſe every body? Hath Virtue no Genius? Can you ſatisfy them who are diſſatisfied with it? And can you love Virtue ſincerely, if you are not capable of bearing patiently to be treated as it is? Is there any other ſure Mark, that it is Virtue itſelf, and not the Glory which generally attends it, you love, but continuing ſtedfaſt to it though it ſhould bring you into Contempt? Time and Patience will diſſipate theſe thin Clouds which obſcure its Glory. The whole World will admire you, if you never turn aſide from the Paths of Truth and Virtue, for the ſake of Words which cannot alter the Nature of things, and ought therefore to make no Change in the Heart: They will regard you, not only as a great Prince, but as an Angel (*n*) elevated above human Weakneſſes, if Praiſes do not ſoften you, nor Cenſure relax either your good Intentions or your Zeal.

V. Take

(*n*) Sicut Angelus Dei, ſic eſt Dominus meus Rex, ut nec benedictione, nec maledictione moveatur. *L.* 2. *Reg.* xiv. 17.

V. Take care above all, ſays that noble Diſpoſition of Mind, to keep your-ſelf from a Curioſity that inclines Princes to inform themſelves what is thought and ſaid of them; not to profit by it and become better Men, but to find him out the Authors of too free and unreſpectful Reports, in order to Puniſh them. To give Attention to them, is the ſure way of multiplying them to infinity, and of making them more buſy and active. A truly great Soul (*o*) deſpiſes them, and extinguiſhes them by Contempt. When they are diſregarded, they fall to the Ground and vaniſh; and when they are not merited, they are not regarded. But Princes render Juſtice to themſelves in their private Thoughts, and ſuſpect, with good reaſon, that to be ſaid of them which they are inwardly ſenſible they deſerve. Hence come their Diſquiets and their Curioſity: But beneficent (*p*) magnanimous Princes have no Suſpicions, and therefore make no Enquiries. And it is indeed very unaccountable, (*q*) that whoever is not eſteem'd, nor loved, ſhould be impatient to know what is ſaid againſt them at Court, and in the City; whereas a Prince worthy of univerſal Eſteem and Love, has no Curioſity to know what is ſaid of him, and much leſs to hear what ſome imprudent Perſons may let fall againſt his Conduct.

VI. There is a Baſeneſs (*r*) in Hatred, that Exactneſs

(*o*) Ipſe Julius, ipſe Auguſtus, & tulere iſta, & reliquere: Haud facile dixerim moderatione magis an ſapientia. Namque ſpreta exoleſcunt. *Tacit. L.* 4. *Annal. p.* 120.

(*p*) De nullo minus principe queruntur homines quam de quo maximum licet. *Paneg. Traj. p.* 14.

(*q*) Queri libet, quod in ſecreta noſtra non inquirunt principes, niſi quod odimus. *Paneg. Traj, p.* 16.

(*r*) Nec unquam perſuadeatur humile eſſe principi, niſi odiſſe. *Paneg. Traj. p.* 19.

neſs of Mind cannot endure. A Prince ought ſometimes to puniſh when he is abſolutely forc'd to it: But he puniſhes according to the Laws, without Malice or Hatred, without taking any Delight in Vengeance. He has no other Intereſt but that of the Public, and he will not allow any ſecret Averſion to enter into his Mind which diſturbs his Peace, and allays its (*s*) Candour and Goodneſs. Entertaining in the Heart ſecret Averſion or Hatred, bewrays a Cowardice unworthy a great Prince, and marks a Weakneſs which can have no other Source but an impotent Timidity, or a baſe Heart that nouriſhes itſelf with Gall and Venom.

VII. A Prince above Hatred, and really an Enemy to the cruel (*t*) Pleaſures of Revenge, knows no ſincerer purer Joy, than in pardoning; and it is by this generous Delight that Magnanimity makes itſelf moſt ſurely known (*v*). He without any Difficulty, diveſts himſelf of all Reſentment and buries Injuries in Oblivion. He feels no Struggle in his Mind with theſe baſe malignant Affections which hinder others from riſing to true Grandeur. He ſees a Beauty and a Glory in Clemency, which diſpels every thing that tends to obſcure it: And he has the Fortitude of Soul to do what all the World will admire when it is done; but few are able to imitate: For the Goodneſs and the Generoſity which makes the Merit of Clemency, have Charms in the Eyes of all Perſons, even of the inhuman

(*s*) Ex iracundia nihil ſupererat ſecretum, & ſilentium ejus non timeres: honeſtius putabat offendere, quam odiſſe. *Tacit. vita Agricol. p.* 459.

(*t*) Hæc divina potentia eſt, gregatim ac publice ſervare. *Senec. L.* 1. *de Clem. C.* 26.

(*v*) Non quantum in cives ſuos liceat experiendo tentare, ſed hebetare aciem Imperii ſui. *Senec. L.* 1 *de Clem. C.* 11.

inhuman Princes, which render it impoſſible for them not to love them. And the Difference between one as cruel as *Tiberius* or as Blood-Thirſty as *Dioclesian*, and another Prince as full of Goodneſs as *Titus*, does not lie in the Idea that is entertained of Clemency and the Glory accompanying it, but in Execution or Practice: For (*x*) *Tiberius* and *Dioclesian* (*y*) have as true and ſound an Idea of it as *Titus*, and regard Clemency as the principal Quality of a great Prince, tho' they ſatisfy themſelves with acknowledging it to be ſo.

VIII. In the Clemency of a great Prince, there is no Mixture of Guilt, no Reſerve. He ſometimes half-puniſhes and with regret. But he pardons fully; eſpecially Faults which have been ſpeedily expiated by Repentance, and produced no bad Effects. He knows that the beſt way to render ſubmiſſive is to forget they had ever failed in their Duty. A City long in Diſgrace for a ſmall Fault, is conſtrained to remember that it had offended and is not beloved; and this Impreſſion itſelf is a Temptation to neglect their Duty. A Prince capable of forgeting all, leaves no Veſtige of Diſobedience, and the People are much the more faithful to him, that they think they have always been ſo.

IX.

(*x*) Quo magis mirum videbatur (*He ſpeaks of Tiberius*) gnarum meliorum, & quæ fama clementiam ſequeretur, triſtiora velle —Nec occultum eſt, quando ex veritate, quando adumbrata lætitia, facta Imperatorum celebrantur. *Tacit. L.* 4. *Annal.*

(*y*) Dioclesian *ſays, That the Emperor* Aurelius *ought not to have been a General, nor an Emperor, becauſe he neglected Clemency, the firſt and moſt eſſential Quality of a Prince*, &c. Aureli clementia, Imperatorum dos prima, defuit: Magis dux eſſe debuit, quam Princeps. *Vopiſc. in vit. Aurel. p.* 282.

IX. Beſides, it is not by the Mertit or the Gratitude of a People that a Prince of a truly great Mind meaſures his Goodneſs and his Duty. He is acted by more noble and diſintereſted Views, and will be a Model to his Subjects, and not depend on their Example. His Deſign is to render them generous and not to ceaſe to be ſo himſelf, becauſe he cannot be imitated. He continues to be great, and exerts himſelf with Vigor, to become more and more ſuch, through the Compaſſion he has for the Puerility and Weakneſs of the greater part of Mankind, who grovel on the Earth for want of Greatneſs of Heart, and noble Sentiments: And he thinks it belongs to Goodneſs to ſurmount Ingratitude, and not to Ingratitude to ſtifle Goodneſs.

X. He loves for that reaſon to put a due Value on the good Services rendered to him, to remember them and to recompence them; that he may bring Gratitude into requeſt, and teach all Perſons that there is as much Generoſity in acknowledging an Obligation, as in laying one under it. (z) Princes, whoſe Hearts are narrowed and contracted by Jealouſy, think themſelves diſhonoured by owning the good Offices done to them; (a) and when the Service rendered them is above their Power to reward ſuitably to its Merit; after the firſt Moments are over, they are inwardly vexed that they have been obliged, and becomeHaters of their Benefactors,to deliver themſelves from their Obligation to eſteem and praiſe a great

(z) In principe rarum eſt ut ſe putet obligatum, aut ſi putet, amet. *Paneg. Traj. p.* 178.

(a) Beneficia eo uſque læta ſunt, dum videntur exſolvi poſſe. *Tacit. L.* 4. *Annal p.* 114.

a great Man who was once neceſſary to them. A magnanimous Prince is quite the Reverſe of ſuch a Character. He places his Grandeur in being ſincere and grateful; in putting a due Value upon a Benefit, and declaring he owes his Crown to a great General, if it be really true, and in ſupplying what is wanting in Recompences of another Kind, by Teſtimonies of his Eſteem and Friendſhip.

XI. By making Acknowledgments of this Sort a Prince is naturally led to thoſe of another Kind, and which are yet a more certain Mark of true Greatneſs of Soul; and it is to acknowledge his Faults when he falls into any. He neither ſearches for Pretexts nor Excuſes to cover or palliate them. He renders Homage to the Truth tho'it condemns him. He is well pleaſed to have it pointed out to him when he does not ſee it. He looks upon Attention to his Conduct and Zeal for his Perfection as a ſincerely good Office: And he leaves to Princes, who have a falſe Delicacy about their Grandeur, the Shame of being full of Defects and Blemiſhes, without ever owning they have any.

XII. As for him, he knows nothing ſo low as Falſhood, nor ſo unworthy as Hypocriſy, he places all his Glory on the Knowledge and Love of Truth: And makes an effectual Duty of it never to employ Diſſimulation or Fraud, but to ſupport in every thing the Dignity of a ſincere Prince, faithful to his Word, religiouſly ſtrict to his Oath, an Enemy to Fraud, natural and ſimple in his Conduct; tho' never to the Prejudice of Prudence and Secreſy. But theſe laſt Characters of Magnanimity require another Regard; and it is fit to conſider them more particularly in the following Chapter.

CHAP.

CHAPTER XX.

A Prince ought to be ſincerely faithful to his Word; a religious Obſerver of his Oath; an Enemy to Diſſimulation, yet prudent and ſecret, and far removed from all Affectation in his Conduct, in which nothing ought to appear but a truly auguſt Simplicity.

ARTICLE I.

A Prince ought to be ſincere, and faithful to his Word.

I. A PRINCE would value himſelf in vain upon his Courage, his Elevation and Grandeur of Mind, if he did not regard Sincerity as a Virtue inſeparable from great Qualities: For nothing is more cowardly, low and mean, than Falſhood, and the baſe Uſe that is made of Cunning.

II. It would likewiſe be to no Purpoſe to inſtruct a Prince, or to hope to form his Mind for great things, if he does not love Truth, and if he thinks himſelf an able Prince in proportion to the Sacrifices he makes of it to Intereſts that touch him more nearly. All that hath been hitherto ſaid, would be rendered ineffectual by that baſe Diſpoſition; and for a Prince of ſuch a Complexion, Leſſons of Treachery, and Miniſters without Conſcience or Honour, is all that is wanting.

III. But he who perhaps may ſee what I have writ, is a Prince whom God hath inſpired with a ſincere

ſincere Love to Truth, and whom his Providence deſtines for a great Kingdom, to be an Example to it of Virtue. He is ſtrongly perſuaded that a Prince is the Head, the Bond, the Center of the Society: That the (*b*) only Foundation of Society is Truth and Faith: That to diſunite Men, render them mutually jealous and ſuſpicious, is to ſhake the Foundation of Society: And therefore that to be the Protector of the public Faith, as he is of the Society, is the proper Buſineſs of a Prince; that he acts directly againſt his moſt eſſential Duty and Intereſt, if he prefers Diſguiſe and Artifice to Sincerity, and that he renounces the moſt auguſt Sanctions of Kings, by giving the Protection to Falſhood he owes to Truth.

IV. He has already read in the Scripture that (*c*) *righteous Lips are the Delight of Kings: and they love him that ſpeaketh right* (*d*). He knew that the Holy Spirit abhors the Double-minded, a guileful Tongue, falſe Politics founded upon Lies. (*e*) After the Example of *David*, he will have none about him but the ſincere and faithful, he ſtrives to ſurpaſs them in thoſe good Qualities, and is far from diſcouraging them: He would look upon it as ignominious Baſeneſs of Mind to exclude himſelf (*f*) from the holy Mountain to which the Prophet

(*b*) Fides eſt fundamentum ſocietatis humanæ, perfidia vero ejuſdem peſtis. *Plato L.* 5. *de legibus.*

(*c*) Voluntas Regum labia juſta: qui recte loquitur, diligetur. *Prov.* xvi. 13.

(*d*) In corde locuti ſunt. *Pſalm.*

(*e*) Oculi mei ad fideles terræ; ambulans in via immaculata hic mihi miniſtrabit. *Pſal.* c.

Diſperdat Dominus labia doloſa. *Pſalm.*

(*f*) Domine, quis habitabit in tabernaclo tuo, aut quis requieſcet in monte ſancto tuo?—Qui loquitur veritatem in corde ſuo, qui non egit dolum in lingua ſua. *Pſalm.* xiv.

phet only admits Men full of love to Truth, and who hath no Diſſimulation.

V. He hath without all doubt ſome Difficulty to conceive how a King is not afraid of diſhonouring himſelf by failing in his Word, by giving out a Deſign directly oppoſite to his inward Intention, or by attempting to gain his Ends by Diſſimulation: How he can hold up his Face without being covered with Shame before the internal Judge of his Sentiments, his Conſcience: How he can deſpiſe that which is the moſt auguſt and ſacred thing within him, his own Heart: How he can reſolve to be in his own Sight and Judgment a perfidious Traitor, unworthy of all Truſt and Credit.

VI. Tho'others ſhould never diſcover his Doubleneſs, and he ſhould be able to ſmooth it over to them, with all the Appearances of Truth and Faithfulneſs, how can he hide it from himſelf? And if he can bear to conſider himſelf as devoid of all Probity, what can one expect from ſuch a worthleſs Perſon, ſo abandon'd to all ſenſe of Shame? What would he have Men to reſpect in him? His exterior Pomp, his Power, his Riches? All that is extrinſic to him, and he abuſes it. His Heart, his Mind, his Sentiments? That is what he hath given up entirely to Falſhood, and what he himſelf makes no account of.

VII. What Right can he have to exact Truth from others, ſince he hates it and betrays it? And who would give himſelf any Trouble to tell it to him, knowing his Averſion to it? What Confidence does he deſerve to have placed in him who puts none in any Perſon? And how can he eſtabliſh it with regard to himſelf, either in his own Dominions, or in neighbouring States, having

inſpired Diffidence into all Perſons, and being himſelf an Example of Duplicity?

VIII. Is there any Advantage a Prince ought to purchaſe at ſo ſhameful a Rate? Is not a Prince greater, beyond compariſon, than all that is beneath Man, and but a Piece of Clay? Ought not a private Perſon to conſider himſelf as ſuperior to all that is merely temporal? And is it not this Conſideration that renders all Men, even the moſt Indigent, inexcuſable, when they depart from Truth and Juſtice, to preſerve or acquire any Goods inferior to Virtue?

IX. Let a Prince therefore examine what it is he puts upon the level with Probity, and prefers to it. Let him compare what he ſacrifices with what he deſires: Let him ask himſelf what he is, and what thoſe frivolous Advantages are which he ſets above Reputation, Conſcience, and his external Intereſts.

X. But without entering into that Compariſon, let a Prince only conſider, what Baſeneſs there is in Guile, and what a Mark it is of a little Mind and of a cowardly Heart to be inſincere. Can he diſown that he has reſource to thoſe unworthy Means, becauſe other more juſt and noble ones are wanting to him, and that they are therefore a Proof of his Ignorance and Weakneſs? Can he deny that it is becauſe he covets what is not his, and what he cannot pretend to by lawful Methods that he uſes crooked and depraved ones? And can he then refuſe to own that both his Aim and his Means are unjuſt?

XII. If his Intentions are right, why does he diſhonour them by Methods which can only ſerve to make them ſuſpected? And if they are contrary to Equity, what does he hope for from In-

Injuſtice, or from the Fraud which he calls to his Aid? Would he not be more happy if he would check his unjuſt Deſires, than in tormenting himſelf to make them ſucceed by Artifice? Does he not know (*g*) that the Source of true Grandeur of Soul conſiſts in deſiring nothing that belongs to another, and that one cannot neither on the Throne, nor in any other Condition of Life, preſerve Courage or Honour, if he ſuffers himſelf to be miſled by Deſires which Juſtice condemns, and that can only be ſucceſsful by fraudulent Meaſures which hate the Light.

XII. But the Succeſs itſelf hoped for, is it very ſure? And does a Prince always accompliſh his Ends when he abandons the Paths of Honour to employ Deceit. He may proſper at firſt and deceive with ſucceſs while he is believed incapable of endeavouring it; but when Diffidence of him is once eſtabliſhed, Artifice meets with nothing in others but oppoſite Artifice. At leaſt he finds a general Suſpicion which diſconcerts him, and diſappoints his Meaſures: For he becomes ſuſpected, ſo ſoon as he is once diſcovered, and nothing is eaſier than to detect him, becauſe one needs only compare his Promiſes and Engagements with the Execution, that is by no means anſwerable to them.

XIII. It is not reckon'd enough, generally, to have found him out, and to have marr'd his Deſigns. It is thought neceſſary to prevent him: And neighbouring States, united by their common Intereſts againſt a falſe deceitful Prince, ſometimes fortify themſelves by ſuch a ſtrong League as reduces him to the utmoſt Danger, and teaches him, but too late, that the honeſteſt Politics are the

(*g*) *See the preceeding Chapter in the Article of Magnanimity.*

ſureſt; and by the Rules of true Wiſdom one ought to avoid Diſhoneſty, not only as it is unjuſt, but as it is likewiſe unprofitable and dangerous. (*b*) *He that walketh uprightly, walketh ſecurely; but he that perverteth his Way ſhall be known, and ſhall fall, ſo that he ſhall be deſtroyed; whereas the upright Man ſhall be ſaved* (*i*).

XIV. The Embarraſments in which a Prince who is an Enemy to Sincerity involves himſelf, and often cannot extricate his Feet, come from within and from without; from the Diffidence of his own Subjects as well as that of foreign States. The Prince and People then conſider themſelves as having oppoſite Intereſts. The one promiſes, the other miſtruſts. The mutual Bond which united them is broken, and tho' a Reſpect for the Royal Authority may ſtill ſubſiſt, yet all Confidence is loſt. The Inclination to contribute for the State is cool'd. They have ſeen ſo many vain Promiſes to render, to pay, to diſcharge the Public that they reckon no more upon them. The Prince and his Miniſters have no more Credit; and ſometimes ſuch a Diſpoſition is joined with an important War, the Succeſs of which becomes very dubious on account of the Diſcouragement and Diffidence of the People, and the Knowledge the Enemy has of this miſerable State of Affairs.

XV. There is therefore nothing more ſalutary, even with reſpect to temporal Government, than due Care to eſtabliſh and maintain mutual Confidence between the Prince and his People, by an exact Fidelity on the Side of the Prince to his Engagement;

(*b*) Qui ambulat ſimpliciter. ambulat confidenter. Qui autem depravat vias ſuas, manifeſtus erit. *Prov.* x. 9.

(*i*) Qui ambulat ſimpliciter, ſalvus erit: qui perverſis graditur viis, concidet ſemel. *Prov.* xxviii. 18.

gagement; and his avoiding the rendering them for ever doubtful by the ſmalleſt failure. The remembrance of it laſts long, and it is beyond all compariſon much better, never to give any Cauſe of Diſtruſt, than to ſeek afterwards for Remedies.

XVI. Before a Prince promiſes, whether to his Subjects or to Strangers, he ought to know the Extent of the Engagement he comes under, the Difficulties it may be oppoſed by, and all the Means of fulfilling it. It is not time to examine into theſe Things when the Engagement is made, unleſs it be unjuſt: For in that Caſe it would be a new Fault to adhere to it, becauſe it was one to enter into it. But Injuſtice excepted, which annulls Promiſes, there is no other Diſpenſation from fulfilling one's Word. He ought to have foreſeen the Conſequences. He ought after that to be ſenſible to no other Motives but his Glory and Reputation. Every other Conſideration is unworthy of him. If he deceived himſelf by his Raſhneſs, he muſt bear the Inconveniencies of his Precipitancy, and not think of throwing them upon others to the Prejudice of his Sincerity. He will gain more than he loſes, if this firſt Experience ſerves to make him more prudent: And he ought to be perſuaded, that whatever Loſs he ſuſtains, it will do him leſs Prejudice than failing in his Word would have done; nay that it will be of real Service to him, by proving to the whole World, that no Intereſt is dearer to him than his Honour and Probity.

XVII. A Prince muſt not in ſuch a Situation liſten to Men born for lying, and fertile in Equivocations and Subtleties to elude the moſt ſerious Engagements; who value themſelves on their Ability becauſe they have no Con-

ſcience, and think they do a Prince Service while they really diſhonour him. He ought, on the contrary, torepel with Indignation ſuch baſe Perſons who think him like themſelves; ſhew them what a diſtance there is between a Prince worthy of commanding, and Counſels injurious to his Honour; and teach them that if Truth and Probity (*k*) were baniſhed from every other Breaſt on Earth, they ought to find a Retreat in the Heart of a King who is eſtabliſhed on the Throne by them, and who ought in his turn to prepare a Throne for them in his Heart.

XVIII. It is the King who is the Fountain of Nobleneſs in a State. It is he alone who gives it, and it is he who ought to re-eſtabliſh it if it begins to decline. How then can he ever determine to diſhonour himſelf by what is the blackeſt of all Reproaches, Falſhood and Lying, and which is yet more ſo, Perfidy? And here he draws upon himſelf an Ignominy which no Man, who has any Soul or Heart, would bring on himſelf, but would take it for a heinous Affront to be ſuſpected of it? Nobleneſs and Truth go Hand in Hand: And a Prince ought to be as far above all the Great in his Kingdom by his Sincerity as by his Crown. It belongs to him to promote a noble Emulation among his Subjects for Truth and Juſtice, as it likewiſe belongs to him to excite a noble Ardour for Glory: And he ought equally to baniſh the Meanneſs and Cowardice contrary to Honeſty and that which is oppoſite to true Courage.

(*k*) John *King of* France *being ſollicited to violate an Engagement, anſwered in Words worthy of immortal Memory:* "*If Truth was diſregarded by all the World beſides, it ought* "*to be found in the Hearts and Mouths of Princes.*

ARTICLE II.

A Prince ought to be a religious Obſerver of his Oath.

I. WITH a Prince, whoſe Mind is repleniſhed with theſe Maxims, there is no need of taking the Precaution to make him add his Oath to his Promiſe, to be aſſured of his Sincerity. He believes that God is intimately preſent to all his Thoughts, and is his Judge. That it is before him he thinks and ſpeaks; and is well perſuaded that one cannot render the Worſhip due to God, as to ſovereign Truth, without rightly diſpoſed Heart, which is thoroughly true and guileleſs.

II. But thoſe who have to do with him, do not ſee that rich fund of Probity that is in his Heart; and tho' they are perſuaded of it, yet they have reaſon for the ſake of futurity, on the Account of his Succeſſors, and becauſe of other Princes comprehended in the Alliance, to make his Word irrevocable by the Sanctity of an Oath.

III. With what Devotion then will a Prince ſo faithful to Men, and ſo exact in his Engagements to them, take God to witneſs his Sincerity? With what Veneration will he invoke the Name of the Almighty, and ſupplicate him to interpoſe in his Promiſes? With what holy Dread will he call upon him to be Guarantee againſt him if he fails in his Word? With what trembling will he ſubmit himſelf to the Anathema he knows he deſerves, if he does not execute his Promiſe? With what careful Attention, before this awful Tranſaction, will he enquire into all the Clauſes and Conditions of the Treaty, that

he may overlook none, when he ſhall be brought under the ſolemn Obligation to fulfil all? How far removed will he be from all Thoughts of ſecret Reſervations and unworthy Reſtrictions, to ſerve for an Outlet from his Oath? And how great a Diſhonour to Religion, and what a Provocation and Handle to its Enemies to ſpeak Evil of it, would he reckon it, if he ſhould entertain any Deſign of eluding, by oblique Methods, an Engagement contracted in the Sight of God, and as it were depoſited in his Hands?

IV. An Oath is the laſt reſort for terminating Diſputes, for aſſuring ourſelves of Men's real Thoughts and Intentions, for ſatisfying all the Doubts Inconſtancy and bad Faith may occaſion, for ſubmitting Kings to the ſupream Judge, and to keep human Majeſty to its Duty, in making it appear before the Divine, in reſpect of which it is nothing. It would be to perpetuate Diffidence and War, to take away all Methods of ever coming to Peace by the moſt ſerious Treaties, to leave a Part always open to Surpriſes, to render the Situation of Kingdoms fluctuating and unſtable, to abuſe what is moſt ſerious and awful in Religion, and to commit the moſt open Impiety by contemning all at once the Preſence, the Truth, the Juſtice, and the Power of God, ſo much as to think of violating in any Degree a Treaty ſealed by an Oath.

V. One muſt be, not only very hardy, but very blind and very corrupt, to dare to adviſe a Prince to render himſelf worthy of the eternal Wrath of God, and to draw Vengeance on his own Head, and on his whole Kingdom, by perverting his Oath into Perjury, and deſpiſing the irre-

irrevocable Threatnings annexed to the Prohibition of ſo great a Crime.

VI. And yet ſome there are who think it impoſſible to reign, unleſs one ſometimes prefers political Conſiderations to the ſtrict Obſervance of Treaties ſolemnly confirm'd by Oath; who make very light of all that a Prince promiſed to his Subjects in the auguſt Ceremony of his Conſecration or Coronation, tho' the Name of God and the holy Myſteries of Religion were interpoſed; who very little regard ſeveral Articles of a Treaty of Peace, of an Alliance, of a Capitulation, either with a particular City or a Province.

VI. Thoſe Men who deſpiſe the Preſence and Juſtice of God, becauſe their Senſes do not diſcover them, and becauſe his Forbearance is great, do they know that it is God above who makes Kings, and that they have no other Authority but what he hath entruſted them with? Do they imagine that it is a ſure Way to preſerve it, to fail in their Reſpect to Religion, and to rebel againſt him who ſet them on the Throne? Do they think the Eſtabliſhment of Kingdoms can be juſt if they cannot be maintained but by Injuſtice? Hath the Providence of God, in their Opinion, need of the Crimes of Kings to protect them? Or is it forced to conſent, or at the leaſt to excuſe them, becauſe legitimate Methods are not ſufficient? Would it be an Advantage or Happineſs to be a King, if one could not long be one without Perfidy and Perjury? Would it not be better to quit the Throne, than to maintain one's ſelf in it by the breach of Treaties and Oaths? Would a good Man obtain the Conqueſt of the World at ſuch a Price, and think himſelf compenſated

penſated for the Loſs of his Soul by ſuch an Acquiſition ?

VIII. Is it the Way to gain Kings the Reſpect of their People to teach them not to fear God ? When this Fear is effaced in their Subjects as well as in the Prince, what will become of Fidelity and Obedience, and upon what Support will the Throne be eſtabliſh'd ? Impiety ſaps the Foundations of it, and it is publickly to teach Impiety, to teach Perjury, with whatever Colours it may be varniſhed. A Prince hath more Intereſt than any other, in ſtopping the Career of that pernicious Doctrine, which hath paſſed from worldly Politicians to Men who call themſelves religious, and hath ſhaken the firmeſt Pillars of Society and Religion, in taking from Words their obligatory Force, and from Oaths their inviolable Sacredneſs.

ARTICLE III.

A Prince ought not only to be an Enemy to Diſſimulation, but Prudent and Secret.

I. BUT if the Prince always ſpeaks ſincerely, and without Artifice, if his Promiſes are almoſt Oaths, and if his Oaths are with regard to him irrevocable Engagements ; what becomes of the Maxim, that a Prince who knows not the Art of diſſembling knows not how to reign ? Diſſimulation being baniſhed, is not the Heart of a Prince naked to all Men capable of abuſing his Candor ? And how ſhall he be able to defend himſelf againſt the Artifices of thoſe who will employ themſelves to lay Snares for him, if he may not do it by the ſame Arts, and muſt only oppoſe

oppoſe his Simplicity to their deceitful Cunning? Such Maxims might be admitted if all Men were honeſt, and many did not hide bad Deſigns under falſe Appearances: But in a corrupt Age, it is abandoning Innocence to Perfidy, not to allow a ſure Guard, by ſurrounding it with all that the profoundeſt Diſſimulation can invent and execute.

II. To anſwer theſe Reaſonings we muſt explain what is meant by Diſſimulation. It is neither Prudence nor Secrecy. We ſhall ſee afterwards, that theſe Qualities are eſſential to Government. It is not a wiſe Conduct, which holds up to ſight ſomething that is true, to hide by it another Truth that ought to remain unknown: Without this Attention Prudence would go but a little way. It is not an open, eaſy, agreeable Countenance which covers ſerious and deep Deſigns. It is the Duty of a Prince to have an agreeable Aſpect and Manner to Perſons of all Sorts; but not to allow his Sentiments to be penetrated but where he thinks fit.

III. The Diſſimulation to which a Prince ought to be a perpetual Enemy, is the Appearance of what is really falſe and contrary to his Thoughts and Deſigns. It is an exterior Conduct to which his inward Sentiments give the Lie. It is Application to perſuade others of the contrary of what he intends to do. Such Diſſimulation is a Crime in all Men; and is yet more inexcuſable in a Prince, who being free and maſter is leſs expoſed than private Perſons to that ſhameful Meanneſs.

IV. If he is worthy of his Rank, he will never command his Ambaſſadors to uſe Words that he does not intend to fulfil: He will never promiſe

Pardon

Pardon to a State-Criminal on condition he owns his Crime, with a Deſign to make uſe of his Confeſſion againſt him: He will never employ Careſſes and artful Flatterers to beget Confidence in a Perſon, he is ſecretly reſolved to ruin: He will never make an Alliance with a Prince on purpoſe to lull him aſleep, and to take Advantage of his Security: He will never make double Treaties with Princes, with an Intention to ſacrifice the Weaker to the Stronger, and to force the one to give him more advantagious Terms, by abandoning the other. He will never take pains to ſow Seeds of Diviſion in States with whom he is in Peace; and he will never think of fortifying or aggrandizing himſelf by ſpreading ſecretly Diſcontent, and a Spirit of Revolt in neighbouring States. Such Perfidies will be abhorred by him, and he would rather chooſe to ceaſe to be King, nay to live, than to ſully his Glory by ſuch opprobrious Stains.

V. But his inviolable Attachment to good Faith, and to Truth, will not hinder him from being very prudent, and very much upon his Guard againſt Artifice: He will not employ Diſſimulation, but he will know how to detect and diſappoint it. He will have himſelf a noble and grand Manner of acting; but he will not imagine there is no other way. He will do nothing but what is juſt; but he will be upon the Watch againſt all that the moſt cunning artful Injuſtice can deviſe. He will obſerve and ſee all that paſſes; and without becoming like the Perfidious, will render their evil Counſels and Deſigns abortive.

VI. Prudence when it is perfect ſees through Artifice, and is not diſarmed by it. Its Light raiſes itſelf above all that Fraud contrives in Darkneſs, and diſcovers from afar the Cloud in which Diſ-

Diſſimulation hides itſelf, in ſuch a Manner, that for fear of being ſeen, it ſees nothing. A wiſe and faithful Prince finds Princes of the ſame Character. He finds at leaſt ſincere Friends in all Countries. He is advertiſed ſeaſonably of all Preparations againſt him; and as he is himſelf very diligent, nothing of Importance in foreign States and Courts paſſes of which he is not informed, and of which he does not profit. He has beſides, knowing and attentive Miniſters, who watch with him. He has Force always ready to oppoſe any ſudden Enterpriſes againſt him; while they exert themſelves to hurt by clandeſtine Methods, he contrives, in profound Secrecy, equally ſure, and lawful Means of fruſtrating their Deſigns.

VII. For ſuch is the Secrecy of his Deliberations, that they are put in Execution before the Public knows any thing of them. Thoſe whom he honours with his Confidence have been tried ſeverely again and again in this Point; they are all as impenetrable as their Maſter; they are as ſilent as he, and as cautious not to ſay any thing that may help to diſcover what they do not ſay; equally attentive to conceal important Reſolutions under a ſimple and natural Exterior.

VII. What need hath ſuch a Prince of Diſſimulation contrary to Truth? And in what is he leſs great, leſs valiant, leſs prudent, and leſs ſucceſsful, leſs reputed, for not knowing how to feign or deceive? 'Tis only what is criminal that requires Aſſiſtance from Crime. 'Tis only unjuſt Deſigns that cannot be executed but by Fraud, which covers their Deformity, but by covering it augments it.

IX. He muſt leave Diſſimulation to Princes like

to

to *Tiberius*, (*n*) for it was his favourite Vice. It well befitted his Conſcience, and he had reaſon to palliate with it a Heart in which all was criminal and deteſtable. It was ſuitable to a *Nero* (*o*) naturally diſpoſed to Perfidy, and who had made a ſerious Study of it, to conceal his Hatred under the ſpecious Shew of Friendſhip. It was becoming a (*p*) *Caius Caligula*, whoſe Intereſt it was to hide a Soul equally baſe and cruel under the Mask of an affected Mildneſs. It was neceſſary to (*q*) a *Domitian*, Enemy to his Father *Veſpaſian*, and his Brother *Titus*, to cover his deteſtable Ambition under the fair Outſide of a quiet Life. Leave to ſuch wretched Princes, who have not mounted the Throne but to diſhonour it by a thouſand Crimes, the Uſe of Diſſimulation, and the Glory of propoſing it as a Virtue to their Imitators. The more they love it, the more ſtrongly do they teach good Princes to deteſt it, and to prefer a ſimple unaffected Conduct, in which all is great and noble becauſe all is true.

(*n*) Nullam æque Tiberius, ut rebatur, ex virtutibus ſuis, quam diſſimulationem diligebat. *Tacit. L.* 4. *Annal. p.* 139.

(*o*) Adjecit (Nero) complexum & oſcula; factus natura, & conſuetudine exercitus, velare odium fallacibus blanditiis. *Tacit. L.* 24. *p.* 259.

(*p*) Caius Cæſar immanem animum ſubdola modeſtia tegens. *Tacit. L.* 4. *p.* 152.

(*q*) Simplicitatis & modeſtiæ imagine in altitudinem conditus (Domitianus) ſtudium literarum ſimulans, quo velaret animum. *Tacit. L.* 4. *Hiſt. p.* 423.

ARTICLE IV.

A Prince in his Conduct ought to be far remote from all Affectation: In it there oguht to appear an auguſt Simplicity.

I. NOTHING is more oppoſite to true Grandeur, than the Affectation of being great; as nothing is more oppoſite to Truth than the Falſhood that would imitate it.

II. But on the other Side, nothing is more difficult than to be without Affectation; becauſe nothing is ſo difficult as to be in reality great.

III. One muſt be ſo in all things, without thinking of appearing ſo. One muſt have inwardly the ſame Virtue that he ſhews in public. He muſt have a conſtant and an unintermitting Attention to all his Duties. He muſt, in one word, be always the ſame, and always be actuated on all Occaſions and in all Times by the ſame Principles and the ſame Views.

IV. The human Mind is not capable of maintaining this Equality if it hath not an extraordinary Force. It may riſe very high, and do great Things, but it fatigues itſelf and falls (*r*). It is animated when it is obſerved, and is negligent when there are no Witneſſes. It is virtuous by Sallies, and is diſguſted thro' Weakneſs. The ſame Perſon is at different Times a Hero, and a Child: On certain Occaſions, all is becoming a Prince, at other times Majeſty is quite loſt.

V.

(*r*) Malis boniſque artibus mixtus, nimiæ voluptates, cum vacaret: quoties expediret, magnæ virtutes. Palam laudares, ſecreta male audiebant. *Tacit, L. 1 Hiſt. p.* 310.

V. We are ſtruck by certain remarkable ſhewing features in the Conduct of ſuch alone, becauſe the Meanneſs of the reſt of his Behaviour ſerves to ſet them off, and make them more conſpicuous: But if all was great, many would then be deceived, unable to diſtinguiſh, and would leſs admire the whole becauſe the Parts deſerves ſuch high Admiration.

VI. It is (*s*) this Equality of Greatneſs and Merit which conſtitutes the auguſt Simplicity of which I wiſh a Prince may have a ſincere Eſteem. Nothing here is diſſonant; but on the other hand nothing contributes to give Relief to one Virtue by the Abſence of another. All the Parts are firmly united and mutually ſupport and aid one another. Truth renders all regular and perfect, as in a beautiful Face one Feature does not predominate or make itſelf peculiarly remarkable to the Prejudice of all the reſt.

VII. To know the value of that Simplicity, ſo rich at bottom, and ſo modeſt in appearance we muſt endeavour to attain to it; and one ſoon diſcovers that what appeared ſo eaſy and natural is the Fruit of a great Virtue, of which Art and Study cannot ſupply the Want.

VIII. Something (*t*) always eſcapes from Imitation which betrays and unmasks it. The Fear itſelf

(*s*) Sincera & per ſe ornata ſimplicitas. nihil obtendens moribus ſuis. *Senec. de tranquil. animi. C.* 15.

(*t*) Eſt ſollicitudinum non mediocris materia, ſi te anxie componas: qualis multorum vita eſt, ficta, & oſtentationi parata. Torquet enim aſſidua [illegible] obſervatio ſui: & deprehendi, aliter quam ſolet, meruit. [illegible] multa incidunt quæ invitos denudent, & ut bene [illegible] diligentia, non tamen jucunda vita, aut ſecura [illegible] viventium *Senec. ibid.*

itſelf of being diſcovered, and of failing, ſerves to diſcover it; and the more anxious it is to ſucceed, the more plainly it ſpeaks out that it is affected. The ſincere Love of Good is not ſo reſtleſs and yet does more. It is leſs in a Buſtle, but is more effective and real. It does make bold Sallies, but it does not fall. It ſeeks not after the marvellous, but it finds it.

IX When one takes a near View of a Prince's Conduct who is deeply impregnated with this Love, all is true and ſincere in it. All comes from the ſame Source. All tends to the ſame Scope. The ſecret and publick Actions have the ſame Motives. The Duties the World leaſt attends to, and thoſe it moſt admires, are performed with the ſame Exactneſs. (*v*) There is nothing in ſuch a Life which is not worthy of being ſeen. (*x*) Such a Perſon is not obliged to diſſemble or excuſe any thing. His Palace is open. The moſt diffident Eyes may follow him every where. Malice and Envy are conſtrain'd to admire an Innocence, that requires no Witneſſes and yet is not afraid of them: And Pride is forced to acknowledge that (*y*) ſuch a Simplicity is infinitely ſuperior to all Efforts to appear great. See here the Fruit of the Love of Truth: The whole World applauds and reveres ſuch a Character, tho' he neither deſires Applauſe nor Reſpect; whereas Affectation cannot long preſerve Eſteem tho' it labour to acquire it.

(*v*) Tibi nihil accomodatius fuerit, quam penitus inſpici. *Paneg Traj. p.* 229.

(*x*) Non alia major gloria tua, quam quod nihil velandum eſt, nihil omittendum eſt. *Ibid. p,* 229.

(*y*) Multum intereſt ſi ſimpliciter vivas, an negligentur. *Senec. Loc. citat.*

CHAPTER XXI.

A Prince ought to neglect none of thoſe Qualities which gain him the Love and Reſpect of his Subjects. He ought to be inſtructed in all the Arts of agreeable Behaviour, that he may employ them to Advantage: He ought to be acceſſible, affable, and humane with Dignity: To be equal and tranquil, or always to appear ſuch.

ARTICLE I.

A Prince ought not to deſpiſe any of thoſe external good Qualities, by which he may attract Love and Reſpect from his Subjects.

I. THERE are Princes endow'd with excellent Qualities who cannot however make themſelves beloved. Their good Qualities are loſt for want of being known; and they render a very happy Stock quite uſeleſs, covering it with an exterior, which is by no means attractive or inciting. There are others on the contrary, who with a very ſuperficial Degree of Merit, captivate every one who ſees them, and diffuſe over all they ſay or do ſuch Charms, that none enquire whether the Goodneſs of their Heart be correſpondent to their engaging Manner.

II. Theſe two Advantages ought to meet together in a Prince, an excellent Stock of good Qualities, and the outward Grace of which every one feels the agreeable Influence, but which few

few can attain to. He ought not to leave his good Intentions dubious and uncertain, nor expect that they ſhould gueſs his Thoughts without diſcovering himſelf or making the firſt Steps. A great and noble Heart will not leave any one in anxious Uncertainty about its Sentiments, but explains itſelf, leſt it ſhould be miſunderſtood.

III. The Language of obliging Manners is underſtood by every one, but that of Merit is not ſo univerſal: One muſt have Merit to diſcern it: But to have Senſibility, it is only neceſſary to be Man, and it is that which judges of outward Manners.

IV. A Prince cannot extend his Benefits to all: He would ſoon exhauſt himſelf, were he always giving. But his noble endearing Manner is a perpetual and univerſal Benefaction, the Source of which never diminiſhes, and from which none are excluded.

V. Sometimes a Prince is never ſeen but once during his whole Life, in certain Towns and Provinces; and that very tranſiently: And therefore he ought at firſt Sight to ſtrike with a high Idea of his Mind, and a ſtrong lively Impreſſion of his Goodneſs: One will always remember it tho' he ſhould never have ſeen him but once. The Idea retain'd will be conformable to the Impreſſion made by his Appearance; and therefore if it be not advantageous, it muſt for ever obſcure the moſt eminent Qualifications which are not known.

ARTICLE II.

He ought to underſtand perfectly the Rules and Arts of Civility and agreeable Behaviour, that he may be able to make a proper Uſe of them.

I. IT is delaying too long to make one's ſelf eſteem'd, and to gain the Affections of others, to leave a Place without having done it. An accompliſhed Prince ought to reign over the Hearts of all, ſo ſoon as he preſents himſelf to their Sight. He muſt be inferior to none in Politeneſs of Behaviour, in Goodneſs, in Addreſs to charm, in Authority to captivate.

II. He ought to have, by a happy natural Turn of Mind, perfected by Reflexion, a (z) Fecundity, a Variety of Charms and Graces for Men of all Sorts, Conditions, and Characters. He ought to underſtand how to employ them, how to blend and mix them, how to diverſify them, that every one may meet with ſomething ſuited to him. He ought to have ſo ſucceſsfully ſtudied Mankind in general, and the various particular Caſts of Men's Minds, that all may be agreeably touched by him, and not one may be able to remain indifferent to him.

III. (a) A high Mein worthy of Empire is ſometimes ſufficient to ingender Reſpect and Eſteem in Spectators, and to gain them: But ſuch an Impreſſion is not the Effect of an effeminate Perſon

(z) Apud ſubjectos, apud proximos, apud collegas variis illecebris potents. *Tacit. L.* 8 *Hiſt. p.* 310.

(a) Aderant juveni, (*ſpeaking of* Nero, *Son of* Germanicus) modeſtia ac forma, principe viro digna. *Tacit. L.* 4. *Annal. p.* 112.

ſon, which the Prince ſeems to be much taken with, and fond to have admired by others. Such Meanneſs ſhocks all who have true Elevation and Courage, and only ſerves to perſuade them that the Prince is a very inſignificant little Thing, ſince he puts ſuch a value on his Figure, and deſires to be eſteemed on ſo frivolous an Account.

IV. (*b*) A Prince's Countenance ought to be the Image of his Mind, and declare what he is. It ought to be the Picture of his great Heart, of his Goodneſs, his Mildneſs, his noble Soul. Thoſe great Qualities, which are united in his Mind, tho' they appear oppoſite one to another, and by their Union mutually illuſtrate and ſet off one another to great Advantage, dwell in his Looks and in his Eyes (*c*), and by their happy Commixtion ſpread a Majeſty and a Sweetneſs over his Face which reciprocally ſtrengthen one another.

V. (*d*) One at firſt ſight inwardly pronounces him a great Man; and with equal Aſſurance deems him full of Goodneſs. The Fortitude and Sincerity which ſhine in his outward Manner warrant the Truth of the other Sentiments of which his Countenance bears the Traces; and one is aſſured of his Clemency by the very Splendor of his Majeſty, which far removes all Suſpicion of Affectation or Artifice.

VI. When this firſt Advantage is joined with the Skill of making a right Uſe of it, and a great

(*b*) Titi ingenium quantæcunque fortunæ capax, decor oris cum quadam majeſtate. *Tacit. L.* 4. *Hiſt. p.* 337.

(*c*) Forma egregia, & cui non minus autoritatis ineſſet quam gratiæ. *Suet.*

(*d*) Nihil metus in vultu, gratia oris ſupererat: bonum virum facile crederes, magnum libenter. *Tacit. vit. Agricol. p.* 466.

Soul, already repreſented by the Features of the Countenance, can perfect its own Picture by ſuch a Management of the Eyes, and the Voice, and ſuch a manner of ſpeaking as are quite correſpondent to a Heart full of Candour, it is indeed incredible how viſible it then renders itſelf, and how it opens the Hearts of others by ſhewing its own Nobleneſs.

VII. Very few know what an obliging Word, a gracious Look, a benign Air can do; and few likewiſe underſtand the Effects of certain ſlight Marks of Abſence, Indifference and Dryneſs. But a well-accompliſhed Prince comprehends the Uſe of all theſe, and never miſtakes in the Application of them.

VIII. He gives the People Marks of his general Benevolence and Affection towards them (*e*), by a lovely Air of equal Goodneſs to all, which by a ſort of mute Eloquence charms and gains all.

IX. But beſide this common Language the Prince hath a particular one, which he well knows how to accomodate to Birth, to Employments, Services, and Merit. He does not caſt obliging Looks promiſcuouſly to all alike. He does not laviſh what ſhould be a diſtinguiſhing Recompence; nor debaſe what ought to be a Mark of Diſtinction.

X. He reſerves for certain Perſons and Occaſions peculiar good Graces which they muſt have merited; but which he with Delight confers on all who deſerve them; and he diſtributes them with ſuch Prudence that to uſe the Scripture Expreſſion, (*f*) *the Light of his Countenance*, never

(*e*) Vultu qui maxime populos demeretur, amabilis. *Senec. L.* 1. *de Clem.* c. 13.

(*f*) Si quando ridebam ad eos, non credebant; & lux vultus mei non cadebat in terram. *Job.* xxix. 24.

never falls upon the Unworthy, and is never received with Indifference.

ARTICLE III.

A Prince ought to be acceſſible, affable, and humane with Dignity.

I. A Prince would be poſſeſſed of theſe Qualities to very little Purpoſe, which are all for the Public, if he was not of eaſy Acceſs, and did not take pleaſure in communicating himſelf: But (*g*) I know the Sentiments and Humours of People are very different: Some prefer Reſerve in a Prince (*b*) as requiſite to maintain his Authority; whereas others are more touched by an open Manner which beſpeakes Frankneſs and Goodneſs; and reſpect the Majeſty of a Prince in proportion as it has leſs the Air of Haughtineſs. He muſt therefore ſtudy theſe different Inclinations, and the Uſages that have been introduced by them: For the firſt Rule in theſe Matters is to obſerve Decorum, and not to offend the general Taſte of the Nation by judging of it according to that of another People.

II. But independently of what Cuſtom hath been able to eſtabliſh to render a Prince more auguſt; it is certain there are Times and Places in which it is allowed to accoſt him; and he ought to be well pleaſed that it is done with Freedom.

III. It is of great Importance to a Prince not to entertain the Error and Prejudice of the Peo-

(*g*) Prompti aditus, obvia comitas, ignotæ Parthis virtutes. *Tacit L. 2. Annal.*

(*b*) Majeſtate ſalva, cui major ex longinquo reverentia. *Tacit. in vit. Agricol.*

ple even when he accomodates himſelf to it, and not to think as they do about the Way of preſerving the Reſpect due to Sovereignty. There are things which have no other Foundation but Fancy and Cuſtom, and there are other things founded upon Truth and Nature. The former laſts no longer than the Prejudices which gave Riſe to them. The latter have an irradicable Root in the Hearts and Minds of Men.

IV. The Precautions which Princes take to maintain their Dignity and Authority, by ſhewing themſelves very rarely, and by communicating themſelves to a very few, are Methods quite foreign to Grandeur, which have nothing of Truth and Nature in them, and only ſubſiſt by Cuſtom founded on Error. But the Perfections of a Prince born for the public Good, worthy of being ſeen by all his Subject, capable of inſpiring equally into all of them Veneration and Love, affable, acceſſable, thoſe are Qualities which by the Law of Nature all Men have a right to be benefited by, and which cannot be ſhut up in a Palace without doing an Injury to the Prince adorned with them, and to the People who ought to enjoy the Advantages of them.

V. I conſent then that at firſt a Prince ſhould make ſome Compliance with the Prejudices of a Nation more affected by a majeſtic Gravity, and a ſtudied Reſervedneſs, than with the Goodneſs which likes to ſhew itſelf. But I deſire that a Prince may inſenſibly deliver himſelf from this Bondage

(*i*) Tanta comitate, adeuntium deſideria excipiens, ut quemdam joco corripuerit quod ſic ſibi libellum porrigere dubitaret, quaſi Elephanto ſtipem. *Sueton. in vit. Auguſt. C.* 53.

Bondage, and may (*k*) ſet his great Qualities at Liberty, which are as it were kept in Fetters by a vain Shadow of Majeſty, diametrically repugnant to true Majeſty, of which it ſtifles the Luſtre.

VI. Otherwiſe he will accuſtom himſelf to Privacy, and loſe, in an obſcure Retreat, not only his noble Air, and his ſuitable Manner ſo befitting him, but likewiſe his real Perfections of Goodneſs and Mildneſs, which Exerciſe augments, and Retirement effaces.

VII. By ſhunning the Light one becomes wild and ſavage: One ceaſes to be humane by ceaſing to have Correſpondence with Men: A Prince cannot know his People (*l*) who is no otherwiſe known to them than by his Portraits. Majeſty degenerates into Fierceneſs when it is merely occupied about not debaſing itſelf, he almoſt overlooks all the Duties of Royalty, by remembering too much he is a King.

VIII. (*m*) We need only compare an amiable accompliſhed Prince of eaſy Acceſs, and who by his Clemency and other good Qualities captivates all who approach him: One, I ſay, needs only compare with ſuch a one, a Prince whoſe Steps are all meaſured, whoſe Words are all ſhort Sentences, whoſe Countenance is always ſevere, whoſe Sentiments

(*k*) Felix abunde ſibi viſus, ſi fortunam ſuam publicaverit; ſermone affabilis, acceſſuque facilis, vultu qui maxime populos demeretur, amabilis, æquis deſideriis propenſus, *Senec. L.* 1. *de Clem.* 13.

(*l*) Quid indignius eo imperatore, quem propter ſolos pictores cognitum habent imperii propugnatores. *Syneſ. de Reg. p.* 13.

(*m*) Juveni (*ſpeking of the celebrated* Germanicus) civile ingenium, mira comitas, & diverſa a Tiberii ſermone ac vultu, arrogantibus & obſcuris, *Tacit. L.* 1. *Annal. p.* 21.

ments are always Riddles, and who ſeldom appears, and that in a Manner more to inſpire Fear than Love. Does ſuch a Compariſon leave any room to doubt about the preferable Merit of theſe two Characters? Is there any one who can chooſe but love the Qualities of the firſt more than thoſe of the latter? Or does not one feel that by laying aſide the Appearance of Grandeur a Prince makes himſelf infinitely greater than he whoſe Thoughts are ſolely employed about upholding and preſerving it?

IX. Nothing ſhews more plainly the real Littleneſs of a Prince, than to affect always to appear grand, and not to dare to deſcend for a few Moments from the Throne. He is far beneath true Grandeur, becauſe he is ſo full of it, and ſo wholly poſſeſs'd by it: If he deſerved it, he would think much leſs about it. And if it was truly perſonal he would not be afraid of loſing it by rendering himſelf eaſily acceſſible.

X. Such a Prince knows but one ſort of Grandeur, and renounces ſeveral other true Kinds of it, becauſe his narrow Mind is confin'd to one Idea of it. He knows not what Dignity there is in the Perfections he looks upon as repugnant to Majeſty. He underſtands not how to ſhew himſelf to Men but on one Side, and he leaves all the reſt in a State of Indifference about him, but thoſe whom that Side alone affects. He does not reflect that ſome admire Spirit, ſome Courage, ſome Clemency, ſome Politeneſs, others Beneficence; that the Number of thoſe whom Majeſty only dazzles is but ſmall: That all deſire it to be univerſally good, and that it does not attract the Admiration of all, but when it is accompanied with Qualities agreeable to all.

XI. If

XI. If *Germanicus*, whoſe Memory was ſo dear to the *Romans*, and of whom Hiſtory hath tranſmitted to us ſo noble a Character, had had but one ſort of Grandeur in his View, he had not been ſo univerſally regarded as the greateſt Man in the Empire. If he had only ſhewn Valour and Courage in War; if he had only aimed at making himſelf feared by his Enemies, and at making the *Roman* Allies feel the Weight of his Authority, he had been very little in ſeveral reſpects, and great in one alone; and ſome of his Actions would have been admired without reckoning him worthy of Admiration: But becauſe together with noble Birth and high Authority, he was poſſeſſed of an Humanity and Politeneſs which gained every Heart; (*n*) Becauſe he treated his Allies as his Friends, and made War in a noble and generous Manner, without the leaſt meaſure of Hatred or Cruelty; Becauſe all his Words and the whole tenour of his Manners equally breathed Gaandeur and Goodneſs of Mind, all the Nations of the World admired his Moderation without envying his Power; and all ſincerely mourned his Death, becauſe all had felt his Greatneſs, every one in regard to his own particular Intereſt.

XII. There always accompanies a ſovereign Power a ſecret Propenſion towards Pride. It is ſuſpected of it, and not without reaſon, when it is ſeen to be always occupied about that which elevates it above the reſt of Mankind: And Pride being real Lowneſs of Mind, a Proof of a little vulgar Soul, whatever hath any ſhew of Pride, brings

(*n*) Indoluere exteræ nationes Regeſque: tanta illi comitas in ſocios, manſuetudo in hoſtes. Viſuque & auditu juxta venerabilis, cum magnitudinem & gravitatem ſummæ fortunæ retineret, invidiam & arrogantium effugeret. *Tacit. L.* 2. *Annal. p.* 69.

brings the Grandeur of a Prince into doubt. On the other hand, whatever proves the Prince to be free from Pride conduces to his real Greatneſs: (*o*) And ſuch a Prince can add nothing to his Grandeur, but by deſcending from it and laying it aſide, and thus evincing himſelf to be truly worthy of it, by having his Mind ſo little ſet upon it.

XIII. When a Prince thus condeſcends to his People by his Goodneſs, they immediately replace him on his Throne by their Gratitude. He then appears to them more great and auguſt; and they render to him from the bottom of their Hearts, by Sentiments of Love and Reſpect, much more than he quits by humbling himſelf towards them.

XIV. Thus inſtead of fearing that Majeſty cannot unite itſelf with an eaſy, acceſſible gracious Manner, it is only by that means that Majeſty can attain to its full Aim, and it will always fall far ſhort of it while it is ſuſpicious and afraid of diminiſhing itſelf.

XV. A Prince who knows what he retains when he diveſts himſelf for ſome Moments of the external Magnificence which ſurrounds him, is not afraid of falling into Contempt. He is very ſure of preſerving his Grandeur by taking other Means to augment it; and he mixes ſo much Nobleneſs and Dignity with what ſeems to hide his Majeſty, that it only ſerves to render it more amiable without being able to cover it.

XVI. It

(*o*) Quod factum tuum (*He ſpeaks of* Trajan, *who in a full Senate gave Marks of Bounty and Friendſhip to the Men deſtin'd for public Dignities*) a cuncto Senatu quam vera acclamatione celebratum eſt: tanto major, tanto auguſtior: nam cui nihil ad augendum faſtigium ſupereſt, hic uno modo creſcere poteſt, ſi ſe ipſe ſubmittat, ſecurus magnitudinis ſuæ. *Paneg. Traj. p.* 250.

XVI. It is chiefly this Dignity and Greatneſs of which I am now ſpeaking, that conſtitute the Value of a Prince's Manners, and his popular Qualities. The whole conſiſts in knowing how far he may deſcend, and when to ſtop: How much Benignity ought to be intermingled with his Grandeur; how he ought to proportionate his Words and Actions to the Sentiments and Impreſſions he would have them produce; and how to make himſelf beloved by his People, by encreaſing their reſpect for him.

XVII. This is indeed one of the moſt eſſential Qualifications of a Prince, and the moſt difficult to be acquired, if he has not a very juſt Judgment, and a very well informed Taſte of Manners. But when, together with a happy Temper of Mind, he has a great and elevated Soul, Politeneſs improved by Reflection, Inſight into the human Heart, ſo as to know what touches and moves it; a Senſibility which can learn from his own Experience, and Attention to profit by that of others, and to diſcern whatever is truly great and noble in others: (*p*) When he has all theſe excellent Talents and Endowments, and is diſpoſed to add to them the good Counſel of Perſons skill'd in thoſe Matters, he cannot fail to hit of the prudent Mean between the deſire of pleaſing and the fear of going too far.

XVIII. If the Prince had nothing in view in all this, but to gain the Eſteem and Affections of Men, all the Recompence he could receive for his Labour could not be worth while, and all his Endeavours

(*p*) Comitate & alloquiis officia provocans, incorrupto ducis honore. *Tacitus* (*ſpeaking of* Titus *commanding the* Roman *Army before* Jeruſalem.) *L.* 5. *Hiſt. p.* 424.

deavours would but terminate in Pride, more delicate indeed and better diſguiſed than that of moſt Princes, but as unjuſt and for that reaſon as ſhameful.

XIX. He ought to have no other end in attaching Men to him, but to unite them by a common Intereſt, to render the Bonds which hold Society together, more cloſe and firm; to eſtabliſh Peace in the Kingdom on the ſureſt Foundation; to prevent contentious and popular Men from employing againſt his Intereſt, Qualities he himſelf too much neglects; and to fulfil one of his principal Duties, which lies in rendering himſelf amiable in order to be uſeful, and in meriting his People's Confidence that he may promote their Intereſts.

ARTICLE IV.

A Prince ought to be equal and ſincere, or to appear ſuch.

I. (*q*) HE is acceſſible, affable, humane with no other View. He inſinuates himſelf univerſally into the Hearts of Mankind by an open Countenance, a ſerene Look, that the moſt timerous may not only approach him with Freedom, but even lay open their Deſires to him with Aſſurance. He purpoſely removes all the Clouds which might obſcure his Goodneſs, and his generous Diſpoſition to be beneficent. (*r*) He baniſhes far

(*q*) Nullæ obices, nulli contumeliarum gradus.—Ipſe autem ut excipis omnes, ut expectas? ut magnam partem dierum inter tot imperii curas, quaſi per otium tranſigis. *Paneg. Traj.* *p.* 137.

(*r*) Verecundus ſine ignavia, ſine triſtitia gravis. *Capitol.* *p.* 141.

far from him all the Marks of Cruelty and Diſguſt which the Laws of Royalty might have impreſſed on his Countenance. He exerts himſelf to hide his ſecret Uneaſineſs, and all the inward Vexations from which the Lives of Princes are by no means exempt, that he may give himſelf up entirely to fill thoſe with Joy and Conſolation who apply to him.

II. He ſuffers nothing to appear but the Prince; all that belongs to the private Man is hid. He knows that the ſmalleſt Traces of an afflicted, diſturb'd, abſent Mind, would ſtifle all the Sentiments his Preſence ought to inſpire. He underſtands with what Awe the Power ſtrikes upon him who abſolutely depends, and he moderates the Awfulneſs of it, (*s*) by the Air of Sincerity and Mildneſs which reigns in his Looks. The more one is depreſſed and aggrieved, the more he endeavouts to keep out of ſight all his other Qualities but Compaſſion and Goodneſs; (*t*) and the better to ſucceed in hiding his Majeſty from others, he begins at hiding it from himſelf, by letting nothing appear but his Attention to the Intereſts of others, and his Diſpoſition to relieve them from all their Grievances.

III. But to preſerve ſuch a ſteady and undiſturb'd tranquility of Mind, at leaſt in outward Appearance, a Prince muſt be Maſter of all the Thoughts which are capable of breaking in upon it; and he muſt not truſt much to the Violence he may do to himſelf to hinder his inward Diſquiet from

(*s*) Fronte ſemper pari, & lætus ad omnia. *Lamprid. in his Life of* Alexander Sever. *p.* 214.

(*t*) Cum ſederem, quaſi Rex circumſtante exercitu, eram tamen mærentium conſolator. *Job* xxix. 25.

from bewraying itſelf by outward Marks, if his Mind is really troubled. It is fit he ſhould be ſenſible to reaſonable Grief, that he feel he is Man, and learn by Experience to have a fellow-feeling with the afflicted, but he ought to have Patience and Submiſſion to the Will of Heaven, able to ſurmount all Difficulties: For the moſt perfect and moſt humble Reſignation becomes Princes who are expoſed to the Eyes of all, and in whom no Weakneſs is excuſed.

IV. Beſides, it is prudent that his inward Uneaſineſs ſhould remain unknown, and that his People ſhould not perceive what they ought not to ſee. Conjectures are form'd, and Conſequences are drawn from the ſmalleſt Tokens of inward Vexation, and Diſguſt, that make it highly proper that none ſhould appear. He ought to inure himſelf to a real Equality of Mind, or to ſuch an Appearance as is indeed his faithful Image; combate with Succeſs before he appears in public whatever might leave on his Countenance any Shew of Trouble or Deſpondency; diſcharge his Heart into the Boſom of ſome faithful Perſons, that he may more eaſily hide from others what paſſes; he ought to have it deeply imprinted on his Mind, that a Prince is a politic Perſon, and that it is not permitted him to ſink under Affliction, to the Prejudice of his important Duties.

V. He arrives to this Tranquility by his indefatigable Care to ſuppreſs all Wrath and all Impatience on Occaſions which are apt to excite them, whether in private or public. A Prince ought to be humane, indulgent, patient with regard to thoſe who ſerve him; ready to excuſe their Overſights or even Negligences, when they reach no farther than himſelf: He ought to conſider a Haſtineſs which diſcon-

diſconcerts and diſturbs him as a ſhameful Weakneſs, and much more ought he to look upon another that goes to a greater Extremity to be ſuch: (*v*) He ought to think it a Diſhonour to him if he has at any time, not been able to maſter his Paſſion, and to puniſh himſelf for it, by reproaching himſelf with it, and by becoming more moderate through Repentance: He ought to take ſpecial Care that no harſh or injurious Words ever eſcape him, and he ſhould be ſo far from being in the habit of uſing them, that they may never ſo much as preſent themſelves to him in the firſt Moment of his Wrath: He ought to accuſtom all about him, to obey with a very mild and moderate Tone of Voice; to reprove with few Words, and to go no farther when he has expreſſed his Diſpleaſure; and for fear of exceeding due Bounds, he ought obſtinately to contradict every Emotion or Deſire of Paſſion, always, exceſſive becauſe it never thinks of making Reflection, or taking Advice, but merely of ſatisfying itſelf.

(*v*) Quanto incautius efferbuerat, pœnitentia patiens. *Tacit. L.* 1. *Annal. p.* 37.

CHAPTER XXII.

It is a great Advantage to a Prince to have been well inſtructed. To what Sciences he ought to give the Preference; and what Uſe he ought to make of them. It is of great Importance to him to be able to ſpeak with a noble and pure Eloquence. And it is neceſſary that he have a juſt and accurate Taſte of every thing.

ARTICLE I.

It is a great Advantage to a Prince to have been well inſtructed.

I. ONE may be a great Prince, and know how to reign without having been inſtructed in the Sciences; becauſe one may have very much Wiſdom, Juſtice and Goodneſs, without being profoundly ſkill'd in Languages, in Mathematics, in Philoſophy, or in Hiſtory; and (*x*) a rightly diſpoſed Heart often diſcovers more things that are uſeful to the Public, and executes more ſuch things, than any Perſons, attentive to inſtruct him by Speculations he hath already prevented, can ſhew him.

II. On the other hand, one may have had very able Maſters for Sciences of all Sorts, and have made

(*x*) Anima viri ſancti enunciat aliquando magis vera quam ſeptem circumſpectores, excelſo ſedentes ad ſpeculandum. *Eccl.* xxxvii. 14.

made a very great Progreſs in them, and yet be a very bad Prince; becauſe he is incapable of making a good Uſe of his Knowledge, and is entirely led by his Paſſions.

III. But it is certain, that generally the natural good Qualities of a Prince ſtand in need of being cultivated by the Sciences, (*y*) that they may become wiſer as they are more inſtructed in them; and his good Diſpoſition is able to carry him farther the more Knowledge he has, and the more extenſive his Views are.

IV. For we are not ſpeaking of loading a a Prince with uſeleſs Studies, and of depreſſing a Mind born to rule and govern a great State with the Weight of many obſcure Sciences, from which neither he nor the Public can reap Advantage.

V. The only Thing aimed at ſhould be to form him for the Throne, and to give him the Inſtruction becoming a King, and therefore whatever would miſemploy his precious Hours, and plague him in barren Speculations, ought to have no place in his Education.

VI. He ought to paſs very ſlightly over whatever a King is not oblig'd to go to the bottom of; and no Curioſity ſhould be inſpired into him for what only terminates in ſatisfying Curioſity, and an Itch of knowing every-thing.

VII. There is a kind of Knowledge which is real Merit in private Perſons, and in which it is very allowable to thoſe who have no higher Care, to excel, but which a Prince ought only to have taken a very ſuperficial View of; becauſe he is too

(*y*) Audiens ſapiens ſapientior erit, & intelligens gubernacula poſſidebit, *Prov.* i. 5.
Da ſapienti occaſionem, & addetur ei ſapientia. *Prov.* ix. 9.

great to ſtoop to a more minute and accurate Study of them; and it would be degrading himſelf to affect to appear profoundly ſkill'd in them.

VIII. It is for him a maſterly Knowledge to be able to diſcern the Vanity of many Sciences with reſpect to him; and to attach himſelf punctually to what he ought principally to mind, and to content himſelf with ſuch a ſuperficial Tincture of other Studies as is ſufficient to ſhew him that he ought to go no farther in them.

ARTICLE II.

To what Sciences a Prince ought to give the Preference, and what Uſe he ought to make of them.

I. A Good Guide is therefore very neceſſary: For it is from ſuch a one alone that a Prince can firſt learn what he ought to penetrate by his Application; what he ought ſeriouſly to ſtudy to a certain Degree and no farther; what he ought to run over, and what he ought to paſs by.

II. Such a Perſon will prevent a Prince from giving himſelf up to the Counſels of many others who have leſs Diſcernment, and would be apt to magnify the Value of the Things they had made themſelves Maſters of: For it is common to put a very high Price on the Science in which one excels, and to repreſent it as of great Importance, becauſe they have made it the Object of their Paſſion.

III. He will exert himſelf to inſtruct a Prince in the real Uſe of every thing; to ſhew him its true Value; to form in him at once a good Taſte, and a certain Elevation of Mind, which will hinder his ſinking into a Lowneſs the Learned ſeldom eſcape, becauſe they are too full of themſelves and

and their Learning; and tho' he will not ſtand him in Stead of all other Maſters, he will overſee all others, and regulate the Inſtructions of each by greater and ſublimer Views.

IV. He will always keep in his View the Scope at which he ought to aim, and will regard, as going from it, whatever will not contribute to render a Prince more knowing in his Duties, better inſtructed in Dangers, firmer in adhering to Good, and more averſe to every thing that tends to weaken him.

V. He will take Pains to form his Judgment, by giving him ſure Rules for diſtinguiſhing a juſt and ſolid Argument from what hath only the Semblance of ſuch: He will teach him to ſeparate in a Diſcourſe all that may dazzle him, from what really belongs to the Queſtion to be examin'd. He will accuſtom himſelf not to be put off with confuſed Terms, which having no Meaning cannot enlighten the Mind. He will lead him from more ſimple to more compounded and difficult Truths. He will make him attentive to Principles of extenſive Uſefulneſs, and ſhew him how eaſy it is, by a proper Application of them, to draw from them very important Conſequences.

VI. He will make him feel how different the probable is from the true, and what a fatal Error it is to confound them. He will often repeat it to him, that there is no true Will where there is no Judgment, and there is no Judgment where there is no Solidity, no Accuracy, and that the Thoughts which ſparkle moſt at firſt Sight, but which vaniſh when they are ſearched and proved, deſerve Contempt; he will exerciſe him in judging about Matters in which the Illuſion is not eaſily diſcovered, and which are ſo much the more dangerous upon that

Account, that he may form in him an attentive Habit, Proof againſt being ſurprized, and a Penetration which abſolutely prevents his ever being impoſed upon.

VII. The Mathematics, in which Science the Method is to demonſtrate every Step, and to make Uſe of one demonſtrated Truth to lead to another, are very proper to form the Judgment to Accuracy and Juſtneſs; and a Prince may apply himſelf to them, above all to Geometry, with great Advantage. He will by that Study become capable of attending to and purſuing a long Train of Conſequences; and the being accuſtom'd to Demonſtrations ſomewhat compounded, will render his Underſtanding acuter and firmer, and thus prepare it for the Examination of Affairs embaraſſed by many Circumſtances and different Intereſts.

VIII. But Care muſt be taken that the Prince's Taſte for this ſort of Science do not lead him too far. As it is of an immenſe Extent, and one may plunge himſelf into it beyond all bounds, it will take up too much of his time, exhauſt the whole vigor of his Intellect, inſtead of ſtrengthening and animating it, and by conſuming him in uſeleſs Speculations, render him particular, abſent and incapable of Buſineſs.

IX. We may ſay the ſame of that kind of Knowledge commonly called Metaphyſics, which hath for its Object whatever is of a more ſpiritual Nature, and more remote and independent of Senſe: For it may be of great Uſe to a Prince if he applies himſelf to it within certain Bounds, but is dangerous, if he gives himſelf abſolutely to it. It is very becoming a Prince to have conſidered what the Spirit or Soul of Man is; wherein it differs from material Subſtance; and what Relation it bears

bears to God, who is its Light and chief Good: How he underſtands ſpiritual Objects; how he feels the Impreſſions of thoſe external ones with which he is governed: How it is united with its Body, and according to what Laws; the Nature of its Powers, the Underſtanding and Will; what is the true Cauſe of the Sentiments and Motions it experiences within it.

X. But after ſome Reſearches, the Prince ought to call to mind that he has other Cares, and to leave it to Perſons whoſe Time is not ſo precious as his, to ſound theſe Sciences to the bottom, the Depth of which aſtoniſhes the wiſer Part of Mankind, and in which raſh and weak Minds may loſe themſelves by their Curioſity.

XI. The Study of Nature expoſes to fewer Dangers, and it may contribute to augment in the Mind of a Prince Admiration of God's excellent Works, in unfolding to him Myſteries which lie hid in Darkneſs to the Ignorant, and making him feel at the ſame time how incapable the moſt penetrating Underſtandings are, by all their Reſearches, of coming at the Knowledge of the ſecret Springs of Motions they are daily Witneſſes to.

XII. This Science, which is made up of Experiments and Conjectures, has made greater Progreſs within theſe few Years, than it had done in many Ages. A Prince ought to be acquainted with it: And indeed it would be in ſome meaſure a Shame to him to be ignorant of it: But he will not apply himſelf to it neither as a Philoſopher nor an Aſtronomer, nor as a Phyſician. He will take a little of all the different Entertainments it preſents to him, and leave all the reſt. He is deſtined to reign, and not to make Experiments. He will be told what is moſt beautiful and

uſeful in its Diſcoveries ; but he will make none.

XIII. But with regard to the Science of Morals he will act a different Part: (z) It is the Science of Kings, becauſe it is the Knowledge of Mankind and their Duties. A Prince will therefore make a ſerious Study of it, and enter profoundly into it. He will conſider it as the Foundation of Prudence and wiſe Policy. He will endeavour to make every Day new Progreſs in it, and be perſuaded that in this Science one is always to learn. He will ſearch into it by himſelf; he will conſult it, and hearken to it: He will always have his Eyes open to profit by what Experience may teach him. And as the Study of Morals is inſeparable from that of Religion, he will ſearch into the Holy Scriptures and ancient Monuments, and take Aſſiſtance from the Converſation of the more Wiſe and Virtuous, in order to diſcover whatſoever it has pleaſed God to reveal to us of his Deſigns towards Mankind, the Rules he ought to follow in his Conduct, and the proper Means for attaining the Good he ought to ſet before him.

XIV. The Knowledge of Hiſtory contributes very much to that of Morality, and it ſupplies to a Prince, yet very young, the Want of long Experience, by ſetting before his Eyes, as in a Picture, all that has paſſed in preceding Ages which moſt merits Attention, by furniſhing him with abundant matter for Reflection upon all that happened before his Time, and Conjectures about what lies hid in the Womb of Futurity.

XV. But by the Knowledge of Hiſtory, I underſtand

(z) *See Chap.* ix. *which treats of the different Branches of Morality.*

underſtand, not a fruitleſs Reſearch into the Succeſſions of Empires and Emperors. One may burden the Memory with a Multitude of Facts, Battles, and Revolutions, without becoming one bit fitter for reigning. One may likewiſe, for want of Diſcernment, chooſe very pernicious Examples to imitate, fill his Mind with falſe Meaſures, and take bad Guides, by receiving without Precaution the Sentiments of Princes or their Hiſtorians, and by aſſuming an Idea of Greatneſs or Lowneſs to whatever they admire or contemn; though by ſo doing, they often depart from Juſtice and Truth.

XVI. It is above all of Conſequence, that a Prince in his earlier Years do not read Hiſtory without the Aſſiſtance of ſome very judicious Perſon, who may teach him not to overcharge his Memory with an unprofitable Detail of Particulars: Not to enter into intricate and ſuperfluous chronological Queſtions: To ſatisfy himſelf with the more conſiderable and leſs diſputed *Æra*'s in univerſal Hiſtory; to know exactly the Geography of *Europe*, but in a general manner that of the other Parts of the World: Who will carry him ſlightly over things which only appear great to the Imagination, and engage him to give extraordinary Attention to what deſerves to be retained in his Memory, becauſe it includes in it ſome profitable Leſſon, with regard either to what ought to be imitated or avoided, to all that may contribute to enlarge his Underſtanding, and to repleniſh it with noble Sentiments for the right Conduct of his Actions.

XVII. Such a Perſon as I have before deſcrib'd will point out to a Prince the viſible or ſecret Cauſes of Events; what conduces to the Grandeur

of

of Emperors, and their Fall or Decline; what has rendered a People famous at one Time, and what has made them loſe their Reputation and Glory at another: What has promoted or diſappointed certain Deſigns; what occaſioned the Loſs of a Battle, or a Victory: What has diſtinguiſhed one General from another of nearly equal Merit; what has enabled one State to ſupport itſelf in ſpite of many Loſſes; and what made another more potent one ſink under its firſt Diſtreſſes. He will go as far as is poſſible back to the firſt Principles, which are the Source and Foundation of Politics and Prudence; and will attach himſelf to things no farther than they are ſubſervient to make a Prince wiſer, more penetrating, more equitable, fitter for the Affairs of Government, and more capable of conducting them.

XVIII. He will lead him to remark from what ſmall Beginnings, to which ſufficient Attention was not given, great Events have ſometimes taken their Riſe: How a particular War becomes afterwards a general one: How the Ambition of Conqueſts frequently ends in being ſtripp'd of all: How in Battles the whole Event ordinarily depends upon unforeſeen Circumſtances; and how the final Iſſue of Events is almoſt always different from what was expected by human Prudence.

XIX. He will lead him by ſuch Obſervations to reflect, that in the greater Part of Affairs, it is not ſo much the thing which preſents itſelf at firſt Sight, as remote Conſequences that is to be feared; and that when one uſes his utmoſt Efforts to foreſee all, the Mind of Man is too ſhort and limited to comprehend Futurities; that a ſuperior Power over-rules all, and that an inviſible Hand conducts every thing, independent of human Counſels,

ſels, always weak and uncertain, that he who miſſes ſingular Occaſions can never have them again; that one ought to know how to profit by the Moments Providence permits, and that without that Attention nothing will ſucceed. That there is more Wiſdom in preventing Evils from falling upon a State, than in ſeeking Remedies for them; and without compariſon it is much eaſier to maintain Peace than to reſtore it.

XX. But at the ſame time, that a prudent Man of a large and comprehenſive Underſtanding will inſtruct the Prince by Examples in Hiſtory, he ought to acknowledge to him that it is not a ſure Rule; becauſe the ſame things, which have on certain Occaſions been ſucceſsful, have proved uſeleſs if not pernicious at other Times: That the Activity which before had been proſperous has on other Occaſions ruined all. That Delay has reeſtabliſhed the diſordered Affairs of one Prince, and confounded thoſe of another: That one Prince, by ſhewing Severity, has made himſelf feared by the Seditious; and that another has but irritated them: And that the ſame holds with, and to almoſt all the Rules of Politics, becauſe they depend on the Execution, upon the real Situation of Men's Minds, which receive great Changes when God ſo wills.

XXI. In running over Hiſtories with a Prince, he will chiefly dwell upon thoſe Truths in which Kings are almoſt never inſtructed but by Books. (*a*) He will ſhew him in a wiſe Writer the Image of what he ought to be, and what he ought to fly from, and will make him perceive by the Liberty with which Hiſtorians treat Kings after they are

(*a*) Principium munus annalium, ne virtutes ſileantur, atque pravis dictis fatiſque ex poſteritate & infamia metus ſit. *Tacit. L.* 3. *Annal. p.* 99.

are dead, what Juſtice Poſterity will render to him. Flattery with him can only attend Princes to the Grave; then Truth takes its Place, and it is by its Sentence that their Reputation is decided. (*b*) See what is praiſed in a Prince when he is dead: And conſider well what is blamed. Imagine it is of yourſelf the Hiſtorian ſpeaks, and learn from one who does not know you nor fear you, what thoſe who do will perhaps never tell you.

XXII. Nothing is rarer than to find in Hiſtory Princes who are Models of Juſtice and Goodneſs to be copied after. (*c*) The Lives of the greateſt Part of them are one continued Series of Crimes; and if any virtuous Actions are intermingled, they are as it were out of their Place, and quite detached from the reſt of the Piece having no Connexion with the real Principles of their Conduct. Some ſet out very happily. The Truth was laid open before them in their early Years: But Paſſion and Flattery have perverted them, and when it was eaſy to them to have acquired great Glory by purſuing it in an honourable Way, they have by renouncing Merit rendered themſelves contemptible. Their Faults ought to be a Leſſon to you. Study in their Conduct what you ought to avoid: And remember that the Example of a bad Prince is very capable of forming a good one, if it is well known and ſecretly condemned.

XXIII. It is this Knowledge of the different Characters of Princes which is one of the principal Advantages of Hiſtory. One does not then examine

(*b*) Non ergo perpetua principi fama quæ invitum manet, ſed bona concupiſcenda eſt. *Paneg. Traj. p.* 294.

(*c*) Propoſitum eſt mihi principem laudare, non principis facta: nam laudibilia multa etiam mali faciunt. Ipſe laudari, niſi optimus poteſt. *Paneg. Traj. p.* 164.

examine into the Outſide which ſerved to hide them; but into the bottom of their Mind and Diſpoſition. One is not then entirely taken up with their Wars and their Victories which decide nothing at all with reſpect to perſonal Merit; but with themſelves and their inward Sentiments. One ſtudies their Motives, their Intereſts, their Counſels, and is aſtoniſh'd to ſee how little many of them have had in them of what is truly eſtimable, and how their whole Life has been a Circle of Paſſions ſucceeding one another, without having done any thing but run perpetual Changes of Vices and Maladies, inſtead of recovering by Virtue.

XXIV. The Hiſtorians, which a Prince ought to prefer, are thoſe who have wrote with moſt Capacity and Strength of Judgment, who have entered moſt profoundly into the human Heart, and beſt underſtood the Duties of a Prince. (*d*) *Xenophon*, in his Education of *Cyrus*, deſigned to inſtruct all Kings; and his Hiſtory, more probable than exact to the Truth, is one continued Leſſon under the Appearance of a Narrative. There is ſomething in *Livy* of a great Character, and one ought to read with cloſe Attention what he relates of *Scipio* and *Hannibal*. *Tacitus* is full of good Senſe and ſolid Reflections. He unfolds the moſt ſecret Thoughts; and provided one does not always give into his Suſpicions, which are ſomething unjuſt, one learns better of him than any other Maſter to know Princes and Mankind in general. *Saluſt* has likewiſe a great deal of Penetration, and tho' he has left us but two ſhort Hiſtories, is very capable of inſpiring with great Views. *Plutarch* has wrote the Lives of the great Men of

(*d*) Cyrus ille a Xenophonte, non ad hiſtoriæ fidem ſcriptus, ſed ad effigiem juſti Imperii. *Cicer. ad Quint. Fab. L.* 1. *Epiſt.* 1.

of *Greece* and *Rome*, with exquiſite Judgment; and if certain things were excepted, into which he was miſled by the Blindneſs of Paganiſm, one finds in him many very ſagacious Reflections in Politics, and upon the good and bad Conduct of Perſons in public Characters. The Commentaries or Memoirs of *Ceſar*, in their auguſt Simplicity, contain both Precepts and Examples which a General cannot read with too much Care: But without uncommon Attention to him it will be difficult to learn from him either to know Princes or other Men.

XXV. As to modern Hiſtorians, the Prince will prefer thoſe of his own Country where he is to reign: But without neglecting others when they are written with as much Solidity as that of *Philip de Comines*: And he will get ſome Perſon of excellent Taſte to make Extracts from him of what is beſt from thoſe Hiſtories, which he may never read in the Original.

XXVI. To the Study of Hiſtory a Prince ought to join that of Law; not with a view to enter into the immenſe Detail of Laws; but to inſtruct himſelf in the principal Rules of the Science of Laws, and to render himſelf capable of diſtributing Juſtice and of giving his Judgment with profound Intelligence upon important Queſtions. There are ſimple Principles very fruitful with Conſequences, which are the Baſes of public Law, and from which a ſuperior Underſtanding, as that of a Prince ought to be, may draw on Occaſions very proper Concluſions. Theſe Principles are pointed out to him, and he immediately diſcerns their Conſequences.

XXVII. Being eſtabliſhed King to judge, he would be wanting in the moſt eſſential of his Duties,

Duties, if he ſhould refuſe to do it, or if he ſhould undertake it without underſtanding it: But he ought to be an Enemy to all falſe Subtilties, all the perplexing ſophiſtical Arts which embarraſs Juſtice. He ought to make higher Account of a ſound Judgment, which finds its way directly to Truth, than of that vain Science which ſpreads Darkneſs and Doubts over all, and gives every thing a problematical Air. He ought to accuſtom himſelf to cut off all that only ſerves to overload and obſcure things, and to diſcern ſo readily the principal Point in a Queſtion as to neglect every thing elſe as uſeleſs and only ſerving to diſtract the Attention.

ARTICLE III.

It is of Importance to a Prince to be able to ſpeak with Purity of Language, and in a noble Manner.

I. IT would be a great Advantage to a Prince to be eloquent, and to be able to reign over the Minds of Men by his Diſcourſe, as he ought to do by his Wiſdom and Authority. Virtue and Truth would derive from thence a new Luſtre. He would be able to ſupport juſt Sentiments by it. Inſtead of commanding he would perſuade. He would render all he propoſed amiable. He would turn the Hearts whitherſoever he pleaſed, without employing any other Means to do it but the Art of touching them agreeably and charming them. (*e*) He would be liſtened to in his Council with Admiration; and his Diſcourſes being

(*e*) Qui me audiebant expectabant ſententiam, & intenti tacebant ad conſilium meum, Verbis meis addere nihil audebant, & ſuper illos ſtillabat eloquium meum. Expectabant me ſicut pluviam, & os ſuum aperiebant quaſi ad imbrem ſerotinum *Job* xxix. 21, 22, 23.

being full of Wiſdom, Spirit, Light, Force, and Beauty, would be every time he ſpoke heard with freſh Delight.

II. I know Princes can have Aſſiſtance, and ſubſtitute the Eloquence of another Perſon in place of what they want, but it is eaſy to diſcern what is natural from what it borrowed; and on certain Occaſions what a Prince ſpeaks would have much greater Weight if it came from himſelf, and was not known to have been ſuggeſted to him. (*f*) It is taken Notice of in Hiſtory that *Nero* was the firſt of the *Roman* Emperors who pronounc'd Harangues which were not of his own compoſing: That his Predeceſſors had all been themſelves eloquent: That they ſpoke marvellouſly well: That *Auguſtus* did it in the manner worthy of a Prince: That *Tiberius* had ſtudied and did not want Art: That *Caius Caligula*, notwithſtanding his Vices, preſerved ſome degree of Eloquence; and that *Claudius* could ſpeak very well when he had leiſure to think on what he was to ſay: But that *Nero*, though he did not want Fire and Genius, was entirely taken up with Occupations unworthy of a Prince; and had neglected Eloquence, to amuſe himſelf with engraving, painting and Chariot-driving.

III. Tho' I deſire that a Prince may be eloquent, I am far from wiſhing that he may be talkative,

(*f*) Adnotabant ſeniores, primum ex iis qui rerum potiti eſſent Neronem alienæ facundiæ eguiſſe: nam dictator Cæſar ſummis oratoribus æmulus; & Auguſto prompta & profluens, quæ deceret principem, eloquentia fuit. Tiberius quoque artem callebat qua verba expenderet, tum validus ſenſibus aut conſulto ambiguus. Etiam Caij Cæſaris turbata mens vim dicendi non corrupit. Nec in Claudio, quoties meditata diſſereret, elegantiam requireres, Nero, puerilibus ſtatim annis vividum animum in alia detorſit. Cælare, & pingere, cantus aut regimen equorum exercere. *Tacit. L.* 13. *Annal. p.* 213.

talkative, fond of ſpeaking, and nothing but Words. The Eloquence of a Prince (*g*) is a maſculine, nervous Eloquence, fraught with Senſe and Matter, in which there is nothing ſuperfluous, but all the Words go home to Men's Hearts, and pleaſes by perſuading.

IV. Except on Occaſions when it is neceſſary to be diffuſe, the Prince who ſpeaks beſt ought to uſe few Words, and to lay it down for a Rule to ſay nothing that is not, in its Place, uſeful and well digeſted.

V. (*b*) He ought to expreſs himſelf in a noble and correct manner, but ſimply and without Affectation; not to uſe low Expreſſions, nor on the other Extreme to aim at a falſe Elevation of Stile by repeating common and familiar Terms. He ought to avoid Obſcurity, Stiffneſs and Unnaturalneſs, all Equivoques founded on the Ambiguity of Words, all Alluſions to low and vulgar Proverbs, (*i*) all ſhocking, all dark and doubtful Phraſes, and to be very circumſpect, for the Uſe of thoſe who appear innocent. For it is of the laſt Conſequence that every Perſon think himſelf in abſolute Security before the Prince; that none dread his Wit nor his Malice; and that his Example keep his Courtiers within the bounds of Decency and their Duty.

(*g*) Imperatoria brevitas. *Tacit. L.* 1. *p.* 313.

(*b*) Genus eloquendi ſecutus eſt (*ſpeaking of Auguſtus*) elegans & temperatum, præcipuamque curam duxit ſenſum animi quam apertiſſime exprimere.—Marcum Antonium ut inſanum increpat, quaſi ea ſcribentem, quæ mirentur potius homines quam intelligant. *Suet. in vit. Auguſti, C.* 86.

(*i*) Aſperæ facetiæ, ubi multum ex vero traxere, acrem ſui memoriam relinquunt. *Tacit. L.* 15. *Annal. p.* 288.

Fæde ad cachinnos moveris: fœdius moves. *S. Bern L.* 2. *de conſid. C.* 13.

ARTICLE IV.

It is neceſſary that a Prince have a juſt and well formed Taſte of every thing.

I. BUT it is in vain to give a Prince Advice about the Uſe of Eloquence, the Knowledge of Hiſtory, of Morality, and the other Sciences, if he have not a juſt and correct Taſte of every thing, a happy Diſpoſition for acquiring it.

II. What I call Taſte comprehends two things; Intelligence for judging rightly, and Senſibility, in order to be ſeaſonably touched, and to act ſuitably. Without the former, the latter cannot enlighten the Underſtanding; and without the latter, Intelligence is not always the Rule of Action. He muſt both ſee and feel, diſcern what is becoming, and conform to it; be conducted by Knowledge, and led by Impreſſion.

III. As his Light ought to be lively and ſteady, ſo the Impreſſion ought to be prompt and delicate: Prompt to advertiſe him ſeaſonably; delicate to adviſe him of every thing. Theſe two form Taſte; and when they are juſt and accurate, they form an univerſal juſt Taſte.

IV. It may be conſidered with relation to Sciences, to Arts, and to Manners: And it is neceſſary that a Prince have a good Taſte in all theſe reſpects.

V. He ought to be inclined both by Intelligence and by Propenſion to the Sciences becoming him; prefer thoſe which are moſt uſeful to him; eſteem others in proportion; and ſatisfy himſelf with a ſlight Knowledge of Objects which, with regard to him, are mere Matter of Curioſity. But even then, when he is not thoroughly acquainted with them, he ought to know their true Value, of what Utility they are to the Public, what Protection thoſe merit who apply themſelves to them, and what Diſtinction is due to thoſe who excel in them.

VI.

VI. It would be a Fault to want Taſte on theſe Occaſions, and to make too great or ſmall Account of certain Sciences not neceſſary to a Prince indeed, but of which he ought to know the Price, and feel the Merit by an excellent Diſcernment, and by Means of a certain Impreſſion always made upon him by things in proportion to their real Merit and Solidity.

VII. It is a Diſgrace to a Prince always to depend upon another's Taſte in Sciences, in Works of Genius, in Diſcoveries, in fine Things. He muſt have formed his Taſte at firſt upon Principles he borrowed from others, but in purſuing them he ought to add to them his own Reflections, and become capable in his Turn of forming or rectifying the Taſte of others.

VIII. It ought to be the ſame with reſpect to Arts. It becomes him to underſtand every thing, to be able to judge well of every thing, to feel the Perfection or Mediocrity of every thing, and to put himſelf above the Danger of being deceived or miſled into a falſe and low Taſte, inſtead of a great and noble one, which ought to be the Character of all he ſays or does.

IX. But it is of infinite Concernment to obſerve that they are two very different things to underſtand Arts, and to like them: To have a very good Taſte of Architecture, and to be very expenſive in Building: To judge well and skilfully of Painting, and to be exceſſively curious about Pictures. An able Prince and a wiſe one are not two Oppoſites. He judges well of an Art, but he can be without it; and it is becauſe he judges rightly of it that he can be ſo, and that he prefers others to it which are of public Utility, tho' leſs eſteem'd: For the public Advantage is his Rule; and tho' he be pleaſed with every thing that is perfect in its kind, he principally purſues the uſeful, and gives but the ſecond Place to the agreeable. X.

X. (*k*) But in what he excels and hath a truly marvelous good Taſte is Manners. He underſtands and he feels all that becomes his Rank; how he ought to ſpeak and how he ought to act: To what degree he ought to apply himſelf to Affairs; what Portion of Time he ought to reſerve to himſelf, and how he ought to mix Sweetneſs with Majeſty: What Share he ought to yield of his Authority, and what he ought to return: What he ought to attend to, and ſound to the Bottom, and what he ſhould deſpiſe: What he ſhould immediately amend, and what he may overlook: To what Studies he ought to attach himſelf, and from what he ought to abſtain, tho' he have a Propenſion towards them: And what he ought to ſatisfy himſelf with a tranſient View of, tho' he ſhould like them.

XI. His Taſte of Manners is not only juſt and true, but great and noble. He never makes a Show of what he knows; never does he appear taken up with himſelf or his Merit; never does he hunt for Praiſe; and he himſelf is always ſuperior to what is eſtimable.

XII. He does not pretend to any particular ſort of Glory. He would even reckon himſelf diſhonoured if he was more conſidered on any particular Account than another. He will not be characteriſed either from his Knowledge, his Wit, his Eloquence, or any other Quality. He deſires no other Reputation but that which belongs to a Prince full of Generoſity, Goodneſs and Juſtice, and he does even retain the Deſire of it to excite him to merit it.

(*k*) Retinuit, quod eſt difficillimum ex ſapientia modum. *Tacit. in vit. Agricol. p.* 453.

The END *of the* FIRST PART.

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